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AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN
Dustin John Byrd, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2006
This thesis examines the events leading up to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in
Iran and the role of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in bringing about that revolution. It
attempts to demonstrate the social, psychological, political, and religious factors that
led to the rise of Khomeini as the leader of the revolution. It furthermore focuses on
Khomeini's strategy to oppose, destabilize, and eventually overthrow the Shah of Iran
through various means. This thesis is limited to the study of Khomeini as a
revolutionary figure, not as a head of state, and therefore I do not examine Khomeini
after the overthrow of the Shah.
This thesis revisits the later half of 20th century Iran, beginning with
Khomeini's political awakening in 1941, and ending with his triumph as the supreme
authority in Iran. The social and political context of Iran is essential in understanding
the success of Khomeini. A key component to Khomeini's rise to power is his
"Prophetic Charisma." Based on the works of Max Weber and Erich Fromm as well
as the Islamic tradition, I develop this category and demonstrate how it applies to
Khomeini. "Charismic Authority," from which Khomeini drew legitimacy, is also
thoroughly examined because of the major role it played in deposing the Shah. The
research sheds new light into a period of Middle Eastern history that still has an
impact ruler.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the West, the image ofAyatollah Khomeini denouncing America as the
"Great Satan" conjures up visions ofterrorist attacks, irrational religious mobs
burning the U.S. flag, blind-folded hostages being led from a battle scared
embassy, and an oppressive government which has stripped away the human rights
ofwomen and minorities. But before these images were permanently burned into
the minds ofmany Americans and Westerners, Khomeini had been resisting foreign
cultural and political influence in Iran for decades. Before he was effectively the
head ofstate ofthe Islamic Republic ofIran, he was a religious revolutionary who
led a popular revolt against a very unpopular monarch. Although Khomeini was
not loved by the West, who often portrayed him as a reactionary religious zealot,
he had mass support by Iranians ofevery sort. Leading a "coalition ofdissent"
made ofleftist intellectuals, communists, socialist, modernist Muslims, clerics, and
commoners, he was able to overcome a well-entrenched and foreign supported
dictator, i.e. Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the "Shah oflran." This successful
revolution ushered in a new era in geo-politics, one that would see the rise of
Islamic militancy, a renewal ofIslam as a guiding political and religious
philosophy, and new tensions between the Western secular world and the religious
world oflslam - which some even claim to be a new ''world war." 1
However, the goal ofthis work is to examine the personal role ofKhomeini

See Bacevich, Andrew J. The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by
War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
1

in the Islamic Revolution oflran, not the Islamic Republic oflran. I shall be
analyzing Ayatollah Khomeini as a revolutionary, not as a statesman. Therefore
my inquiry will be limited to Khomeini's political life prior to the successful
overthrow of the Shah in January of 1979.
First, I shall review the political life of Khomeini, beginning in the 1940's
when he first became interested in political issue, through 1960's when he first
began to publicly oppose the Shah and subsequently was exiled to Turkey, Iraq,
and France, and finally his return as the "supreme leader" oflran. Secondly, in
examining how Khomeini so successfully led the nation in a revolution, I shall
provide a ''theory of prophetic charisma," primarily based on the works of the
sociologist Max Weber, and or the critical theory of society developed by the
social-psychologist Erich Fromm. Next, I shall demonstrate how the theory of
"prophetic charisma" is applicable to Khomeini, and how such charisma is partially
responsible for his success. Then, I shall analyze the very important issue of
"charismatic" and "prophetic" authority, and how and where Khomeini came to
"possess" both. Lastly, I shall discuss the very important "coalition of dissent"
that Khomeini led during the revolution - more specifically how Khomeini was
influenced by Marxist-Leninist philosophy through political parties, guerilla
groups, and philosophers, how militant Shi'a Islam was radicalized by such
philosophy, and how Khomeini acted as a conduit for Marxist-Leninist philosophy
to spread from the urban educated middle-class to the religiously inclined under
classes.
2

In putting forward the theory of"prophetic charisma" and the examining of
the connection between Khomeini and the Marxist-Leninist philosophy, I want to
shed light on how Khomeini was able to succeed in leading the revolution against
the Shah and his foreign benefactors. Through my research I have found that
Khomeini's success as a revolutionary is based on two central themes. I will argue
that the first essential component was his ability to attract followers through his
"prophetic charisma." The second concerns the convergence of established Shi'a
models of resistance, and the proliferation of radical Western ideology throughout
Iran. This convergence, led by Khomeini, was the key to the success of the
revolution.
I hope this work will provide some basis for understanding past revolutions
and potential revolutions in the Islamic context.

3

CHAPTER II

In order to fully understand the charismatic nature of Ayatollah Khomeini's
leadership in the Iranian Revolution, it is imperative to be familiar with a basic
historical timeline which led up to the revolution in 1978 - 1979. Although he rose
to international notoriety in 1979 with the success of the revolution, he was known
in Iran in many circles for years prior to this date. I shall give a brief overview of
his political career, from when he first began to involve himself in the national
politics of Iran to the successful removal of the Shah from his seat of power. I
shall not focus on the Islamic Republic oflran post-revolution because that goes
beyond the scope of my inquiry. Throughout this paper I am dealing with Imam
Khomeini as a revolutionary figure, not Imam Khomeini as a head of state.

4

IMAM KHOMEINI'S POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
1941 - 1960: Political Awakening: Reform the Shah in order to Resist the
Shah
The genesis of Khomeini's political activity began in 1941 after the forced
abdication ofRiza Shah. In his place was a secular Iranian Nationalist government
that, much like the previous government, didn't hold clerics in high regard. Prior
to this period, Khomeini had spent much of his time teaching at the Fayziya
madrasa in the holy city of Qum on various facets of the Islamic sciences (' Ulum
al-Din). There he attracted large crowds of students and fellow clerics who where
drawn to his charismatic teachings, especially concerning current socio-political
events. However, he was still a student of Ayatollah Burujirdi, who did not
approve of clerics actively engaging themselves in politics. For Burujirdi, it was
sufficient for the 'ularna (scholars) to comment on and criticize government
policies and government officials, but they were not to become part of the
governing apparatus. 1 Because ofK.homeini's dedication to Burujirdi, he obeyed
his demand to stay out of politics. Yet, as the popularity of Khomeini's anti
government speeches grew among many disaffected students and politically
alienated clerics, he was viewed as a potential problem for the Pahlavi regime.

1

This position is not peculiar to Ayatollah Burujirdi, but belongs to the Quietist School ofShi'a
political thought.
5

Although he did not advocate open revolt, he was consequently removed from his
position at the Fayziya Madrasa and forced to teach at the Mulla Sadiq madrasa,
which was unable to accommodate the large crowds that gathered to hear
his speeches. 2 However, after Riza Shah was deposed in 1941, Khomeini returned
to his students and his teaching position at the Fayziya madrasa. 3
In a response to anti-religious literature that had been flourishing under
Riza Shah and the new nationalist government, Khomeini joined the political
religious debate in 1943 by writing the book Kashf al-Asrar (Secrets Unveiled) at
the behest of Ayatollah Burujiridi, in an attempt to refute the allegations against
religion and the clerics. 4 Although this work represents Khomeini's first
substantial political declaration, he does not openly advocate an Islamic state or
the overthrow of the current regime. He uses this opportunity to criticize the
secular government, especially the monarchy, for not living up to the standard of
government set out by "God's law." He says, "we do not say that government
must be in the hands ofthefaqih (Jurist); rather we say that government must be
run in accordance with God's law, for the welfare of the

Hamid Algar, Brief Biography oflmam Khomeini www.wandea.org.pl/ayatullah
wahhabism.html Retrieved 4/7/2004, Section
3.5 The Fayziya madrasa is a theological law school founded in 1533 and named after its most
famous scholar, Mahsin Feyz Kashani. Khomeini would expand the original building complex
ofthe Fayziya after the revolution. Heinz Halm Shi'a Islam: From Religion to Revolution
(Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1999) 128 - 129.
3
Ibid.
4
Hamid Algar, trans. and annotated, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations oflmam
Khomeini (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981) 169.
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country... "5 Furthermore, he also criticizes the Shah's admiration for the Third
Reich and their doctrine of Aryan superiority. He says, "This Hitlerite mentality
you idiotically praise from afar, which says, 'I will occupy Poland by tank and
bayonet, even though a hundred thousand families may perish,' is one of the most
,
poisonous and heinous products of the human mind.' 6 Clearly, Khomeini
disagreed with the "aristocratic law of nature" which was an integral part of
Hitler's racial theory and was deployed in order to legitimate Nazi aggression and
dominance in Europe. Khomeini also used Kashf al-Asrar to attack those reform
minded clerics who openly supported the monarchy, such as Shariat Sangalaji. 7 In
fact, many believe that Khomeini was responding to a pamphlet called Asrar-i

Hezar Saleh (Secrets of a Thousand Years) written by Hakamizadeh, the editor of
the reform journal Homayun. Khomeini called the writer a "mindless twisted
person" who is spreading "poisonous" ideas about the clergy. 8 He believed, unlike
the reform clerics, that Islam wasn't in need of a reformation but that the
government under the monarchy needed to be reformed by the clerics. He accused
the monarchy of destroying public morality in Iran, insulting Islam, and leading the
country into cultural chaos with its pro-western orientation. What he proposed

5

Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid., p. 170.
7
Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press, 1993) 9.
8
Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999) 61 - 62.
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was an assembly of senior mujtahidun (lit. ''those who strive") that would choose a
'just monarch" who would not violate the tenets oflslam, private property, lives
and honor, and would furthermore rule for the benefit of the people, not the ruling
class or western powers.9 Furthermore, the legitimacy of such a monarchy is
predicated on the notion that a truly just and legitimate ruler can only become
reality with the return of the twelfth Imam. Therefore, this monarchy is only a
temporary system which will end with the coming of the now hidden but long
awaited Imam, Muhammad Mahdi. 10
By 1946, Khomeini began teaching kharij level classes which had upward
to five hundred students.11 According to Hamid Algar, who interviewed many of
Khomeini's students at this time, kharij classes were "distinguished from other
classes taught in Qum on the same subject by the critical spirit the Imam instilled in
his students, as well as his ability to connectfiqh (jurisprudence) with all the other
dimension oflslam - ethical, mystic, philosophical, political, and social."12 It is
clear that Khomeini had the ability to present his followers with a comprehensive
worldview in which they could relate their daily lives, history, world events, and
national politics to their understanding of the Shi'a Islamic tradition. This ability
would have a great impact on Khomeini's leadership of the revolution because it

Algar, Brief Biography Section 3.13
Ibid., 3. 13.
11
[bid., 3.15. "Kharij" is a title for the most advanced clerics in the religious hierarchy.
12
Ibid., 3.15.

9
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allowed him to draw together various political and religious factions throughout
Iran in a common effort ofremoving the Shah from power. Ifhe would not have
had such an ability, he would not have been able to muster the kind ofbroad
support it took to depose the Shah. Furthermore, these years ofintensive teaching
served to produce a large base ofsupport among younger clerics who would,
although not monolithically, support his actions against the monarchy because they
themselves had been exposed and educated in Imam Khomeini's critical thought.
Even though 1953 saw the restoration ofthe Pahlavi monarchy by a CIA
supported coup, the 1950's remained a relatively peaceful period between the state
and clergy. 13 In fact, many clerics secretly applauded the return ofthe Shah
because offears that the secular-socialist regime ofDr. Mossadeq represented a
turn toward the Soviet Russia and its atheism. For them, a quasi-religious ruler,
though unjust, was better than an atheism that attacked the very existence ofa
divine being. The Shah could be tolerated as long as he respected the role of
religion and religious beliefin national and personal life. Despite the lull in tension,
in 1955 the Shah established Sazman-i Amniyat Va Ittilaat-i Keshvar
(Organization ofNational Security and Intelligence), better known as SAVAK.
This paramilitary police force, who's responsible for collecting intelligence and

Moin, p. 69. The CIA, under President Eisenhower, was worried about the growing influence
of Communism in Iran. Fearing that Mossadeq would be overthrown and a communist dictator
would take his place, Eisenhower authorized a coup d'etat against the regime in order to place
the pro-American, anti-communist Shah in power. See Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men:
An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken NJ, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2003.
13
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suppression of opposition, was directed by the prime minister's office, and would
come to be a powerful tool against all forms of political opposition against the
regime. 14

1961 - 1964: Political Activism: Contra Dictatura Coronada

After the apolitical quietist Ayatollah Burujirdi's death in 1961, Khomeini
vigorously reentered politics when the monarchy adopted its "White Revolution"
in 1962 - 63. This so-called "revolution" was viewed by many clerics as a serious
threat to traditional Shi'a culture due to its proposed land reforms and voting
rights for women. 15 Khomeini immediately denounced such actions as an attempt
to destroy Islam. First, the land reforms did not exempt religious endowments
(waqf) from being seized and redistributed. Secondly, the enfranchisement of

women threatened the traditional structure of the Islamic family by giving the
woman political autonomy thus undermining her husband as the ultimate family
authority. 16 And thirdly, these land reforms were not in the best interest of average
Iranians, but were designed to benefit the Pahlavi family, foreign companies,

14

Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) 41
Ayatollah Burujirdi was Khomeini's teacher whom he swore obedience to. Burujirdi believed
that the clergy should have a voice in the national discourse but should formally stay out of
politics and national government. However, after his death, Khomeini was released from this
vow and pursued what he though was the correct path of clerical engagement in politics.
16
Though Khomeini criticized the Shah for this reform, women would later gain the right to vote
in the Islamic Republic. Abrahamian, Khomeinism pp. 33 - 34.
15
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especially American agribusiness. 17 According to Hamid Algar, a distinguished
scholar on Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution, foreign agribusiness cultivated
crops completely alien to the traditional Iranian diet, and ultimately destined for
foreign markets. When the best Iranian land is used for export crops, Khomeini
would argue, it is not used to feed the native people. Furthermore, native products
such as Iranian butter were becoming scarce and the people were forced to buy
foreign-made products, which made Iran more dependent on Western countries for
basic survival. 18 The little bit ofland that was distributed to the peasants was often
not cultivatable and was not free. They had to make payments on the land to
banks owned by the Pahlavi family and most ofthe best land was simply seized by
the royal family and leased to the multi-national corporation in order to grow
asparagus and other unfamiliar crops. 19
These types of"land reforms" were also criticized by leftist-leaning
intellectuals and communists oflran as proofofcapitalism's perpetual need for
natural resources and markets. They would point to the hypocritical nature ofthe
''white revolution": that in the name ofsocial and economic progress for the
masses, only the few would really benefit, ultimately leaving more Iranians
impoverished than before and a society on the verge ofcultural collapse.
Khomeini, forever the student and strategist, would frequently study these leftist

Eliz Sanasarian, "Ayatollah Khomeini and the Institutionalization of Charismatic Rule in
Iran, 1979 - 1989," Journal of Developing Societies 11 (1995): 190.
18
Hamid Algar Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications
International, 2001) 55.
19
Ibid., p. 56.
17

II

argument and would later employ this kind oflanguage to denounce such reforms
made by the Shah.
Khomeini also believed that the Shah's sudden concern for Iranian women
was principally based on his desire to be seen in the west as "enlightened" and
"progressive." By championing ''women's rights" he would secure his place as a
benevolent and compassionate ruler. Unfortunately for the Shah, according to
Hamid Algar, more Iranian women found their liberation not in the Shah's reforms,
but in their opposition to them.20 Khomeini would actively encourage women to
resist such westernization by retaining their traditional Islamic identity through
wearing chador, preserving the traditional roles in the Muslim family, and rejecting
the western notion ofa modem i.e. western "liberated woman." Although the
pressure to westernize was vast, it was mostly the elites and their children who
adopted western ways of life, while the sons an daughters ofthe working class and
poor maintained their traditional culture.
Although Khomeini's willingness to engage in open conflict with the
regime which appealed to many in the general public, he had difficulty mustering
support from among his closest clerics. According to the Khomeini biographer
Baqer Moin, Khomeini confided to one ofhis students that:
These gentlemen are not ready for a struggle, I'm afraid. Shari'atmadari
says: "Ifwe go too far they will put a policeman on our doorstep." What
can I do with this gentlemen who says ifthey put policemen at our doors
we will be dishonoured, we will be insulted? I tell them that the path of
prison, torture and martyrdom is the right path. But he says we will be
20

Ibid., p. 56.
12

insulted. 21
He further added:
lfl protest against their political stance, they say: "I am a mojtahed and I
know my religious duties." I cannot tell someone who says: "This is
my religious duty" that they are wrong. I know that they are not the men
for the battlefield. 22
Khomeini's willingness to take action while the rest of the clerics worried about
their well-being and honor would prove to be a decisive reason for his rise to
prominence in the revolution against the Shah. The Iranian masses were used to
clerics vocally protesting against what they saw as corruption and immorality, but
they were not accustomed to seeing senior clerics act on their conviction especially not engaging in open revolt.
Despite Khomeini's lack of support from his peers, his unrelenting attacks
on the Shah and the widespread discontent felt among the masses due to the land
reforms, anti-government protests and revolts spread throughout the country. In
June 1963, the Muharrum religious processions commemorating the martyrdom of
Hussein broke into violent protest. During 'Ashura, the tenth day of Muharrum
(June 3), Khomeini gave a fiery speech at the Fayziya madrasa comparing the Shah
oflran to the Ummayyad caliph Yazid, the murderer of Hussein and the Son of

21

Moin, p. 83. Even though conservative clerics, like Grand Ayatollah Hakim and Ayatollah
Kho'i, where willing to criticize the Shah, they were not willing to call for an open rebellion
against him. Moin, p. 76.
22
Ibid., p. 83.
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Mu'awiyah, the murderer of'Ali ibn Abu Talib. 23 To give such an inflammatory
speech at the height ofthe emotional festival of'Ashura was to fan the fire of
revolt against an unpopular and oppressive ruler. He further warned the Shah
about not learning the lessons ofhis father, Riza Shah, who, as he became more
oppressive, was eventually deposed by the Iraninan people. 24 In his speech,
Khomeini was able to blur the lines between the murderer Yazid and the new
murderer Muhammad Reza Pahlavi in a future-oriented remembrance ofpast
injustice in an attempt to remedy the injustice oftoday. The memory ofpast
injustice became fuel for those seeking to end the tyranny ofthe new Yazid Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. The Shah, like Yazid, was an illegitimate ruler given
power over the lives ofMuslims as a test from the divine. Khomeini put to good
use the Shi'a's zeal for martyrdom. The death ofHussein, at the hands oftyrants,
was something to be emulated, not feared. 25 Toward the end ofhis speech,
Khomeini makes a rather prophetic statement,
"You don't know whether the situation will change one day nor whether
those who surround you will remain your friends. They are the friends of

Algar, Brief Biography 4.6 Soon after the death of the Prophet, the Ummayad ruler
Mu'awiyah and his opponent 'Ali were engaged in a struggle for authority over the young
Muslim community. Although 'Ali did battle with the Ummayad powers at Siffin, he was
eventually killed in 661CE by Ibn Muljam, a Khawarij assassin. After Hasan, the eldest son of
'Ali, succumbed to pressure and abdicated his claim to authority, for the Shi'a that authority
passed to Hussein. By 680, the deceased Mu'awiyah's son Yazid had claimed the throne of
Umayyad power that began another cycle of animosity towards to sons of 'Ali. Hussein and his
family, traveling through Southern Iraq, were brutally assassinated at Karabala, a small Arab
garrison town. This is remembered and reenacted through passion plays and ritual flogging by
the Shi'a on the tenth day ofMuharrum ('Ashura) The significance of Hussein in Khomeini's
leadership will be examined later.
24
Algar, Religion pp. 177 - 180.
25
Moin., p. 101.
23
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the dollar. They have no religion, no loyalty. They have hung all the
responsibility around your neck. 0 miserable man. "26
For the later followers of Khomeini, this June uprising, or Qiyam-i Khordad,
marks the beginning of their movement against the Shah. On June 4, just one day
after Khomeini's speech, approxametly 100,000 protesters took to the streets in an
anti-Shah march - shouting "Death to the dictator, death to the dictator, God save
you, Khomeini, Death to your bloodthirsty enemy!"27 Clearly, Khomeini was
quickly becoming the mouthpiece for dissent in the country. In order to silence
such a powerful and vocal dissent, and furthermore not to repeat the mistakes of
his father, who didn't attack his opposition early, the Shah had Khomeini and many
of his closest companions arrested on June 5, 1963. 28
Khomeini's arrest sparked protests and demonstrations throughout Iran.
Although there were some demonstrators chanting pro-Mosadeq themes, "Death
or Khomeini" was the popular slogan of the majority of protesters.29 It is clear
that the Shah's government was not prepared for such an uprising; it quickly
moved to declare martial law in order to repress the demonstrations that were
rapidly turning violent. Despite these measures, it took six days to fully restore
order and upward to 15,000 people were killed. 30 Khomeini spent nineteen days in

26

Ibid., p. 104.
Ibid., p. I 06.
28
Sanasarian., p. 191.
29
Moin, p. 111.
30
Algar, Roots of Revolution p. 58.

27
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prison and another nine months under house arrest in an attempt to intimidate him
into moderating his revolutionary views. However, just three days after his release
on April 7, 1964, Khomeini dispelled the rumors that he had made a compromise
with the Shah by denouncing the monarchy and its "white revolution" and
furthermore vowed that the uprising of 15 K.hordad would continue. 31 At no point
in his imprisonment or his house arrest did he negate or temper his position against
the Shah. Khomeini proved to be as uncompromising as he was charismatic. He
and his followers always knew that rebelling against the Shah and his U.S.-supplied
paramilitary apparatus could ultimately end in their deaths and the death of many
others. However, Khomeini made it very clear, with the precedent of' Ali and
Hussein in his shadow, that death was a welcomed event when it came from
fighting injustice. Martyrdom was a gift for Allah and should be embraced as such.
Neither imprisonment, exile, or death intimidated him.
Yet, while he was clearly becoming the figurehead of the resistance
movement, attracting not only religious followers, but young secular activists as
well, he did not have the full backing of the clerical class. Many Ayatollahs,
including Shari'atmadari and Golpayegani, both very important and influential
scholars, saw Khomeini's activism as violating the clerics' traditional political
quietism, as well as threatening their status-quo in Iran. 32 They had a lot to lose by
actively backing this resistance. Khomeini countered their timidity by courting

31

32

Algar, Brief Biography 4.9
Moin, p. 121.
16

secular dissidents, including nationalists, liberals, and Marxists. 33 Although he
would disagree with them on many issues, they could work together with a
common cause of liberating Iran from the Shah and his foreign benefactors.
Solidarity among the anti-shah opponents and the unity of cause overrode the
doctrinal and political differences of the various groups. However, although the
majority of clerics agreed with Khomeini's critiques of the Shah and his repressive
regime, they were unwilling to translate that critique into concrete action. The
Iranian people expected this of the clerics: this was their modus operandi, words
but no action. This disconnect of the theory-praxis dialectic among the clerics
would serve to bolster Khomeini's profile as the religious leader who was willing
to challenge the Shah against all odds. 34
In the autumn of 1964, the Shah was able to force through parliament
(maj/is) a bill that effectively gave immunity from prosecution under Iranian law to
all American forces within Iran. 35 Immediately after this bill was passed, the majlis
approved a $200 million dollar loan for the procurement of American-made
military equipment. 36 With the weapons came a flood of American military
personnel and their families, further augmenting the already sizeable American
presence in Iran. These personnel were often called ''white-collar mercenaries"
due to their ties with the oppressive internal paramilitary group SAV AK - the
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domestic strong arm of the Shah. 37 For Khomeini, this act by a despotic regime
and the collaborating majlis was the last insult to sovereignty Iran could take. In
one of his most fiery speeches, he denounced the Shah and his co-opted majlis as
traitors, saying that ''they have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than
that of an American dog."38 Furthermore, he said ''the government has sold our
independence, reduced us to the level of a colony, and made the Muslim nation of
Iran appear more backward than savages in the eyes of the world!"39 Khomeini
goes on to express his belief that the Shi'a religious leaders oflran would not have
allowed such a capitulation of sovereignty to a foreign power and the resulting
cultural chaos to occur if they had influence. He said,
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit this nation to be
the slaves of Britain one day, and America the next.
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit Israel to
takeover the Iranian economy; they will not permit Israeli good to be sold
in Iran - in fact, to be sold duty-free.
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit the
government to impose arbitrarily such a heavy loan on the Iranian nation.
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit such misuse to
be made of the public treasury.
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit the Majlis to
come to a miserable state like this; they will not permit the Majlis to be
formed at bayonet-point, with the scandalous results that we see.
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit girls and boys to
wrestle together, as recently happened in Shiraz.
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit people's
innocent daughters to be under young men at school; they will not permit
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women to teach at boys' schools and men to teach at girls' schools, with all
the resulting corruption.
If the religious leaders have influence, they will strike this government in
the mouth, they will strike this Majlis in the mouth and chase these deputies
out of both its houses.
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit a handful of
individuals to be imposed on the nation as deputies and participate in
determining the destiny of the country.
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit some agent of
America to carry out these scandalous deeds; they will throw him out of
Iran.
So the influence of the religious leaders is harmful to the nation?
No, it is harmful to you, harmful to you traitors, not to the nation!
You know that as long as the religious leaders have influence, you cannot
do everything you want to do, commit all the crimes you want, so you wish
to destroy their influence.
You thought you could cause dissension among the religious leaders with
your intrigues, but you will be dead before your dream can come true.
You will never be able to do it. The religious leaders are united.40
For fear of a massive uncontrollable popular uprising, the option to assassinate
Khomeini was ruled out. Likewise, in fear of such an uprising, Khomeini could not
be jailed in Iran. On November 4, 1964, he was arrested by the Iranian military,
and taken directly to the Mehrabad airport in Tehran, and was deported to Turkey
in hopes that his physical removal from Iran would lessen his public persona and
influence. 41 Furthermore, Turkey, a secular republic with sympathy for the Shah's
''white revolution" agreed to keep watch over Khomeini by restricting his access to
the outside world.
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1964 -1979: Exile and The Return of the Imam

While in Turkey, Khomeini felt the sting of the secularism he hated. For
example, he was forbidden to wear his clerical garb, including his turban which
identified him as a Shi'a cleric. This by itself was the biggest insult to his Shi'a
identity, because his clerical garb signified his deep ties to the Shi'a tradition of
scholasticism and righteous suffering. Although the secular ethos of the family he
stayed with while in Ankara clashed with his religious sensibilities, he soon grew to
like this family and likewise they enjoyed his presence - so much so that it alarmed
the SAVAK detail that was perpetually looming over the residence.42 However,
on November 12, he was moved to Bursa where he stayed another eleven months.
While in Bursa, Khomeini worked on Tahrir al-Wasila, his two-volume
compendium of jurisprudence, taking up issues which were relatively new to the
Iranian clerical establishment and other issues that had been long abandoned by the
clerics. His new developments infiqh (jurisprudence) were probably due to his
encounter with secularism in Turkey.43
Growing more suspicious of Khomeini's popularity in Turkey, and in an
attempt to deal with domestic pressure by Khomeini's supporters in Iran and
international human rights agencies, the Shah agreed to have Khomeini transferred
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to the holy Shi'a city ofNajafin Iraq. Here, the Shah hoped that Khomeini's
prestige and influence would be eclipsed by more influential and moderate Iraqi
clerics.
Indeed, Khomeini found a chilly reception in Iraq among the Grand
Ayatollahs, who not only saw him as a rival, but also rejected his politicization of
Islam. Because ofthis, Khomeini refrained from engaging in political discourses
and forbade his followers from distributing any form ofliterature dealing with
political issues. 44 Although the Shah hoped Khomeini would spend his energy in
debates with the 'Ulama oflraq, and would therefore spend less time agitating the
Iranian regime, Khomeini did not fall into this trap. Although he did tactfully
engage the 'Ulama in robust dialogue, discourse, and debate, he managed not to
avoid being alienated from his fellow Shi'a clerics. 45
However, in a vigorous debate with the most senior Grand Ayatollah
Mohsen Hakim, Khomeini told him that "I have the feeling that you are not being
informed ofthe atrocities ofthe Iranian regime. Otherwise, you would not have
,
remained silent.' 46 From this statement, Khomeini argued the case ofmilitant
Islam ofImam Hussein- an Islam that actively engages itselfinto history. In
contrast, Ayatollah Hakim argued for the Islamic pragmatism oflmam Hassan,
who rejected armed struggle against the usurper Mu'awiyah. 47 Though the debate
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was fruitful, with both parties understanding the position of the other in clearer
terms, both agreed that they would have to disagree on the role of the clergy in
political affairs. It was clear among Khomeini's followers that, while other
ayatollahs complained, he denounced. While other compromised, he resisted. 48
Once he became settled in Najaf, Khomeini dedicated his time to teaching
at the Shaykh Murtaza Ansari madrasa, leaving behind any engagement in Iraqi
national politics and the internal politics ofNaja£49 Khomeini spent a total of
thirteen years in Najaf doing what clerics normally do: teaching, writing, lecturing,
etc. As in Iran, his classes were very popular among young religious students and
advanced clerics who were attracted to his interdisciplinary style of scholarship and
his critical modus operandi. When it was proposed to him that students from Qum
should migrate to Najaf in order to study under his direction, he patently advised
against it because it could weaken Qum as a theological center ofShi'a Islam. 50
Some of his most important works were written in the relative calm ofNajaf,
including Menasek Haj (Pilgrimage rituals), and Kitab-i Bey (Book ofTrade). 51
Consequently, during the thirteen years Khomeini resided in Iraq, he only issued
fourteen political pronouncements. 52
Despite his disengagement in active politics, he gave a series of lectures in
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1970 that were later published under the title, Velayat -i Faqih: Hokumat-i Islami
(Rule ofthe Jurist: Islamic Government) which was to become the basis ofthe
Islamic Republic after the 1979 revolution. Spoken in Persian, translated into
Arabic, these lectures were possibly aimed at Ayatollah Abul-Qasem Khoi, Iraq's
leading mujtahid (senior jurist, lit. "one who strives") and his advocating of
political quietism. 53 Although not widely read before the revolution in Iran, it
became the most important work ofKhomeini for his supporters. In it, he
denounces the apolitical Islam ofthe Shi'a clergy and the whole institution of
monarchy as being an illegitimate system of government. 54 Furthermore, he
postulates that it is the correct role ofthe clergy to rule in the place ofthe twelfth
Imam until he returns, and cites relevant ayahs ofthe Qur'an and prophetic
traditions to support his thesis. While emphasizing the Ulama's responsibility as
religious leaders and encouraging them to abandon their petty concerns, he says:
"Is it the duty ofall ofus to overthrow the taughut, the illegitimate political
powers that now rule the entire Islamic world. "55 His lectures and letters to
Iranian leaders were smuggled into Iran by his supporters who came to visit him in
Najaf, as well as ordinary Iranian Shi'a on pilgrimages to the Imam 'Ali masjid
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(mosque) and tomb. 56 Many of these lectures and speeches were distributed by
cassette tape: Khomeini was recorded and the tape was duplicated by being played
at one end of a phone line and recorded at the other. For Hamid Algar, much as
the symbol of the Constitutional Revolution earlier in the Twentieth Century was
the telegram, ''the revolution was a revolution of which the technical symbol was
the cassette tape..."57

As the

revolution progressed, the cassette tape would play

an increasingly important role in disseminating .Khomeini's words and his calls to
action. It was cheap, effective, and, with the help of the Shah's modern
communication systems, easily sent from one side of the country to the other via
the telephone lines.
From afar in Iraq, Khomeini continued to criticize and condemn the actions
of the Shah and his attempts to ''westernize" Iran, including issuing fatwas
(religious legal rulings) against any financial dealing with Israel after the June 1967
Six Day War. This provocation prompted the Shah to ransack Khomeini's house in
Qum and arrest his second son Hajj Sayyid Ahmed Khomeini. 58 Furthermore,
many of.Khomeini's unpublished books and writings were destroyed during this
destructive rampage through his house. It was becoming clear to the Shah that
Khomeini's presence in Iraq was not silencing him or diminishing his influence;
therefore he should be moved to India, where communication with Iran would be
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much more difficult.59 This plan, however, never materialized.
One cannot understand the success of the revolution without understanding
the apparatus that resisted the revolution. The Shah was not only a powerful
monarch, he was a heavily armed ruler thanks to the American military support.
According to Michael T. Klare, the director of the Five College Program in Peace
and World Security Studies at Hampshire College,
Between 1970 and 1978, the Shah of Iran ordered $20Billion worth of
arms, ammunition, and other military merchandise from the United States
in what one member of Congress called "the most rapid buildup of military
power under peacetime conditions of any nation in the history of the
world.60
This massive militarization of Iran was not only a way of pleasing the "imperial"
ego of the Shah and solidifying his rule; the West, especially America, engaged in
this massive project in order to strengthen its zone of influence in the Middle East,
protecting what was seen to be Western "rights" to Middle Eastern oil, and
especially to block the influence of the U.S.S.R.
The American administration was operating under the "heartland" theory.
Developed by a Nazi professor and his son during WWII, this theory states that
the power that controls the Tigris and Euphrates river valley , i.e. Iraq, Iran, and
South East Asia, has a strategic advantage over Russia, Eastern Europe, and the
Near East itself Fearing Marxist-Leninist influence in Iran, in 1967 the Nixon
administration, under Henry Kissinger, then head of the National Security Council,
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drafted the "surrogate policy" for Iran and the broader Middle East. This plan,
which crune in response to the British pulling out oflran as the guardian of
western oil interest, was to bolster the Shah's military power in return for his
safeguarding the "interests" of the West in the Middle East.
According to Klare, the Shah's military buildup was partly responsible for
his ultimate downfall. Klare bases his analysis on five principle features; 1)
Volume: since the early 1970's, imperial Iran was the largest purchaser of

American made military equipment. 25% of all military arms between 1970 to
1978 were sold to the Shah.61 2) Sophistication: beginning with the Nixon
administration, the Shah was allowed to purchase the most advanced military
equipment in the U.S. arsenal, despite the fact that many in the Pentagon and
Military objected to this deal. Much of this went to the Iranian air force, the pride
of the Shah- himself being a pilot.62 3) Technology Transfer: Iran not only
acquired the most advanced weaponry, but also acquired the technological ability
to domestically produce it. 4) Military technical assistance: because of the
massive importation of weaponry and the inability of the Shah to train Iranians on
this equipment, thousands of American tech workers were hired for the job - thus
alienating local Iranians by giving foreigners the high-paying jobs and by the
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"western" behavior patterns that were offensive to the Muslim sensibilities. 63 5)

Repressive exports: coupled with the conventional military armaments going to
Iran were the paramilitary weapons used by SAVAK, the Shah's repressive secret
police and domestic security force. 64
Although President Jimmy Carter prided himselfon his human rights
record, he nevertheless sent "emergency" supplies (tear gas, riot gear, etc.) in
order to repress the anti-Shah demonstrations.

As

these U.S.-made paramilitary

weapons and the conventional weapons oftanks and helicopters were being used
on unarmed Iranian civilians, America became synonymous with the Shah's violent
and unjust oppression and his fleeting struggle to retain power.65 Not only did the
militariz.ation oflran feed the Shah's dreams ofreestablishing the great Persian
empire, the American military industrial complex, against which President
Eisenhower warned the American people, profited greatly at the expense ofthe
Iranian people. 66
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Although American companies bribed Iranian officials in order to gain
military production contracts, the millions that were given to secure those deals
paled in comparison to the billions made from those contracts.67 In fact, by the
end of the Shah's rule in 1979, he had placed upwards of 20 billion dollars in
military orders to U.S. and British companies. 68 However, the revolution in Iran
saw the end of this "surrogate policy", because Khomeini and his supporters made
it clear that they were not the guardians of the West's strategic and or oil interests
in the Middle East. For Khomeini the surrogate policy was the loss oflran's
sovereignty - "modernization" through "militarization" had made Iran weak and
submissive to the imperial desires of the West, not strong and independent. It not
only drained the nation's public wealth, the Shah had made a once self-sufficient
country dependent on western goods and services in the name of economic
modernization. Furthermore, he had "polluted" Iranian Shi'a Muslim society with
his cultural modernization through adoption of western popular culture, and he had
turned the imperial seat of an ancient power into a puppet regime for western
capitalism and American imperialism. At all costs, Khomeini pledged to resist this

disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.
We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the
proper meshing of the hughe industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful
methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together.
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assault on Iranian independence and dignity. Furthermore, like Imam Hussein, he
would actively fight against this corrupt and illegitimate power who sat in
authority over Muslims, while at the same time insulting their faith by political
corruption, excessive militarism, repressive secret police, and attacks on Islam and
the clergy. In order to save Iran and the Iranian people, the Shah's
''westoxification" had to be cancelled, and Khomeini found himself nearly alone
among clerics who were prepared to make that sacrifice.69
The spark that ignited a chain of events that would ultimately lead to the
downfall of the Shah happened on October 23, 1977 in Najaf, with the death of
Hajj Sayyid Mustafa Khomeini, the eldest son of the Ayatollah. 70 SAV AK, the
Shah's secret police, were immediately suspected of the Mustafa's death, which
sparked protests and riots in many major cities in Iran. 71 Khomeini however, faced
his son's death very stoically, repeating the Qur'anic ayah "We belong to God and
to him we shall return. "72 Furthermore, he depersonalized the issue and integrated
it into the larger struggle against the Shah, when at the funeral he said: "We are
facing a great calamity and should not mention personal tragedies."73 For
Khomeini, the death of his son was an act of providence; he even referred to it as a
"hidden favor" from the Divine. 74
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The protest in Iran that followed the death of Mustafa sparked calls for
Khomeini's return to Iran. On November 15, 1977, the Shah made a state visit to
the United States and President Jimmy Carter in order to demonstrate U.S. Iranian solidarity. However, outside of the White House, angry Iranian and
American demonstrators protested the visit of the Shah. Led by the Confederation
of Iranian Students, they demanded that President Carter hold the Shah responsible
for his human rights violations and put pressure on him to implement Carter's
human rights program. Ultimately, the demonstration was broken up by riot police
who inadvertently spilled tear gas on the White House lawn. Images of the Shah
crying from exposure to tear-gas were beamed back to Iran to the delight of his
opposition. 75 Ironically, it was probably the same U.S. made tear-gas that SAVAK
so often used against the Iranian people.
In Tehran on New Year's Eve, 1977, to the disgust of masses of Iranians,
President Carter praised the Shah as an "island of stability in one of the more
troubled areas of the world...a great tribute to the respect, admiration and love of
your people for you."76 Needless to say, Khomeini couldn't have disagreed more.
Despite the kind words from the U.S. President, momentum against the
Shah's regime increased throughout 1978 with riots and protests in the streets of
Qum and other holy cities. On January 7, an article published in the "semi-official"
newspaper Ittila 'at, apparently approved by the Shah, attacked Khomeini as a
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traitor, a sexual deviant, saying he was originally from India and was collaborating
with foreign powers, mainly the British, who wished to destroy Iran. Entitled,
"Black and Red Imperialism", written under the pseudonym Ahmed Rashidi
Motlaq, the article backfired against the Shah. 77 It led to a massive protest in Qum
in support of Khomeini and the growing revolutionary movement. Calling for a
coup d'etat against the Pahlavi regime, the demonstrations were brutally repressed,
with the resulting murder of many protesters. 78 The dead were celebrated as
martyrs forty days later, with a massive workers' strike in every major city in
Iran. 79 This cycle of violent repression of protesting voices, followed by days of
commemoration of martyrs, unleashed an unstoppable chain reaction of massive
protest and opposition to the Shah. The Shi'a tradition of respect and glorification
of martyrdom was a driving force that undermined the regime. Each murder led to
protests, which led to brutal repression and more deaths, which led to greater
protests, which led to even more repression. This cycle continued until the
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eventual fall ofthe regime. 80
As the movement against the Shah continued to grow among his religious
followers, secular intellectuals, communists, socialists, and Iranian nationalists
began to flock to Khomeini's call in ever increasing numbers. It was common not
only to hear the slogans of"Islamic Rule" and "Allahu Akbar" in demonstrations,
but increasingly secular and leftist slogans such as "Liberty and Independence"
where becoming more prevalent with each demonstration. 81 By careful
appropriation ofleftist language, often adjusted to fit Islamic sensibilities,
Khomeini made appeals to the secular left, as well as to intellectuals and Iranian
communists. Under threat ofa common enemy, many ofthese groups were more
than willing to aid Khomeini in his opposition to the Shah. Furthermore, due to
Khomeini's denunciation ofAmerica as the "Great Satan", and hoping to gain
some influence to its south, the Soviet Union switched sides to support the
opposition against the Shah. 82 Despite the internal upheaval and instability, U.S.
shipments ofarms and supplies continued to flow into Iran in a desperate attempt
to salvage the regime. Khomeini himself, seeing the willingness ofsome to
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compromise with the Shah, urged his followers to stand steadfast against the new
Yazid. 83 He reminded them that compromise was the mistake that 'Ali had made
at the battle ofSi:ffin; a mistake that would not be made again.
On September 24, 1978, at a meeting in New York, the foreign ministers of
Iran and Iraq agreed to remove Khomeini from Najaf. Giving him the option of
staying ifhe would cease his anti-Shah rhetoric, Khomeini prophetically chose to
leave over being silenced. First he tried to enter Kuwait, but he was stopped at the
border. He would have preferred to go to Algeria, Lebanon, or Syria, but none of
these countries was willing to take in the rebelling cleric. In fact, not a single
Muslim country was willing to accept Khomeini and he was eventually forced to
go to France, where he took up residence near Paris, in the village ofNeauphle-le
Chateau, in a house rented for him by Iranian exiles. 84 Although he found himself
in the capital ofwestern cultural life, he saw very little ofit. He had no intention
to do any sightseeing for he was too busy formenting revolution back in Iran. He
was determined to leave France and go to any Islamic country; he even issued a
decree that he would move to any Muslim country that would guarantee him
freedom ofspeech. 85 Unfortunately, still no Muslim countries were willing to
accept him. For Khomeini, this was a proofofthe deepeningfitnah (divisions)
among the Muslims, and a sad day in the history ofIslam when no Muslims were
willing to help and aid another Muslim who was fighting for the dignity oflslam
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itself. The Muslim world was devoid of Ansar (helpers). 86
Despite his disappointment, Khomeini continued to denounce the Shah
from France. He was constantly bombarded by international media and gave
frequent interviews and press conferences. Later he wrote:
To begin with, the French government was a bit cautious. But when they
were kind to us and we could publicize our .views extensively, much more
so than we expected, and the news concerning us and our demands was
even reported by the media in America itself...every day groups oflranians
came to see us, and this strengthened and helped to promote our
objectives. 87
His access to Iran while in France was two-fold. First, his appearances in the
international press continued to keep him and his struggle against the Shah in the
newspapers and broadcast television. Secondly, because of the Shah's
"modernization" and his deep- seated desire to keep Iran technologically
connected to the west, Iran's telephonic communication systems were used by
Khomeini to send messages to Iran, which were then recorded on audio cassettes
and distributed throughout the country. 88 Many of these addresses would be
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broadcasted from mosques or would be the subject of the Khutba (sermons) at
Friday prayers. Furthermore, many clerics dressed in civilian clothes would
journey to the Iranian countryside distributing these lectures and sermons of
Khomeini to rural villagers and peasants. Throughout 1978 and 1979, it became
commonplace to see the usually apolitical commoners of the countryside joining in
demonstrations, protests,
9

and political marches. 8 This demographic had been known to ignore such political
issues; hence Khomeini'ssuccess was a new phenomenon in Iranian history. Thus,
despite Khomeini's physical absence from Iran, his words and ideas were
influencing the masses on a daily basis and furthering the discontent felt by many
against the Pahlavi regime.
With the Shah's continuing struggle with cancer, and the growing violent
opposition to his rule ever increasing, the Shah attempted to reform his
government by establishing a military government under the direction of General
Ghulam-Riza Azhari, replacing Sharif-Imami as Prime Minister.
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This reshuffling

of the government, which brought about ineffective curfews and other attempted
restrictions, had no substantive influence on the progress of the revolution.
However, Khomeini's fear that the revolution would respond to the Shah's
reforms by compromising their demands continued to plague him. Therefore, he
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advocated to his followers and the Iranian people that they not let the ''fire in
[their] hearts...be extinguished." This ''wounded snake" must be removed.91
Furthermore, on November 23, one week before the beginning of the Muharram
(when the Shi'a emulate the martyrdom of Hussein), Khomeini declared the sacred
month to be,
...a divine sword in the hands of the soldiers of Islam, our great religious
leaders and respected preachers, and all the followers of the Lord of the
Martyrs (peace and blessings be upon them), they must make the maximum
use of it. Trusting in the power of God, they must tear out the remaining
roots of this tree of oppression and treachery, for the month ofMuharram
is the month in which the forces of Yazid and the stratagems of Satan are
deafeated. 92
Furthermore, he states that the month ofMuharram is,
the month in which blood triumphed over the sword, the month in which
truth condemned falsehood for all eternity and branded the mark of
disgrace upon the forehead of all oppressors and satanic governments; the
month that has taught successive generations throughout history the path
of victory over the bayonet; the month that proves the superpowers may be
defeated by the word of truth; the month in which the leaders of the
Muslims taught us how to struggle against all the tyrants of history,
showed us how the clenched fists of those who seek freedom, desire
independence, and proclaim the truth may triumph over tanks, machine
guns, and the armies of Satan, how the world of truth may obliterate
falsehood. 93
With more intensity than normal, the month ofMuharram took on a new meaning.
It was now a future oriented-remembrance of past injustice with a determination to
end the present conditions of servitude and oppression. The martyrdom of
Hussein became the new paradigm through which to oppose the Shah; the new
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Yazid. Across the country, approximately 17 million people joined in the
Muharram commemorations, demanding the end ofthe monarchy. 94 Two to Three
million alone demonstrated in Tehran. 95
Seeing that the Shah's rule was coming to an end, Khomeini was pressured
to elaborate on what kind ofgovernment would be replacing the monarchy.
Although Khomeini had already written a book about Islamic governance or the
"Rule ofthe Jurist" (Ve/ayat-i-Faqih), it was not widely read until after the
revolution succeeded. Therefore the blueprint for what was to become the Islamic
Republic had already been made public but simply ignored. However, at this time,
Khomeini could not want to risk alienating those secularists, nationalists,
communists, and socialists, etc. who played such an important role in the
revolution. He therefore remained ambiguous and vague about specifics ofan
Islamic Republic, resigned to speak in generalizations concerning a broader vision
ofwhat was to come. Speaking about he nature and essential goal ofan Islamic
regime, he said:
There can be no return [to monarchy], and individuals who say they want
such a return are in the minority. The whole notion, throughout Iran, cries
out: "We want an Islamic Republic." An Islamic regime and an Islamic
Republic rests on the general will and a general referendum. Its
constitution is the law oflslam and must be in accordance with the laws of
Islam. The law oflslam is the most progressive oflaws. That part ofthe
constitution that is in accordance with this progressive law will remain in
place, and that part which is contrary to this law is not binding. 96
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Furthermore, when being interviewed by an Arab journalist, he was pressured into
giving more specific details on the coming "Islamic Republic." He skillfully
replied:
You think there is no program? Not at all. There is a program. Islam has
a program. We also have a program. But the program is Islam and it is
better and more progressive than the program implemented by the
colonists...
When asked to clarify the main guidelines, he replied:
...You must go, study and then grasp the main outlines. We will in the
future announce all our political, economic, and cultural policies.97
It is clear that Khomeini wanted to refrain from being overly specific about what
he planned for the Islamic Republic in order to maintain unity among his followers
at the very moment when they seemed to be on the verge ofsuccess. Division
among the revolutionaries would have been exploited by the regime to the
detriment ofthe future oflran. Khomeini could not afford this, so, going against
his own nature and the nature oflslamic scholarship, he resigned himselfto
vagaries and generaliz.ations. However, those who were the nearest to him and
knew his work on Islamic governance had a much clearer picture ofwhat the
Ayatollah had in mind. "Progressive Islam" he called it; an Islam that would
ensure "freedom, independence, and social justice. "98
For the Shah, adding insult to injury came through President Carter's
statement to the press ofDecember 7. Commenting on the upheaval against the
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Iranian regime, Carter stated that it was "up to the people oflran to decide the
Shah's fate", thus signaling Washington's unwillingness to intervene in the Shah's
demise. 99
In a last-ditch attempt to save power, the Shah tried to seduce secular and
nationalist politicians by appointing Shahpur Bakhtiyar of the ''National Front"
(Jabha-yi Milli) party to the position of prime minister. 100 The short-lived

Bakhtiyar government had little power, if any. Although he did not believe that
the Shah's regime could fall, Bakhtiyar was powerless against the rising tide of the
Islamic Revolution. Khomeini countered the Shah's political ploy by forming the
Council of the Islamic Revolution (Shaura-yi lnqilab-i Js/ami) which was a body
entrusted with the task of establishing a transitional government that was to
replace the collapsing Bakhtiyar administration, and ultimately forever vanquish
the monarchy. 101
To the joy of millions oflranians, the ailing and rejected Shah forever left
Iran on January 16, 1979. He would later die in exile a wanted man. As news was
breaking around the world about the Shah's departure, one of Khomeini's
assistants interrupted him during the dawn prayer (fajr) to tell him the news.
Again, very stoically, Khomeini only said... ''what else."102
After some political and military delays, Khomeini boarded a chartered Air
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France jet on the evening of January 31 and arrived in the capital Tehran the
following morning. He had by that time been in exile for 14 years. Among the
estimated 10 million joyful followers who greeted his return to Iran, he proceeded
to the cemetery ofBihisht-i Zahra, south of Tehran, where the revolutionary
martyrs were buried. There he proclaimed he would appoint a government that
would "punch Bakhtiyar's government in the mouth", because Bakhtiyar was
nothing but the last remnant of the Dictatura Coronado's illegal rule_ t03
Faced with massive desertion among the military, and complete disregard
for Bakhtiyar's curfews, his government surrendered power to Khomeini on
February 12, 1979. All institutions of the Pahlavi regime, political, administrative,
and military had collapsed under the weight of the Islamic Revolution. 104
Claiming a triumph for Islam and the Iranian people, Khomeini and his closet
followers and advisors began to go about the hardest task, constructing a Islamic
Republic that embodied the Iranian Shi'a Islamic identity while organically
confronting and adapting to modernity.
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CHAPTER III
A THEORY OF "PROPHETIC CHARISMA"

In an attempt to explain Khomeini's successful leadership of the Iranian
Revolution, I have developed a theory of"Prophetic Charisma", using primarily
the work of Max Weber and Erich Fromm. However, other will be consulted
when they can uniquely contribute to the theory. First, I shall examine Weber's
sociological conception of"charisma" and the "charismatic", i.e. the bearer of
charisma, as well as Weber's definition of the "prophet", and its connection to
charisma. Secondly, I will examine the psychological character of the "prophet" as
expressed by Erich Fromm; looking into the important nature of the ''theory praxis" dialectic and his comparison between the "prophet" and the "priest."
Furthermore, I shall demonstrate how the Prophet Muhammad serves as the
standard bearer for what is "prophetic" in the Islamic tradition. By bringing the
"sunnah" (way) of Muhammad and the works of these two scholars together, I will
offer a theory of"prophetic charisma" that can best explain how and why
Khomeini, over and above all other clerics, was successful in his attempt to
overthrow the Shah and his westernization and modernization project.
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Weber's Concept of Charisma

Weber defines "charisma" as:
a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is
considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural,
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.
These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are
regarded as of divine origin or exemplary, and on the basis of them
the individual concerned is treated as a "leader." 1
Weber's conception of charisma is ambiguous. He doesn't connect specific
actions, miracles, or feats of genius with the holder of charisma. He prefers to
keep his analysis universa� broad, and ambiguous, as opposed to speaking in
particulars. Thus it is value-free and equally applicable to the saint and the sinner.
The results of such an analysis leads to the conclusion that men and women with a
heightened capacity for productiveness and or destructiveness, especially those
who seem to have abilities "not accessible to the ordinary person", can both be the
bearers of charisma. One need not look far back into human history to witness
such "charismatic" leadership. Adolf Hitler, though a necrophile and extremely
destructive, easily fits into place with Weber's value-free definition.2 Furthermore,
men like Dr. Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi, both of whom dedicated
Max Weber, Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968) 241. Weber tends to
use the terms "prophet" and "charismatic" interchangeably. In order to avoid confusion, I will
not do this because the word "prophet" (rasul, nabi) in Islam has a very particular meaning
which cannot be universalized the way Weber tends to do.
2
For a general study of the charismatic nature of sociopaths, see Stout, Martha. The Sociopath
Next Door. New York: Broadway Books, 2005. Also See Fromm, Erich. The Anatomy of
Human Destructiveness. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973. I use the term
"necrophile" as defined by Erich Fromm; one that is enamored by death, destruction, and all that
is non-living.
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their lives to the resistance ofoppression through non-violent means, can likewise
fit into Weber's value-free notion ofcharisma. What they have in common is that
all three ofthese men were seen by their followers as having at minimum,
"specifically exceptional powers or qualities"; they were therefore treated as
"leaders" because ofthese powers and qualities that seemed to be out ofreach of
the "ordinary" person. Ultimately, both authoritarian and revolutionary, good or
evil, sinner or saint, can fit into this value-free definition. That brings us to the
more important issues ofperception and legitimacy.
When one examines Weber's definition ofcharisma carefully, one can sees
that Weber explicitly identifies the observer ofcharisma as being the basis for his
definition. He says, ''what is alone important is how the individual is actually
regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his "followers" or
"disciples""3 Thus, it is the observer ofcharisma, not the holder ofcharisma's
claims to "extraordinary powers" that legitimates the holder's status as
charismatic. It is the observer of charisma who considers the individual to have
"supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities."
Furthermore, it is the observer who legitimates the claims to charisma by
identifying and or accepting the claimants leadership based on his "divinely
originated or exemplary" powers and qualities. Stemming from this notion of
perception is the issue oflegitimacy. Does the charismatic "possess" charisma if
no one identifies him as being charismatic? For example, a Prophet who was
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designated by the divine, yet rejected by the people would nonetheless still be a
Prophet, because his legitimacy is rooted in his designation as a Prophet, stemming
from the ultimate authority (the divine), and not the perceptions of the people.
Therefore, in this case, perception is not needed, and his legitimacy is ultimately
not in question, for "no prophet [charismatic] has ever regarded his quality as
dependent on the attitudes of the masses toward him."4 However, if perception is
needed to legitimate his claim, then the supposed charismatic is dependent on
those who identify him as such. The Story ofShabbtai Zvi, the Jewish "heretic
Messiah" of the Middle Ages, is a good example. His followers believed him to be
the long-awaited Messiah who would gather all the Jews back in Zion. His status
as a charismatic was based on his followers' perceptions that he was designated by
the divine for a specific purpose and was endowed by certain "supernatural" and /
or "superhuman powers and qualities." However, when he converted to Islam
under pressure from the Ottoman Sultan, he was abandoned by the majority of his
followers, who then regarded him as a fraud. Therefore his legitimacy was based
on his followers' perceptions and their willingness to submit to his leadership.
Once their perceptions of him changed, due to his own actions, the legitimacy of
his charisma was terminated.
As the story ofShabbtai Zvi demonstrates, the claimant to charisma could
be a fraud, having no real "superhuman or supernatural gifts or powers." He could
just be a skilled actor with an elaborate scheme to deceive his would-be followers
4
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into thinking he has such qualities. He could be a master of"perception
management" without having any inherent qualities that mark him above the
average person other than being a skilled illusionist. Therefore, if the
legitimization of charisma is based in the perception of the claimant by those
people who perceive him as charismatic, then legitimacy is endowed to the
claimant through their recognizing and subsequent submission to his leadership. If
no recognition is given to the claimant, then he is without legitimacy as a
charismatic. 5
Another factor that is important to Weber was the issue of the success of
the charismatic. Weber states,
If proof and success elude the leader for long, if he appears deserted by
his god or his magical or heroic powers, above all, if his leadership fails
to benefit his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority will
disappear. 6
Again, working on the issue of perception, if charismatic leadership fails to bring
about the effects desired by those who are subject to the charismatic leader, then
support can be withdrawn from that leader, who thereby loses legitimacy - as
happened to Shabbtai Zvi. However, if legitimacy is based on something other
than perception, such as divine designation, as was the example of the Prophet,
legitimacy is not diminished though the goals were not achieved. On the other
hand, if the goals are achieved, and the charismatic leadership is instrumental in

5
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achieving those goals, and the followers perceive the leadership as being
instrumental in achieving those goals, then the legitimacy of the leadership is
heightened by the leader's ability to bring about publicly stated goals. Success and
failure are key to the survival of charismatic movements. 7 From the perception of
the followers, anyone can fail, but only the "chosen", blessed with superhuman,
supernatural, or exemplary qualities can succeed against the odds.
If the divine is appealed to by his followers, it is because they believe that
the divine power has the ability to change, alter, and/ or transform the situation in
which they find themselves. The charismatic leader, designated, blessed, or sent by
the divine to be his active agent in history, to represent the divine in human affairs,
therefore should have the ability to bring about the desired change. However, if
this charismatic cannot, for whatever reason, effect the change, and has failed in
his given task, it is logically consistent that the followers would skeptically
question and or doubt the relationship between the charismatic and the divine and
likewise their submission to the charismatic leadership. If failure in the short term,
on a given issue, does occur, then it is important for the charismatic to interpret
the failure in such a way that it does not interrupt or diminish the perception of the
followers of his charismatic authority or designation. For example, in 625 CE, the
second battle between the Muslims and the Meccans, called the battle ofUhud,
ended in a devastating loss for the Muslims. Muhammad placed a unit of archers
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in the rear of his army in order to fend off a surprise attack from behind.
However, this rear guard left their position in order to join their fellow fighters in
collecting the spoils of war. Once they moved, they were flanked by the Meccan
cavalry and the Muslim army was then attacked both from the front and from the
high ground behind them. 8 This loss, which should not have occurred if the divine
was actively supporting the Islamic mujahideen (soldiers), had to be reinterpreted
in such as way that it did not damage Muhammad's charismatic and prophetic
authority. What was a devastating defeat was transformed into a vitally important
God-given lesson: always adhere to the will and command of the Prophet. And
furthermore, greed will get you killed!
As you

can see, this short term loss could have had a decisively negative

influence on those followers of Muhammad, especially those who were not entirely
committed or convinced of Muhammad's Prophethood. By reinterpreting such a
loss, Muhammad was able to maintain his status as a divinely designated prophet
and carrier of charismatic authority without loosing his support. A military failure
was transformed into a successful lesson in obedience to the divine will.
However, the battle ofUhud was only a "short-term" loss for Muhammad,
who ultimately had a "long-term" success in his establishment of Islam throughout
Arabia and beyond. For the early followers, short-term setbacks were minimized
because the overall success of Islam and the Prophet were so encompassing.

Cyril Glasse, The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1989) 68 69.
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Failures were seen as lessons, while successes were seen as overall proofthat their
mission was divinely supported.
In this particular case, "success" didn't "elude the leader for long" and "he"
didn't "appear to be deserted by his god." Ultimately, although many setbacks and
failures occurred, the leadership ofMuhammad did "benefit his followers", and he
was not deserted.

Weberian and Islamic Prophets

Weber's "Sociology ofReligion" defines a prophet as an "individual bearer
ofcharisma, who by virtue ofhis mission proclaims a religious doctrine or divine
commandment."9 Although Weber doesn't clearly define what he means by
"religious doctrine" or "divine commandment", it is obvious from his examples
that he doesn't mean secular political, social, or psychological systems and
institutions that serve the ''function" ofreligion, such as a political party,
nationhood, race, or community, but rather he implies systems that maintain a
superhuman being, a divine being or beings, and or the totally other. Yet, because
he doesn't clearly define "religion", but seems to assume the reader will understand
what he means, his definition of"prophet" is subject to interpretation and can

9
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imply that any individual possessing, or that is perceived to possess, charismatic
qualities can be considered some form of a "prophet." Therefore one can have
political prophets, social prophets, secular prophets, and even prophets of atheism,
etc. However, because we are dealing with Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic
tradition, which has a clear definition of"prophet", it is entirely appropriate that
we make apparent the meaning of this term, so as not to augment confusion
between the sociological understanding of a "prophet", as expressed by Weber
(later on by Fromm's socio-psychological character type) and the religious concept
of"prophet", as expressed by Khomeini and the Islamic tradition.
In Islam, prophets are divided into two distinct classes. 1) The Rasul is the
"messenger" who brings a new "revelation" to the people. The Qur'an refers to
them as "al-mursalum" or "those who are sent." 10 Among these prophets are
Moses, David, Jesus, and Muhammad, because each of these men, according to
Islam, brought a new revelation, a new scripture, for their communities (ummah).
2) The Nabi is the lesser prophet, who doesn't bring forth a new scripture, but is in
a way a "renewer" (mujadid) of an older scripture. These prophets remind the
people of their obligations to the scriptures, law and commandments that they
already possess.11 Often the missions of these two categories of prophets overlap,
such as when the rasul reminds this followers of their prior scripture through the
use of the new one, or when the rasul acts as a ''warner" (nadhir), a function
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usually associated with lesser prophets. However, Weber refuses to make a clear
distinction between these two forms of prophethood. He says,
No radical distinction will be drawn between a "renewer of religion" who
preaches an older revelation, actual or supposititious, and a "founder of
religion" who claims to bring completely new deliverances. The two types
merge into one another." 12
Generally, in the history of religion, Weber would be correct in saying that "the
two types merge into one another." However, in the Islamic tradition, a Nabi, the
lesser prophet, never merges into a Rasul, because by his very definition, he does
not bring a new revelation, the very issue that defines a Rasul. For example,
Muhammad is considered a Rasul and a Nabi because he both brought a new
scripture, the Qur'an, and through it reminded Arabs of what they knew about
Jesus, Moses, and Abraham. However, Yahya (John the Baptist), was only
considered a Nabi, not a Rasul, because his message was a future-oriented
remembrance of prior scripture and hence he did not bring a new revelation. In the
case of Yahya, these two categories clearly remain separated.
What distinguishes a prophet in the Islamic context from any charismatic
leader is the direct designation by the divine. In Islam, no one can claim to be a
prophet unless he has been expressly designated, by the divine himself, for that
office. By definition, it is only "those who are sent" that can claim prophethood in
Islam. These prophets, because their legitimacy stems from the creator, the
12
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ultimate source of all authority, via his direct designation, do not require the
acceptance of followers. Even if they are rejected by their people, as so many of
the biblical prophets were, it doesn't diminish their legitimacy as prophets or the
legitimacy of their assignment. Yet any given charismatic leader can claim to be
divinely appointed to his mission. However, if this is not the case, and his success
rate is dismal and therefore his followers withdraw their support, his legitimacy is
null and void because his legitimacy is rooted in his followers' willing submission
to his authority. Furthermore, the charismatic leader who does not claim any
divine inspiration or divine patronage, such as a secular prophet (in sociological
terms), is also dependent on the will of the followers to support and or submit to
his leadership. Because he lacks the authorization of the ultimate source of
authority, i.e. Allah in the Islamic tradition, Muslims could not call such a person a
"prophet." However, if this secular prophet fulfilled some attributes characterized
by the genuine religious prophet's modus operandi, then that secular prophet could
be legitimately called"prophetic" in the eyes of the Islamic tradition. For example,
Muslims could not accept Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. as being a legitimate prophet
because he lacked the direct designation of God as such. 13 However, because his
mission was to alleviate oppression by undermining and tearing down the walls of
exploitation instituted in the status quo, he was by all means acting in such a way
that his actions are congruent with the actions of a prophet. Thus, though he

13 Just for the sake of the argument, I'm ignoring the fuct that Muslims believe that there will be
no other prophets (Nabi or Rasul) after Muhammad; he is the "seal ofprophets."
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cannot be considered a prophet is Islam, he could be considered "prophetic."
In sum, the definitive distinction between a prophet and the prophetic is
the connection between the agent ofaction and the divine. Ifthe individual agent
has been directly called by the divine to perform a mission, and therefore
legitimacy comes from the divine, then he is considered a "prophet." However, if
he has not been directly called by the divine, and therefore legitimacy comes from
the consent ofthe followers, and yet fulfills some ofthe modus operandi ofa
prophet, at best he can be called "prophetic." 14
The issue ofproofand success affects the prophet and the prophetic
similarly yet with slight differences. Doubtless that the prophet and the prophetic
both need to prove to their followers the correctness oftheir mission. However, if
success doesn't come to the prophet, it does not affect his status as a prophet
unless he is abandoned by the source ofhis legitimacy and authority, i.e. the divine.
Yet the prophetic, whose legitimacy and authority is rooted in the followers'
consent and submission to his leadership, can no longer claim any legitimacy or
authority over them ifhe cannot produce successes and his followers abandon him.
Because the authority to lead comes from below, it can be removed through their
retraction ofsupport. The prophet's authority can only be removed from above

Unlike many Christian denomination who designate figures as ''prophets" because of their
''prophecies" (predicting the future), or non-religious "prophets" such as Nostradamus and Edgar
Cayce, who do likewise, Islam does not designate figures as prophets by these standards. Future
telling does not qualify an individual for prophethood.
14
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when the divine retracts his support. However, both are subject to the perceptions
of the followers. Neither can maintain support of the people if they cannot provide
fruition of stated goals.

General Role of the Prophet

The role of a prophet in the Islamic, Biblical, and secular traditions goes
beyond that of simply delivering a message from the divine. The prophetic role is
also to stand outside of the dominant culture and political structure, and
uncompromisingly speak truth to power. In their attempt to interrogate the
mendacity and hypocrisy of given structure and institutions of authority, prophets
are not historically "harmonizers." They universally stir up trouble, discontent, and
animosity by exposing the corrupt rulers, cultural practices, class antagonisms, and
overall decay of any given society's cultural norms, values, and principles. By
emphasizing what "ought" to be the case, prophets radically negate what "is" the
case in a call to reform, transform, or even overthrow existing social, religious, and
political orders. It is clear from BiblicaL Qur'anic, and even sociological
understanding of prophets that they have tended to be a great hindrance and
nuisance to the perpetuation and safety of the status quo. Thus, prophets have
often found themselves the object of attack, physical and verbal, by the ruling
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party, group, and or government. For example, Muhammad was repeatedly the
object ofassassination plots, bribes, and wars by the ruling Quraysh tribe of
Mecca. Because Muhammad's call to social justice and monotheism threatened
the religious and business status quo ofthe ruling class, his existence had to be
terminated. Muhammad's attempt to transform the hard-drinking, polytheistic, and
hedonistic Arabs into a society ofjustice, equality, and monotheism, was a direct
and potent threat to the status quo. Likewise, Jesus' emphasis ofthe "Kingdom
ofGod" did not only offer an alternative vision ofthe future, in contrast with the
prevailing thought ofthe Jewish religious elite, but it also was a political statement
against the "Empire ofRome." By proclaiming what "ought" to be the case in
opposition to what was the case, Jesus antagonized two powerful groups who had
a vital interest in maintaining the status quo. Therefore, like many prophets before
him,

Jesus found himselfthe victim ofa brutal assassination carried out in the name

of preserving the structures ofreligious and political power.

Weberian Roles of the Prophet

Weber postulates several specific roles for prophets. First, there is the
Prophet as Lawgiver. This prophet is responsible for "codifying a law

systematically or ofreconstituting it." 15 This form ofprophethood is best seen in
the orthopraxis religious tradition ofJudaism and Islam who put a premium on
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adherence to religious law. Secondly, Weber gives us the prophet as Teacher of
Ethics. 16 This form ofprophet is primarily concerned with "ethical order" and is

greatly influenced by wisdom traditions in an attempt to establish social reform.
Thirdly, Weber identifies what he calls the Ethical Prophet. 17 Because this
prophet has received a commission directly from the divine, he demands
"obedience as an ethical duty." 18 Lastly, Weber distinguishes what he calls the
Exemplary Prophet. 19 This prophet does not demand obedience from his followers

and those around him, but by personal example he "demonstrates to others the way
to religious salvation."2° For Weber, the Buddha and other far-East religious
figures such as Lao Tzu fit this form ofprophethood.
Concerning these forms ofprophets and their relations to the broader
social-political and religious context, all of them stand outside the given status quo
as an testament to how the world or their given society "ought" to be. None of
these prophets can be integrated into a society that is not based on prophetic
principles. All ofthese prophets embody visions of the world and the cosmos that
serve as indictments of the broader social context and demonstrate how these
societies have not lived up to prophetic standards. The evidence for this assertion
can be found in what Weber regards as the prophet's ultimate and predominate
role which is to provide the prophet's followers with a vision of''the world as a
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meaningful ordered totality."21 In the face of a prevailing chaos, whether it be
religious, political, social, or even linguistic - through the disintegration of
meaning, family, community, politics, etc., the prophets bring an alternative view
of the world, which at its core, domesticates the chaos of the given society. 22
These alternative visions of the world provide a system of thought and orientation
of action which supplies the believer with an internal reference point and
intellectual categories from which he can judge behaviors and actions to be in
violation with that given "vision of the world." Therefore, by giving these
alternative visions, the charismatic prophet slays the inner chaos and uncertainty
the believer has about the world and his existence, and provides for him a sense of
agency - that he can become an active player in human history and has a firm sense
of where he wants history to go. Furthermore, when an alternative vision of the
world gains enough support among the people of a given society, they are able to
impose their will, rooted in the alternative vision, on a broader scale. As we will
see later, Khomeini first provides a vision of how Iran "ought" to be. Then, when
it becomes feasible to implement that vision because it has become the dominant
vision amongst the population, the status quo of the Shah is overthrown and
replaced with Khomeini's vision. Thus, the chaos of the Shah is first
"domesticated" and then negated. Consequently, what was once alternative, now
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becomes the dominate political and social order.

Erich Fromm's Prophet and Priest

Although Fromm will add many more qualifications onto his concept of the
"prophet", he very generally defines it as "those who announce ideas - and not
necessarily new ones - and at the same time live them we may call prophets."23 For
Fromm, the very basis of the "prophet" is rooted in the theory - praxis dialectic.
If praxis is disconnected from theory, then the words of the so-called prophet are
hollow and meaningless, and the listener is less inclined to follow such teachings.
However, when a prophetic voice expresses universal values and ideas (theory),
and embodies those values and ideas in their life (praxis), then they are maintaining
what Fromm believes is essential for a prophet. He says,
...ideas do have an effect on man if the idea is lived by the one who
teaches it; if it is personified by the teacher, if the idea appears in the
flesh.24
From Fromm, positivism in religion, philosophy, ethics, etc., which has emphasized
the simple rote memorization of ideas and concepts, has robbed those very
concepts of their revolutionary meaning, which, if still taught as a "way of living",
could potentially be a contributor in the continual perfection and / or advancement
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of mankind and society. By placing a premium on the semantic (language)
material of philosophy and religion, at the detriment of the semiotic (meaning)
material, modem man has castrated the power of mankind's collective knowledge
which has organically evolved parallel with the biological evolution of man.
Philosophy and religion become an exercise in mental and linguistic acrobatics, as
opposed to a radical engagement of the world, in the world. Thus, the
revolutionary theories of philosophy and religion, are divorced from their praxis
potential. Fromm would agree with Marx's 11th thesis on Feuerbach that the goal
of philosophy is not only to interpret the world, but to change it. Fromm observes
that modem man studies Socrates, but fails to practice the Socratic tradition. He
studies Jesus, but fails to implement the social justice called for by the Gospels.
For him, this theory - praxis disconnect has led to "unrestricted egoism, which
breeds hysterical nationalism, and which is preparing for an insane mass
slaughter."25 The "slaughter-bench of history", with its massive human suffering,
is possible because religious, philosophical, and humanistic praxis has been
neglected. Although human ethical thought continues to progress, yet praxis of
that thought diminishes; a new age of'jahaliyya" (ignorance) is able to grow. This
'jahaliyya al-jadid" (new age of ignorance) is furthered by the triumph of
instrumental rationality; the rationality of tooL machine, domination over nature,

and science, over communicative rationality of community, family, solidarity,
mutual recognition, morality, and love.
25
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As Dr.

Martin Luther King would say,

"when scientific power outruns moral power, we end up with guided missiles and
misguided men."26
Fromm clearly believes that if mankind, whose knowledge of these
religious and philosophical theories has never been greater and more widespread,
would only put to action that which they know is intellectually true, then
collectively mankind would be in less danger from the destructive forces of his
own making. The prophet in Fromm's thinking is the individual who bring
together prophetic thought and prophetic action, thus rejecting simple positivism
ofmemormition for a dialectical and revolutionary action approach to human
history. The prophet is not divorced from the world, or cocoons himself in mental
abstraction, but is radically engaged in his society, his community, his government,
and his religion/ philosophy. Fromm states that,
It is the function of the prophet to show reality, to show alternatives and to
protest; it is his function to call loudly, to awake man from his customary
half-slumber. It is the historical situation which makes prophet, not the
wish of some men to be prophets.27
For Fromm, a historical situation which leads to the rise ofprophets is one of deep
disillusionment, deep disempowerment, deep alienation, and deep hopelessness. A
situation which renders an average man into an automaton; the customary half
slumber of those who have already given up on changing the world and their
situation and have thus succumbed to their feeling ofpowerlessness. Because of
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such lack ofagency within the individual, stemming from fear and hopelessness,
and the experience of being denigrated, oppressed, and disposable by the prevailing
political-economic system, they seek ideological shelter and security in the "herd";
the herd being the dominate intellectual ideology that outwardly or internally
justifies and legitimizes the status quo.28 The role of the prophet, for Fromm, is to
penetrate this ideological security blanket, awaken the individual from his mental
slumber, and convincingly demonstrate that another vision of the world is possible
if only the victims of history would engage in radical overturning of"what is the
case" i.e. the exploitation, oppression, hatred, and domination of the individual by
the ruling minority.
Like Weber, Fromm believes that a distinguishing characteristic of the
prophet and charismatic is his "personal call" to action. Weber uses this "personal
call" to differentiate between the prophet and the priest. He says that,
the latter lays claim to authority by virtue of his service in a sacred
tradition, while the prophet's claim is based on personal revelation and
charisma.29
For Weber, the personal call is a question of authority. The prophet possesses
authority by virtue of his "personal revelation and charisma." In contrast, the
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priest's authority is rooted in the "hierarchical office" because he is a member of an
"organized enterprise of salvation. "30 However, Fromm sees something more
sinister in the role of the priest. He says,
Prophets appear only at intervals in the history of humanity. They die
and leave their message. The message is accepted by millions, it
becomes dear to them. This is precisely the reason why the idea becomes
exploitable for others who can make use of the attachment of the people to
these ideas, for their own purposes - those of the ruling and controlling.
Let us call the men who make use of the idea the prophets have
announced the priests. 31
As one can see, Fromm has a rather negative evaluation of priests. He sees their
role as that of guardians of the status quo. They legitimate the prevailing
institutions and structures of power through the use of semantic sophistry.
Because the message of the prophet has been "accepted by millions", the priest
skillfully clothes his message in the language of the prophet, all the time benefiting
"those who have power" i.e. the enemy of the prophet. The priest by nature, for
Fromm, is dishonest, deceitful, and untrustworthy. He continues,
The prophets live their ideas. The priests administer them to the people
who are attached to the idea. The idea has lost its validity. It has become
a formula. The priests declare that it is very important how the idea is
formulated; naturally the formulation becomes always important after
the experience is dead; how else could one control people by controlling
their thoughts, unless there is the "correct" formulation? The priests use
the idea to organize men, to control them through controlling the proper
expression of the idea, and when they have anesthetized man enough they
declare that man is not capable of being awake and of directing his own
life...32
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Fromm believes that the "formula" becomes the accepted "common sense";
common sense being the generally accepted idea of the masses that, at its core,
reflects the interests of the ruling class. Again, Marx's thesis concerning the

connection between the "ruling material force" and the "ruling ideological force"
is apparent. Furthermore, the process ofturning a prophetic idea into a
"orthodox" formula, and its general acceptance by the masses, allows the priest to
wield immense power over those who have accepted the "common sense" idea. 33
When that correct formula is internalized by the masses, the mental automaton is
created. For Fromm, this "functionalization ofprophetic language" is an effective
tool ofthe ruling class to control, manipulate, and coerce the masses.
Consequently, when a true prophet or a prophetic individual speaks and acts
against the "common sense", they are seen as being mentally unstable, deranged,
or "out ofthe mainstream." However, the very root ofthe prophetic mission is to
stand outside ofthis "common sense", break through the common sense ideology
with a penetrating critique, and provide an alternative vision ofthe world.
Therefore, the prophet is one who has negated and destroyed "common sense" in
his own life, and is on a mission to liberate others from their ideological strait
jacket parading as "common sense."
Yet another aspect ofthe priest is his opportunism. Ifthe priest is in

Also see Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, I 966. for a
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disagreement with the prevailing power, he will compromise with that power in
order to maintain his situation, position, and status because of his self-serving
orientation. This is unlike the prophet, who is unwilling to compromise if
compromise conflicts with his inner convictions or his divinely appointed mission.
The priest's self-concern and self-preservation takes priority over those he is meant
to serve. If he can negotiate with the power, as opposed to conflict, he is willing
to sacrifice and/ or compromise core beliefs and values in order to preserve his
status. If this occurs, he will have to modify his "formulas" in order to fit the new
political, social, and/ or religious reality. He will skillfully "reeducate", through
manipulation and "perception management", the masses who he controls. He will
explain to them the "prophetic" basis for his new position; claiming that it is rooted
in the teachings of the prophet and that the new alteration is a logical extension of
the original prophetic message. And because of their automaton state, the priest
will have little opposition from his followers. However, if the priestly class is not
the "mouthpiece" of the powerful ruling class, but is the ruling class, they will not
have to play the function of the intercessor between the ruled and the rulers.
However, they will still have to justify and legitimate their changing ideology and
practices through the "functionalization" of the prophets legacy and teachings.
Fromm makes it clear that their are many forms of priests, not only
religious ones. There are social and cultural priests, those who by way of mass
media, manipulate people into accepting and absorbing certain beliefs about society
and culture; political priests, who administer the political ideology that stabilizes
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governments, regimes, administrations, and society; and philosophical priests, who
"administer the idea of the original thinker, to impart it, interpret it, to make a
museum object and thus to guard it. "34 What all these priests have in common is
that they are all defenders of the status quo, and have some incentive in seeing that
the prevailing social, cultural, political, and philosophical systems remain in place.
Thus, they will all vehemently attack those who question their ideology and
provide a alternative vision of life.
Ultimately, prophets all share a key characteristic; their unwillingness to
surrender to "irrational" authority, and their active disobedience against that
authority. Irrational authority can be characterized as such: any authority that is
based on exploitation, domination, and or oppression; that at its core serves the
interests of the exploitative, dominating, and oppressive groups, structures, and
or institutions, and can only be maintained by force, coercion, and or war. 35
Fromm makes it clear that the antagonism of interests between the oppressed and
the oppressor, the slave and the master, the serf and the lord, renders the authority
of the powerful in these relationships "irrational", and therefore unworthy of
submission. Social-cultural, political, and philosophical prophets stand in
opposition to the prevailing and dominate social-economic, religious and political,
structures that are represented by their priestly counterparts. "Rational" authority
is characterized by any relationship in which the authority's interest is rooted in
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the betterment, advancement, and progress of those under them; and that this
relationship is maintained and perpetuated on a willing basis; free from coercion
and or force. Therefore, Fromm's prophets are capable of identifying irrational
authority; articulating an alternative to that authority; guiding his followers in the
act of transforming or replacing that authority; and at the end, establishing a new
authority that is rational.
After examining the theory of charisma of Weber, and the theory of
prophet by both Weber and Fromm, we should be able to establishing a concrete
and workable definition based in those two scholars. I define prophetic charisma
as such: "An individual who possess or is perceived to posses charisma, i.e.

extraordinary gifts, talents, and or abilities, not generally attainable to the
average person; whose uncompromising goal is to show alternative vision
of being; the dissemination of rational authority over irrational and or
authoritarian authority; and in general embodies that rational authority through
the theory - praxis dialectic; thus becoming an example of the alternative mode of
being; without regards to his own personal safety, status, and or wealth." We will
see how this definition can be applied to Muhammad, the exemplary
prophet oflslarn, 'Ali, Hussein, and finally Imam Khomeini.
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Prophet Muhammad as Standard Bearer for What is "Prophetic"
In the Islamic tradition, the most sacred figure is Prophet Muhammad ibn
'Abdallah ibn Abu Muttalib ibn Hisham of the 7th century Arabia. He was born in
the year 570 CE in the town of Mecca in Arabia, among the tribe of"bani
Hisham", which was a sub-tribe of the Quraysh, a very powerful and influential
clan. Orphaned at a young age, Muhammad was sent to live with his uncle Abu
Talib, who taught him the skills ofa trader, making frequent trips north to Syria
and south to Yemen. At the age of25 he was married to Khadijah, a wealthy
business woman in Mecca who bore his six children: 4 girls and 2 boys.
Unfortunately, the two boys both died as infants, while all 4 girls lived to
adulthood. During Muhammad's lifetime, Mecca became very prosperous for two
reasons. First, it lay in the middle of the trade routes connecting the Far East with
Europe, Middle East, and Africa. Secondly, Mecca was the epicenter ofArabian
paganism, with Arabs continuously journeying from all corners of the peninsula to
worship their pagan deities in the Ka'ba (cube). This massive stone structure was
said to be originally built by Abraham (Ibrahim) and his first son Ishmael (Isma'il)
in dedication to the one true god ofAbraham. Regardless of whether or not there
is any historical validity to this claim, the Ka'ba was at the time of Muhammad a
center of paganism, with 360 idols residing inside the structure.
As Mecca grew in affluence, wealth and power, the traditional social values
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of the Arabs began to wane. They neglected orphans, abused women, gambled,
were hard drinkers, owned slaves, and even practiced female infanticide. Social
inequality was the ugly step-sister of the ever-increasing wealth of the elites of
Mecca, especially the Quraysh tribe. Being very aware of his own precarious
position as a orphan, Muhammad was very sensitive to the plight and predicament
of others. He was disgusted by the rampant deterioration of any semblance of
justice and mercy, and often would retreat to a cave outside of Mecca for prayer
and contemplation. Furthermore, Muhammad was a hanif, someone who did not
participate in the paganism of the time but rather preferred to reserve his worship
for the single yet ambiguous deity addressed as Allah. Though there was no
formal religious tradition centered around a monotheistic notion of Allah, there
were many who would be labeled hanifbecause of their pre-Islamic disapproval
and rejection of polytheism. Taken together, Muhammad's concerns were
primarily religious and social in nature; he believed the origins of social inequality
were to be found in the prevalent paganism of Mecca.
According to Islam, Muhammad, at the age of 40, received an unexpected
commission from the divine when he was meditating in his cave. He was called to
be the Rasul Allah or Prophet of God, and to deliver a message to the world,
beginning first with his own Arab community. This message, which was given to
him via the angel Gabriel (Jibra'il), consisted of the very words of the divine.
These words or ayat (signs), would form what would later be called the Qur'an
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(the recitation), the sacred scripture oflslam. The essence ofthis new revelation
was twofold; first, tawhid, the oneness ofGod and the rejection ofpolytheism or
shirk (associating partners with God). Secondly, the establishment ofa just

society, based on the principles laid down by the Qur'an and Sunnah (traditions) of
the Prophet. Taken together, the Qur'an lays before the believer the Sirat al
Mustaqin or the straight path.

Because ofMuhammad's radical attack on the gods ofMecca and the
corrupt society that stemmed from those gods, the Prophet became a dangerous
enemy to the status quo. Not only did he attack the validity ofthe pagan gods,
and therefore the honor ofthe families that worshipped them, his message also had
a economic consequence; if the gods ofthe Ka'ba were not real, then why
should Arabs make hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca to worship worthless sticks and
stones; furthermore, ifthey didn't come, the pockets ofthe wealthy who depended
on the pilgrimage for their income would suddenly go empty. His attacks were
therefore both religious and economic and radically subverted the status quo. Not
only did the message ofIslam fundamentally call into question the pagan gods of
the Ka'ba, but also the corrupt and destructive society which stemmed from those
gods. However, the pagan Arabs associated their growing financial success with
the religious devotion to the gods oftheir fathers and to attack those gods was to
attack their way oflife and their wealth. Muhammad, like all prophets, would not
succeed without a struggle.
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Opposition to Muhammad first began with an attempt to buy him off. He
was offered money, status, women, and a leadership position in Mecca, ifonly he
would cancel his attacks on the gods and Meccan society. He refused, saying,
...by God, ifthey put the sun in my right hand and the moon in my left
and ordered me to give up this cause, I would never do it until either God
has vindicated me or I perish in the attempt. 36
All attempts by the elites ofMecca to discredit and discourage Muhammad's
message didn't stop it from attracting followers, especially among the poor, slaves,
and women - i.e. the disenfranchised and oppressed ofthe city.37 His calls for
social equality and justice were especially attractive to those who had never seen a
day ofpeace in their lives. Although a few in his own family didn't follow his
religious appeals, they nevertheless protected him from being killed by members of
other tribes and clans. Because tribal law prevented them from killing him, the city
fathers enacted an economic embargo against the early Muslims as the next best
thing. This embargo forbid anyone from doing business with them, which, in
effect, was intended to starve them out ofexistence. On top ofthis, Muslim
homes and properties were confiscated and sold off to the caravans, and thus they
were forced to live outside the protective confines ofthe city. Despite this massive
campaign against him, Muhammad's community (ummah) continued to grow and
the message ofthe Qur'an continued to be revealed to him through Gabriel.
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This oppressive situation lasted until September of 622 CE, with
opposition so fierce that Muhammad's life came to be in perpetual danger. Then
an invitation to mediate a conflict bordering on a civil war in the northern city of
Yathrib was extended to Muhammad. 38 On the condition that he and all his
followers would be welcome in the city as equals, and that the city would be under
the guidance of Islam and the Prophet, Muhammad accepted the offer and began
to move his people north. This "migration" or hijrah to Yathrib would mark the
year 1 in the Islamic calendar. 39
An Islamic government was established in Yathrib (later renamed Medinat

al-Nabi, City of the Prophet) and Muhammad's role as Prophet took on a new
component - that of a statesman and ruler. Between the year 622 CE, the year of
the migration, and 632, the year he died, Muhammad continued to build an Islamic
society, based on the principles and beliefs revealed to him by Allah. He ushered in
peace to the tom city of Yathrib, entered into mutual defense pacts with various
tribes including many Jewish tribes, signed peace treaties, expanded his religious
following throughout Arabia, cemented friendly relations with other Arab tribes
through marriage, led and fought in multiple armed conflicts, sent Muslim
emissaries to regional powers including Persia, Egypt, and Byzantium inviting

Muhammad was in more danger than before because his uncle Abu-Talib had recently died,
thus lifting any tribal protect afforded to Muhammad by tribal law. Assassination attempts were
being plotted and even implemented. Ali, Muhammad's cousin, was almost killed in
Muhammad's bed in an attempt to fool the conspirators. Because of Ali's ruse, Muhammad was
able to escape Mecca unharmed. Glasse, pp. 156 - 157.
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them to accept Islam built mosques, taught his followers the verses and meaning of
the Qur'an, and ultimately established a model oflslamic governance that has been
used as a guide for Muslims from then on.40 This was also the time period where
the vast majority oflslamic law was revealed by the Prophet. This law, later
canonized as the "shari'ah" by the four Sunni schools oflaw, was mostly the result
ofthis "Medina" period ofIslam and contains a wide variety ofsubjects including
property law, inheritance law, laws ofwar, trade laws, laws concerning slavery,
divorce, family, etc.
By the end ofMuhammad's life he had occupied the roles ofmessenger of
God, military general, revolutionary, statesman, arbitrator, father and husband, and
law-giver. What is most important about these roles is that they provide a guide
for later Muslims. This "custom ofthe Prophet" is called the sunnah.
The Qur'an and sunnah are the two primary sources oflslamic law,
customs, theology, and general guidance. The Qur'an is considered by Muslims to
be the direct and literal word ofGod (Ka/am Allah). It was preserved primarily
through memorization among Muhammad's immediate followers and, after his
death, was codified on paper by Caliph Uthman ibn 'Affan. On the other hand, the

Khomeini would later invoke these missions to the regional powers as proof of Allah's
condemnation of monarchy. He said: "Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession
wrong and invalid. When Islam first appeared in Iran, the Byzantine Empire, Egypt, and the
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Noble Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) wrote to the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius
and the Shahanshah of Iran, he called upon them to abandon the monarchical and imperial form
of government, to cease compelling the servants of God to worship them with absolute obedience
and permit them to worship God, Who has no partner and is the True Monarch." Algar, Islam
and Revolution 31.
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sunnah ofMuhammad is predominantly found in collections ofhadith (traditions),
including Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Abu Dawud, al-Tirmidhi, al-Nasa'i, and
Ibn Maja, which were compiled within the first centuries after Muhammad's death.
Although there are other collections ofhadith, these six, often called the al-Kutub
al-Sittah (the six books), are considered the most authentic.41 Among these, the
first two, al-Bukhari and Muslim, are considered the most authentic and reliable
because oftheir isnad, or chain oftransmission. These chains are meant to
demonstrate the reliability ofthe report by linking it through creditable sources
until it reaches the original source. Thus the solidity ofthe isnad lends validity to
the report.
When we look into the sirah (history) ofthe Prophet, we can begin to see
an example ofan individual who embodies what we can call "prophetic charisma."
Although Muslims do not consider Muhammad to be a deity, his earthly example is
taken as being normative in all dealings in the world. Because he was divinely
appointed to his mission, and served as the vessel through which the Qur'an was
delivered to mankind, his behavior is legitimated by the divine himself, thus giving
it authority to serve as a guide to other Muslims. Therefore Muslims for the last
fourteen hundred years have engaged in a imitatio Muhammadi (imitation of
Muhammad). No other person in the history oflslam has enjoyed
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such a position. 42
When we reexamine Weber's and Fromm's characterizations of
"Charisma" and "Prophet", we begin to see a mold that is adequately fit by
Muhammad. Firstly, Muhammad certainly fits the definition Weber lays out for
charisma. He is "considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or
,
qualities.' 43 This, of course, comes by virtue of his relationship to the divine,
being the active agent and mouthpiece of that deity. His position as Prophet of
Allah is not "accessible to the ordinary person" because he is in fact considered the
"seal of prophets" or the final prophet to mankind. Because of this status, he is
considered by his followers to be their "leader." Furthermore, his legitimacy is not
based on his acceptance by those around him. He is, regardless of their belief or
disbelief, the legitimate prophet because of his "divine call" or commission by the
divine; he was designated by the divine, not chosen by the people. Therefore,
unlike Shabbtai Zvi, success or failure does not affect his status as a prophet or
carrier of charisma. However, success ultimately did come to Muhammad and that
greatly enhanced the attraction people had to his message.
Consistent with Weber's notion of prophet, Muhammad certainly
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Muhammad.
43
Weber, Max. Economy and Society 241.

42

73

"proclaimed a religious doctrine or divine commanclment.',44 Although Weber
himselfdoesn't make a distinction between the "renewer ofreligion" and the
"founder ofreligion", it is clear from Muhammad's title ofRasul, that he would be
considered both in the Islamic understanding. Recall that the Rasul primarily
brings a new doctrine, but through that new doctrine, also reminds the believer of
that which he already knows. Muhammad's mission to the 'Arabs was not only to
bring the Qur'an (new doctrine), but to ''restore" the religion ofAbraham (old
doctrine). Thus Muhammad status ofRasul assumes a dual role - renewer and
founder.
Muhammad also fulfills the general role ofa prophet: that is, to stand
outside ofthe broader dominant culture and political structure, and
uncompromisingly speak truth to power. When he was offered wealth and status
he refused to compromise. Although there were multiple assassination attempts on
his life, he refused to give up his mission. The beliefthat he could not be bought
or killed only added to his appeal from those around him who were used to the
corruption ofpagan elites and the blood feuds between tribes. Although his
ultimate message had peace as a goa� he was not a harmonizer. The peace he
envisioned could only come from a radical negation ofthe given society. Until
then, he would expose and attack the unjust living situation ofthe slaves, women,
poor, and orphans, and the social structure that kept them in their place. He ended
the wide-spread practice offemale infanticide; he called for an end to lifetime
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slavery; he called for the equal treatment of women, and proclaimed that society at
large had a responsibility to meet the needs of orphans. This social message,
rooted in the fear of Allah justice, radically subverted the "intellectual force" - i.e.
the paganism and hedonism of the Arabs - which legitimated the status quo of the
"material force." Thus his call to Islam and the justice demanded by Allah
fundamentally undermined the material dominance of the ruling elite. His new
intellectual force, Islam, showing a new alternative vision of the future, first
attacked, then subverted, and ultimately replaced the old intellectual and material
force. For Muhammad, what ought to be the case negated what is the case, and
from the first day of Muhammad's prophethood that was an integral part of his
rmss1on.
Muhammad was certainly what Weber calls a law-giving prophet. Islam,

•

similar to Judaism, is a tradition that places an emphasis on law: i.e. personal law,
public laws, and laws of governance. However, Muhammad himself served as a
model and embodiment of that law in the eyes of the Muslims. According to
Islam, Muhammad did not suffer from a theory - praxis disconnect that is so
important for Fromm's notion of a prophet. What became law for the Muslims
was law for Muhammad. 45 Revolutionary speech was transformed into
revolutionary action. The Qur'an speaks about hypocrisy in a very damning way,
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even calling it a "disease of the heart.',46 Through the comprehensive guide of the
Qur'an and Muhammad's sunnah, he brings about an understanding that the world
is a "meaningful ordered totality", and that the social, political, and religious chaos
of the jahaliyya Arabs is a deviation from that ordered world. Furthermore, that
"meaningfully ordered world" is legitimated by the single deity Allah, not by the
discredited and impotent gods of the pagans, who had no power to resist their own
destruction.
For many people who heeded the call of Muhammad, their adoption of
Islam was a rejection of"irrational authority" and an acceptance of an authority
that encouraged growth and development of their intellectual capacities, their
capacity for solidarity and equality, the rejection of tribalism and an economic
structure based on subjugation and oppression, and a return to society based on
just principles. Freedom came through disobedience to the status quo and
submission to a new revolutionary force, i.e. Islam. Coming from the context of
the powerless, Islam deeply empowered the formally disenfranchised and liberated
their capacity to develop themselves as individuals and member of a community.
Islam and Muhammad, for the newly freed , represented the ultimate in "rational
authority."
From this point on, Muhammad's story of struggle against this irrational
authority, the irrational authority of pagan gods and their elite beneficiaries
established a model of prophetic action based in prophetic speech that would be
46
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emulated by later revolutionaries, such as Khomeini, and would be easily
recognizable as ''prophetic" by the followers of such revolutionaries.

The Prophetic and Martyrdom: 'Ali and Hussein

Because the orthodox doctrine of Islam says that Muhammad is the last
and final prophet to the world, no one after him can legitimately claim to be
divinely designated as a prophet. At best, people who wish to claim some form of
legitimacy based in religion, can claim to be embodying the mold established by the
prophet, thus bearing the description of"prophetic." But they cannot claim
prophethood because they lack the legitimacy of a divine designation. Unlike
Fromm's notion of a prophet, meaning anyone who represents rational authority
and speaks truth, while fully living up to the theory - praxis dialectic, Islam
believes it takes a individual designation by the divine to be a prophet.
Muhammad's call to prophethood in the cave outside of Mecca is a prime
example. Henceforth, when we speak of a "prophet", we shall be using the Islamic
understanding based on the designation clause, while using "prophetic" for those
who engage in actions and speech that would be associated with prophets, but who
lack a direct designation by the divine.
Because of the violent origins, and the brutal suppression of the Shi'a sect
oflslam, the Shi'a have a long history of glorification of martyrdom and martyrs
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(Shuhada') A typical definition of a martyr is anyone who dies or is killed while

fighting, bearing witness (shahid) to the faith.47 Although there are many martyrs
in the Shi'a tradition, two stand out well above all others due to their importance
in the development of the Shi'a sect. First, there is 'Ali ibn Abu Talib (598 661CE), Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law through his marriage to the
prophet's daughter Fatimah. The second is 'Ali's second son Hussein, who was
also killed while fighting those he believed were usurpers to the office of Khalifah
(representative or successor to the prophet).
The story of'Ali's martyrdom is complex and detailed. However, I shall
summarize much of the story in order to get to the "prophetic" aspect of his life
and death. 'Ali was one of the first converts to Islam. Raised in Muhammad's
house after Abu Talib, 'Ali's father, had died, the father of Muhammad's two
grandchildren, a great military general who conquered and converted Yemen to
Islam; and was appointed representative of the Prophet while Muhammad was
engaged in a battle at the northern oasis city ofTabuk:48 According to the Shi'a
tradition, Muhammad had officially designated 'Ali to be his religious and military
successor upon his death.49 However, after Muhammad died, 'Ali's claim to
power was thrice rejected. Abu Bakr al-Sadiq (d. 634 CE), Umar ibn al-Khattab
(d. 644 CE), and Uthman ibn 'Affan (d. 656 CE), were all elected caliph, by means
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of a shura (council), before 'Ali ever saw power. 50 It was only after Uthman ibn
'Affan was assassinated in Medina in 656 CE that 'Ali was installed as the
successor to the Prophet.
A deep division ensued between those who followed 'Ali and the belief that
the bait al-Rasul (house of the Prophet) were the legitimate successors to
Muhammad (since known as the Shi'a, from Shi 'at 'Ali - Party of 'Ali), and those
who believed that succession should be decided by the companions of the Prophet
through an elective council. Furthermore, during Uthman's reign, the Umayyad
clan ascended to power through the political and military conquest of the Middle
East. During the time of the Prophet, the Umayyads were the "urban aristocracy
of Mecca" that first bitterly opposed the Prophet, then only nominally converted to
Islam after being faced with overwhelming forces. 51 Through the reign ofUthman,
his Umayyad clan maintained and augmented their wealth and power and their
hedonistic lifestyle, hidden behind the public veil oflslam. Nepotism was the norm
in the Umayyad dynasty, and it deeply antagonized 'Ali and his followers, who
believed Islam and the office of Khalifa was being abused by a corrupt family.
Furthermore, the core of their resistance to the Umayyads was the belief that 'Ali
was the only legitimate heir to the prophet because he was publicly designated by
the Prophet for that position. Thus, all three men who had been elected to succeed
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the Prophet by the shura were illegitimate and rejected by the Shi'a. The fact that
these men were elected over Muhammad's clear designation of 'Ali is often
explained as being a test from Allah to separate the mu 'min (true believers) from
the munafiqun (hypocrites). 52
Although 'Ali was eventually installed as the Khaliph by those who killed
Uthman, support for his rule was small and he was forced to leave Medina for the
safety ofKufa, Iraq, an 'Arab garrison town between the Tigris and Euphrates.53
Because of the assassination ofUthman, a blood-feud erupted between the families
of 'Ali and the slain Khaliph. Mu'awiya, the Damascus governor of Syria and an
Umayyad clan member, vowed to destroy the Shi'a and their troublesome leader.
Likewise, 'Ali was prepared to fervently defend his claim to leadership. Because
of this, their two armies eventually faced each other on the battlefield of Siffin in
4
657 CE.5 However, none of the battles were decisive and both sides reluctantly

agreed to arbitration. Afterwards, Mu'awiyajudged that he had ultimately won
the battle and continued to declare himself the legitimate Khaliph. On the other
hand, many in 'Ali's army were extremely dissatisfied with his decision to agree to
arbitration, saying that he had no right to compromise on what Allah had ordained;
their cry was "Decision is God's Alone."55 For his treachery, the Khawarij,
seceders from 'Ali's army, succeeded in assassinating 'Ali by stabbing him with a
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poisoned sword late in January 661 CE, while he was entering his mosque in
Kufa. 56 He was buried in the Iraqi city ofNajaf, where today his tomb serves as a
pilgrimage site for many Shi'a, and a center of Shi'a theological training. 57
For those who stayed loyal to 'Ali, this crime was an unspeakable
rebellious act against Allah himself and it has served as a line of division between
the Sunni and Shi'a sects ever since. Furthermore, 'Ali's refusal to submit to an
illegitimate authority has inspired his followers through the ages. Like
Muhammad, he serves as a template for radical prophetic leadership through his
uncompromising attempts to negate the status quo and his willingness to be
martyred for the cause. Unlike the Khawarij, who saw 'Ali's agreeing to
arbitration as a compromise, the Shi'a have generally been reluctant to interpret it
in such a way. Rather they see it as a pragmatic strategy, designed to save lives
and resources and fight another day . Although Damascus hoped this challenge to
their rule would diminish, the antagonism between them and the descendents of
'Ali didn't end with the death ofMu'awiya nor 'Ali. It was passed on to the next
generation.
Upon Mu'awiya's death, Umayyad authority passed onto his son Yazid, an
overtly hedonistic and irreligious man. Likewise, for the Shi'a, authority passed to
Hasan, the eldest son of'Ali, known for his piety and scholarship. Despite his
claim to authority, the overwhelming military strength and Syrian occupation of
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Iraq forced Hasan to negotiate with the Umayyads, and this eventually led to his
abdication of authority in 661 CE. 58 He would eventually retire in Medina and
dedicate his life to scholarship; his only major contribution was his fathering of
many children; he therefore became the progenitor ofnearly all the descendents of
Muhammad. Hasan's non-resistance to tyranny would later provide the Shi'a
clerics with a precedent for political "quietism": the purposeful absence ofclerics
in national and international politics. 59
The Shi'a disappointment with Hasan soon faded as they set their eyes
upon his younger and more politically active brother Hussein. Mu'awiya's death
and designation ofYazid in 680 CE allowed for another opportunity to challenge
the legitimacy ofthe Umayyad Khaliphate. The Shi'a, led by Hussein's cousin,
Muslim ibn 'Aqil, had determined that the conditions were right for such a
challenge and informed Hussein that thousands would support his
claim to the Khaliphate ifhe wanted it. 60 Wanting to avenge his father and
believing in the correctness ofhis cause ofreestablishing the legitimate heir to
Muhammad, Hussein secretly traveled from Mecca northeastward towards Iraq.
What he didn't know was that his travels were being watched by Umayyad spies
sent by Ubaydallah ibn Ziyad, the Iraqi Governor, and that they were plotting an
ambush for Hussein and his party, which consisted mostly offamily and a small
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contingency offighters.61 The Umayyad force pushed Hussein's party north of
Kufa until they reached Karbala. The next day the enemy forces were reinforced
with approximately 4,000 solidiers and forced the Shi'a to go without water for
three days. 62 Most disappointing to Hussein was the fact that none of the
"partisans" ofKufa, who had sworn they would fight for the cause of Hussein
showed up, leaving his small group to fight an overwhelming force on its own.
When Hussein refused to pay tnbute to Yazid on the 9th ofMuharram, the army
encroached on the camp and, by morning on the 10th, had attacked and
slaughtered all the people in Hussein's camp, including women and children.63
Although Hussein's men fought valiantly, and he himself led the fight from the
back of his horse, they were no match for the overwhelming force ofthe
Umayyads. Hussein was decapitated and his body trampled by horses. 64
Afterwards the dead were buried in Karbala and the head of Hussein was sent to
the Governor in Kufa; it later ended up in Damascus or Cairo. 65

Although at

the time the death of Hussein had little effect on the overall political environment
of Iraq, it became a extremely important event in the development of Shi'a Islam.
Up to this time, as Heinz Halm has argued, the Shi'a movement was only one of
political motivations. However, after the brutal killing of Hussein and his family,
the Shi'a tradition was forever separated religiously from the more dominant Sunni
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tradition. Hussein himselfbecame the archetype ofthe martyr, forever suffering
under the authority ofillegitimate power, yet never submitting to that authority.
The story ofHussein's martyrdom at Karabala at the hands ofYazid came to play
a major part in Khomeini's narrative about the Shah; Khomeinei called the Shah
the "new Yazid."
As we can see, the story ofearly Islam provides many models and
templates for the resistance to irrational and illegitimate power. These templates
would come to be used quite effectively by Khomeini as he struggled against what
he believed to be a new manifestation ofthe same powers that martyred 'Ali and
Hussein. As Yann Richards has written, "the martyrdom ofHoseyn [Hussein] has
become the prototype ofevery struggle for justice, every suffering. That is where
the heart ofShi'ism lies, in this agony which is at one and the same time a revolt
and a sign ofhope."66
Heinz Halm has articulated a very important factor in the development of
the Shi'a from a political opposition group to a minority religious sect. When
Hussein was in need ofreinforcements from his "partisan" followers ofKufa, they
shamefully remained idle and in consequence allowed Hussein and his party to be
massacred. The emergence of"the penitents" (al-tawwabun) came from what
Halm calls a "crisis ofconscious" from those partisans because oftheir failure to
assist Hussein. 67 This movement, led by a man named Sulayman ibn Surad, who
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had earlier sworn allegiance to Hussein and his claim to authority, sought to relieve
their collective through collective repentance (tauba). 68 Because this sin (dhanb or
khata ') was shared throughout the Shi'a community, it's atonement must be

sought even by future generations and is still performed today in Iran and other
Shi'a dominated areas.69 The bloody 'Ashura ceremony, which takes place every
year on the 10th day ofMuharram and includes ritual flagellation and beating one's
brow with a sword in processions and collective gatherings is seen as a substitute
for the death which should have occurred at Karabala. The penitent shows his
desire to relieve his historic guilt by saying: "...if we been there at Karbala we
would have stood with him [i.e., the imam Hussein] and shed our blood and died
with him."70 As Halm correctly points out, Ayatollah Khomeini skillfully tapped
Shi'a sensibilities concerning their failure to help Hussein when he was in need,
when he likened the modern struggle against the Shah to the struggle against
Yazid and the earlier tyranny. 71 The Shi'a, it would seem, would not let another
revolutionary figure become a martyr because of their inaction. Even after
Khomeini's death in 1989, Iranian television displayed Iranian prisoners of war
returning from Saddam Hussein's Iraq who knelt at the grave of Khomeini,
begging for his forgiveness at their failure to die in battle. In effect, Khomeini
became a modern Hussein figure, and this time Iranians would support him.
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CHAPTER IV
KHOMEINI'S PROPHETIC CHARISMA

Now that we have investigated the many facets of"prophetic charisma",
and have determined the exemplary figures ofprophetic charisma in the first
paradigm ofShi'a Islam, i.e. Muhammad, 'Ali, and Hussein, we need to examine
Khomeini's political and religious history to determine where these concepts are
applicable to Khomeini.
Returning to Weber's original definition ofcharisma, Khomeini was
considered by many to be "extraordinary" and endowed with "exceptional powers
or qualities." His powers ofintellect, persuasion, scholarship, and rhetoric, not to
mention his unflinching courage, all contributed to the almost mystical aura and
appeal that surrounded him. However, though he never claimed to be anything
other than a cleric, many perceived him to be nearly "supernatural", and or
"superhuman." In fact, the very title of"Imam", usually only applied to the
Twelve Imams ofShi'a Islam, testifies that some speculated, whether spoken or
only in thought, that he could be the returning Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, or at
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least that he was somehow connected with the return of the hidden Imam. 1
Because this speculation could only enhance his legitimacy, this underground
notion was never officially repudiated by Khomeini himself, nor his government.
On the other hand, it would not have been appropriate, for reasons that are
obvious, to confirm or openly encourage such assertions. Some conservative
clerics saw the novel use of the term as possibly blasphemous. 2 Therefore,
Khomeini neither confirmed nor denied the speculation. However, he was often
called Naib al-Imam or Vice-Regent of the Hidden Imam throughout the Iranian
press. 3 This designation gave him heightened stature through his connection to the
Hidden Imam, while implicitly denying that he was the Hidden Imam himself. 4
For those who did not believe Khomeini was the hidden Imam, yet
submitted to his authority, he was an exemplary figure who, because of his
exceptional abilities, was ''treated as a leader." This is important because
Khomeini's legitimacy as a revolutionary leader was dependent on the consent of
the followers, not from a direct divine designation, located in a given time of
history. Although he had religious authority as a scholar, a mujtahid, and marja-i
taqlid, his political leadership was not commissioned by the divine, as a Prophet's
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Iranian people. The situation in Iran gave rise to Khomeini's quest, not a divine
appointment from above. 5 Therefore, his legitimacy as a revolutionary had to be
accepted by those around him who through their acceptance, conferred upon him
legitimacy as the leader of the revolution. Without it, he would have been just
another Ayatollah among many.
Weber makes "proof of success" an important feature of the charismatic
leader's claim to continuing acceptance. If success eludes him, Weber says, "his
charismatic authority will disappear."6 In the early days of the revolution, it would
be hard to categorize the situation as being anything but successful. The Shah was
consolidating power, militarizing, implementing the "White Revolution", poverty
was on the rise, international corporations were dominating the economy, and the
Shah and his family were reaping the benefits. However, in the long run, Khomeini
did deliver on his promise to rid Iran of the Shah and his Western cultural
influences and his so-called "modernization" programs. Although there were
setbacks, challenges, and painful moments, i.e. exile, loss of freedom, death of
loved ones, and massacres, these were interpreted as being tests from the divine to
separate the mu 'min from the munafiqun - just as it was for 'Ali and Hussein.
Interpreting the events in such a way deflated any accusation that, because of the
setbacks, the divine had abandoned their cause. In the perception of the majority
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oflranian people, the fight against the Shah's tyranny led by the Ayatollah resulted
in Iranian independence from the dictatora coronada, Western domination, and a
new promise of the future. Needless to say, that was not the view of the defeated
regune.
It is absolutely clear that Khomeini never claimed to be a prophet, nor did
his followers see him as such. However, they did see him and his actions as being
"prophetic" in that it fit the model of the prophet, and the prophetic example of
'Ali and Hussein. Recalling the general role of the prophet to stand outside of the
dominate culture and political structure, uncompromisingly speak truth to power,
interrogate institutions of irrational authority, stir up discontent by exposing the
contradictions and antagonisms in society, government, religion, etc., and finally
offer an alternative vision of being in the world as opposed to the status quo, it is
clear that Khomeini molded himself, either by design or by nature, to the prophetic
models that preceded him. The prophetic role to undermine and transform or
abolish systems and structures of corruption and domination was fulfilled in
Khomeini's uncompromising attacks of the Shah and his regime. Just as
Muhammad had led a movement to end the age of Jahaliyya (ignorance) during his
time and offered an alternative vision of the future, likewise Khomeini would
interpret his own actions and the actions of his fellow revolutionaries as being
much the same; a righteous attack against ignorance and domination in order to
establish an alternative order based on the principles of the Qur'an. Furthermore,
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Khomeini's revolutionary stance against the Westernization oflran through the so
called "White Revolution", and the cultural and political chaos that flowed from
that policy, was domesticated by Khomeini's attempt to bring political, social, and
religious order back to Iran. Khomeini, in the eyes of the Iranian people, was a
spearhead that would kill the chaos of the Shah.

Modernization Without Westernization?

There is a certain dialectic of the Iranian revolution that many scholars
seem to misdefine. Khomeini was not against technological modernization. The
case is quite the opposite; he believed those clerics who were to be "reactionaries."
He felt that Iran had to modernize, but not at the expense of the Iranian Shi'a
identity. He was fervently against "cultural modernization" - i.e. westernization of
Iran - and even called the cultural infatuation with the West "westoxication."
However, part of Khomeini's revolution was to reestablish an Iranian "identity"
based in Shi'a Islam, not Iranian nationalism based in blood and soil, while
absorbing parts of modernity that could be used without conflicting with that Shi'a
identity. Khomeini tried to bring Iran into the modem world organically, while at
the same time saving and preserving cultural identity from the Shah's culturally
suicidal plan. This strategy preserved enough of the Shah's modernization
program so that the country would not fall into a new dark age, while maintaining
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the traditional and historical Shi'a religious identity. Through his determinate
negation of modernity, preserving technology while rejecting Western cultural

penetration, Khomeini's attack on the Shah was meant to end cultural chaos while
still modernizating Iran, albeit promoting a modernization that is organic, not
forced upon Iranians from the West or from the monarchy. 7
Some Western scholars - i.e. Jurgen Habermas - would argue that the
instrumental rationality of the modern technological world would undermine the
communicative rationality of the Qur'an and the Islamic tradition, citing the

precedent of Christianity in Europe. However, Khomeini agreed with the radical
sociologist 'Ali Shari'ati's thesis that secularization brought progress to Europe,
because of the historical tyrannical rule of the church (presumably Catholic). But
Islam was not Christianity, and regardless of all their faults, the Shi'a clergy never
acted in a tyrannical way, partly because they had never held power, and partly
because the Islamic tradition did not have a deep seated antagonism towards
science and technological progress as did Christianity. In Western history, science
undermined the legitimacy of religious rule because it negated the sacred text that
legitimated that rule. Once weakened, the Western worldview became increasingly
secular, and was devoured by instrumental rationality. In the East, including Iran,

1ran was surrounded by well equipped militaries such as lraq, Turkey, and Israel, and Khomeini
could not have even attempted to disassemble the Iranian military modernization program
without subjecting Iran to threats from neighboring countries, let alone a possible counter
revolution by the U.S. Although Khomeini did not agree with the Shah's extensive purchasing of
U.S. military goods, which he claimed made lran most dependent on the West, he was soon using
those weapons in the Iran - lraq war from 1980 -1988.
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instrumental rationality was neglected for a strong communicative rationality.

Hence technological progress was slow but families, communities, and their sense
of solidarity remained intact. Thus Khomeini and other "modernizers" of Iran did
not fear the influence of technology, but fervently rejected the politics behind the
Shah's cultural modernization.

Khomeini's Theory - Praxis Dialectic

As demonstrated before, a major aspect of Fromm's notion of the prophet,
and my theory or prophetic charisma, is the theory - praxis dia/ectic. 8 In order for
Khomeini to fit the mold of the prophetic, he would have to demonstrate that his
actions are congruent with his theory. Does Khomeini practice what he preaches?
Is he a leader who leads by example, fulfilling his own pronouncements, or does he
stop at the act of speaking and criticizing and leaves the doing to subordinates?
According to Fromm, the man whose words are not followed by deeds
cannot be prophetic, because the very nature of the prophetic is rooted in the
consistency of theory and praxis. When we look into the political biography of
Khomeini, we see an individual who placed himself at the center of a struggle, not
only offering up a critique of the regime, but physically paying the price for that
critique. For example, after Khomeini made a speech in June of 1963, likening the
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Shah to Yazid, that sparked the Qiyam-i Khordad uprising, Khomeini spent
nineteen days in jail and another nine months under house arrest for his actions. 9
Following his confinement, he dispelled all myths that he compromised with the
Shah, vowing to continue to struggle against him. 10 Furthermore, these continued
attacks led to Khomeini's exile from Iran that lasted over a decade. At all times
Khomeini was prepared to face death. Although SAVAK, the deeply feared secret
police, always monitored his movements and speeches and :frequently killed
political opponents ofthe regime, including thousands ofhis supporters, Khomeini
stayed resolved to speak truth to power prophetically. Khomeini remained
undaunted by the Shah's overwhelming forces, and like the Prophet Muhammad,
taught that death in the defense ofreligion is not only honorable, but to be
welcomed. Speaking to a delegation ofcustoms officials in March of 1979, he
said:" My dear brothers! Do not abandon this secret ofyour success, do not
abandon orientation to God, to Islam. For the Muslim, for the believer,
martyrdom is a source ofhappiness. Our young men regard martyrdom as a
blessing, and this, too, is a secret ofour success."11 Khomeini faced death at every
moment yet did not fear it. He often even taunted his enemies to make a martyr
out ofhim, saying: "I say this quite clearly; ifthey wish, let the agents oflsrael
come put an end to my life."12 However, the Shah feared making Khomeini into a
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martyr. During a conversation with Ayatollah Kamalvand in 1963, the Shah said;
"I assure you that we are not going to kill Khomeini and turn him into a martyr.
We are going to compromise and discredit him among the people." 13 Clearly, the
Shah's attempts to discredit him failed as well and the Ayatollah remained
uncompromising. Unlike the other clerics, who stopped only at criticism of the
regime and often compromised with it, Khomeini was determined to end the reign
of the Shah, and would not ask others to do what he was not willing to do himself.
This aspect places him well within Fromm's category of prophet.
Furthermore, Khomeini interpreted the suffering and martyrdom of the
young revolutionaries to be in the service of Prophet Muhammad and Imam al
Hussein. On April 3rd, 1963, at a fortieth day commemoration of the Martyrs of
Qum, Khomeini said,
Indeed, we must offer our condolences to the Prophet oflslam (peace
and blessings be upon him and his family) and the Imam of the Age
(may God hasten his renewed manifestation), for it is for the sake of those
great ones that we have endured these blows and lost our young men.
Our crime was defending the laws oflslam and the independence oflran.
It is because of our defense oflslam that we have been humiliated and
brought to expect imprisonment, torture, and execution. 14

The language of Khomeini's speech betrays his mindset.

As

you can see, he

speaks in terms of the collective. He says "We have endured these blows, and lost
our young men", "Our Crime was defending the laws oflslam... ", "It is because of
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our defense ofIslam that we have been humiliated..." Through his rhetoric,
Khomeini is able to draw the listener close to the leader, demonstrating to them
that their struggle is against the common enemy, and that the leadership of
Khomeini will not, like so much ofthe clergy, simply stop at words. Although this
semantic strategy has been a Machiavellian trick used by tyrants and despots for
ages, Khomeini's story corresponds to his words. Khomeini did lose his son
Mustapha to the struggle, he was imprisoned by the Shah, he was exiled, and he
was humiliated in Turkey when they stripped him ofhis clerical garb.
Consequently, Khomeini is perceived as the "suffering charismatic" much like the
suffering ofMuhammad, 'Ali, and Hussein; his suffering is donefisabilillah (for
the sake ofAllah); like Hussein, he is a "defender oflslam" treated shamefully by
a tyrannical despot. 15 His personal suffering does not go unnoticed by the people,
especially when they compare his plight to the relative ease ofthe quietist clerics.
In fact, when Khomeini was jailed, accused ofbeing a agent ofimperialism, or
when his son mysteriously died, all these events served as a catalyst for
demonstrations and protests against the regime. His prophetic action and his
suffering was in stark contrast to the priestly others' inaction, and signaled his
sincerity to engage himselftotally in the struggle against the Shah. Furthermore,
the special attention the Shah gave to Khomeini only highlighted Khomeini's
leadership ofthe revolution. By recognizing Khomeini as a real threat, the Shah

15

It is interesting to note that Khomeini and Hussein's image were used as symbols of resistance
to the Shah. It was not uncommon to see the images of these two men side by side in the massive
street demonstrations in Iran.
95

legitimated Khomeini's leadership and helped to bolster his profile and therefore
his following. This strategic blunder on the part of the Shah highlighted the
difference between the prophetic Khomeini and the priestly clerics, who were
quickly falling out of popularity with those who where joining the revolution. It
also sidelined other moderate middle-class opposition movements who were more
interested in reforming the monarchy than overthrowing it. 16

Khomeini and the Priest

If we are going to say that Khomeini embodies the prophetic, based on the
model of the Prophet and his martyred family, then we have to examine
comparatively the notion of the Priest according to Weber and Fromm. At first
glance it would be easy to assume that Khomeini would fall into the category of a
priest because, as Weber states, the priest claims authority "by virtue of his service
in a sacred tradition." 17 In contrast, the prophet's claim is "based on personal
revelation and charisma." 18 Setting aside the issue of authority, which I will
examine later, it is clear that Khomeini never claimed to have a special designation
from the divine that would give him the authority of a prophet. On the other hand,
although his political activism was rejected by many senior clerics, his service to
the sacred tradition through his scholarship, teaching, and religious leadership was
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impeccable. Based solely on Weber's concepts, we are left with only the
possibility that he was a "priest" in service to the Shi'a tradition, yet functioned,
through his political speech and actions, to fill the model of the prophet, thus being
prophetic. Therefore, he could be considered a "prophetic priest." This would
make Khomeini the exception in Weber's analysis. In distinguishing between the
prophet and priest, Weber says; "it is no accident that almost no prophets have
emerged from the priestly class." 19 His use of the term almost indicates that
Weber is open to the possibility that a priest could become a prophetic renegade, a
traitor to his class. Once this is the case, the prophetic priest assumes the role of
the prophet, and although his origins are in the priesthood, and his authority is still
to some extent based there, his role as a prophetic leader eclipses his traditional
role as a priest. Much like the liberation theologians of South and Central America
who rejected the neutrality of the church, and its collusion with state power, in
order to side with the victims of that oppressive situation, Khomeini likewise
rejected the clerics' historical quietism and/ or melancholy acceptance of the
tyrannical regime, to lead a movement that would benefit the victims of the regime.
The priest turned prophetic.

19
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Khomeini's Attempt to Bring the Prophet to the Priests

In his conversation with other clerics, Khomeini's goal was often to
radicalize them and to instill the prophetic into their priestly religious attitudes. He
did not in any case wish to destroy and or abolish the clerics, who were his own
power-base. What he did wish to do was to instill the prophetic Hussein model
into the clergy that was so heavily dominated by the Hasan model ofpolitical
quietism In short, Khomeini tried to instill the prophet into the priest.20 In a
friendly debate with the Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Mohsen Hakim, Khomeini skillfully
urged the quietist scholar to follow the prophetic model ofHussein. He said;
Khomeini: "How could it [a revolution] not achieve results? Did not the
uprising ofHossein serve history? Are we not benefiting greatly from his
uprising?''
Hakim: "What do they have to say about Imam Hassan? He did not stage
an uprising!"
Khomeini: "Iflmam Hassan had as many followers as you have he would
have led an uprising. He initially stood up [ for his religion] but failed
because his followers had sold themselves out to the enemy. But you have
followers in all Islamic countries."
Hakim: "I do not see anybody who would follow us ifwe took action."
Khomeini: "You order an uprising and I will be the first to follow you."21
Soon after this discussion, Grand Ayatollah Hakim died and sent the
leading clerics into a frenzy over his replacement. The Shah strategically sent
encouraging telegrams to the apolitical conservative clerics Shari'atmadari and
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Khonsari in an attempt to dissuade other from recognizing the militant Khomeini
as Hakim's successor, thereby preserving the Hassan model in the higher echelons
of clerical authority. 22 During this period, Khomeini made multiple speechs on the
need to establish an Islamic state in Iran, pressing his audience to understand that it
is a ''religious duty" to bring about such a state. 23 Anticipating attacks from the
conservative clerics for his mixing politics and religion, Khomeini appealed to the
moderate clergy saying,
Whenever a man has risen to prominence they have killed, imprisoned or
exiled him, and have tried to accuse him of being political. This mol/ah is
political. The Prophet was a political person. This evil propaganda [the
need for the clergy to remain outside politics] was spread by the agents of
imperialism to cause you to shun politics, to prevent you from intervening
in the affairs of society, and struggling against treacherous governments
and their anti- nationalistic and anti-Islamic policies. They want to do
whatever they please without anybody trying to stop them.24

It is clear from this speech that Khomeini associated the Prophet with politics. By
stating that the Prophet was political, and that he is also political, Khomeini is
attempting to prove to his audience that political opposition to the Shah is
grounded in the prophetic model: that privatizing religion, keeping it out of
politics, not only castrates its prophetic potential; it is a strategy of those who fear
the power of Islam and is contrary to the sunnah of Muhammad. Speaking in
Najaf, just forty days after the massacre of protesters in Qum on January 8, 1978,
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Khomeini responded to the notion ofthe separation ofreligion and politics, saying,
The imperialists know full well how active the religious scholars are, and
what an activist and militant religion Islam is. So they drew up a plan to
bring the religious scholars into disrepute, and for several centuries
propagated the notion that religion must be separated from politics. Some
ofour akhunds [religious authority] came to believe it and began asking,
'What business do we have with politics?' The posing ohhis question
means the abandonment of Islam; it means burying Islam in our cells in the
madrasa! It means burying Islam in our books! The imperialists dearly
wish that religion could be separated from politics, and our politicians, in
turn, have filled people's mouths with these words, so that some ofus
have come to believe them and ask, 'What business do we have with
politics? Leave politics to those whose business it is, and ifthey slap us in
the face, let us turn the other cheek!"25
In no way did Khomeini believe in the separation ofreligion and politics. For him,
the uncompromising prophetic stance ofthe Islamic tradition was the only true
and authentic form ofresistance to a tyranny- a tyranny that was attempting to
destroy Iran, Islam, and the Muslim world. He did not want to follow the Western
bourgeoisie model ofrestricting religion to private life, only to call upon it in order
to legitimate policies and/ or actions when going through a crisis oflegitirnacy. 26
This was the hypocrisy ofthe bourgeoisie enlightenment and ofsecular
democracies abroad. More importantly, ifIslam was a "complete and total way of
life", and not just an intellectual philosophy, then it was not even possible to
compartmentalize politics and religion. Because the Prophet's life is taken as a
''normative" example ofhow a Muslim should live, and because he himselfdid not

Algar, Religion and Revolution 219. Akhunds was Khomeini's sarcastic term for religious
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separate religion from politics, then it was not feasible for those who are supposed
to represent that tradition (sunnah) i.e. the clerics, to do otherwise.
Of those "priestly" clerics who represented the status quo, who had
compromised with the Shah and joined ranks with him, Khomeini defiantly says,
God knows what misfortunes Islam has suffered from its inception down to
the present day at the hands of these evil ulema [scholars]. Our youth must
strip them of turbans. I am not saying they should be killed; they do not
deserve to be killed. But take off their turbans! They do not need to
be beaten much; just remove their turbans. 27
Khomeini did not want clerics to be attacked in the streets; this would bring about
accusations that he was an "agent of imperialism" by the Shah or collaborating
clerics. Furthermore, Khomeini believed that the Shah would be delighted to see
clerics turn on themselves and hence diminish the power of the clergy through
internal divisions. 28 However, he did believe that clerics who compromise Islamic
principles by submitting to or working with illegitimate and tyrannical regime
should be stripped of their clerical rank; hence the removal of the turbans.
Although he hadn't given up hope on the majority of the ulema, Khomeini
did vehemently attack some conservative "priestly" clerics, including Iraqi
Ayatollah Kho'i. Kho'i was a very influential and authoritative scholar who had an
immense following in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Having rejected Khomeini's
political activism, Kho'i criticized what he believed were the inconsistencies and
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flaws ofKhomeini's philosophy oflslamic governance, velayat-ifaqih (Rule ofthe
Jurist). 29 Even as Khomeini was actively resisting the Shah in December of 1978,
the Ayatollah Kho'i was entertaining visits from the Empress Farah and Saddam
Hussein. Ever the Shah's friend, Ayatollah Kho'i gave the Empress a ring as a gift
for the Shah. The inscription read "God's power is superior to theirs'. "30 The
Ba'athist dictator Saddam Hussein and the Empress were actively courting the
Ayatollah Kho'i support against Khomeini and the growing rebellion.
To no one's surprise, Khomeini held a deep dislike for the conservative,
apolitical Kho'i. Khomeini resented the ties between the monarchy and the cleric,
who was a leading voice against the revolution because ofhis immense influence .
This priestly cleric, whose authority was based in the same traditional scholarship
and institutions oflearning as Khomeini's, was a potent alternative to Khomeini's
views, and therefore a threat to the movement. Ifhe had gained enough influence
he could have been the water that doused Khomeini's prophetic fire. After Kho'i
called Khomeini's followers "donkeys" for being killed by SAVAK machine guns,
Khomeini responded,
While our young people were killed in the streets he sent a ring for the
health ofMuhammad Reza (the Shah). These people, as Imam Ali himself
said, devote their entire attention, like animals, to their fodder, their whole
life is spent filling their stomachs. 31
No compromise could be made with such priestly scholars; after it was established
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that they would not defect to Khomeini viewpoint, he no longer tried to convert
them. On the issue ofKho'i quietism, I disagree with some scholars who would
say that Kho'i's position was apolitical. What he did not do was engage in
oppositional politics - he did politically choose sides, and he sided with the
monarchy. That in and ofitselfwas a political act. Furthermore, Heinz Halm, in
his discussion on traditional Shi'a quietism, makes it clear that quietest clerics did
intervene in current events on occasion ifclerical interests were at stake, such as
the tobacco concessions and land reforms ofthe previous Shah. Therefore it
would not have been a total break from tradition to intervene in the current
ongoing struggle.32 In Khomeini's view, the situation in Iran was now far more
detrimental to the interests ofthe clerics than ever before, and thus warranted a
break in the quietist position. However, Ayatollah Kho'i was not persuaded and
continued to remain loyal to the Shah; and to be a political enemy to Khomeini.
The Ayatollah also had no tolerance for clerics who claimed it was the
responsibility ofthe Twelfth Imam to set things right. He said, "now we find one
ofthe 'ulama ... expressing himself as follows: 'lfthe Imam ofthe Age [Twelfth
Imam]...thinks it necessary, he will come, I cannot claim to be more concerned for
Islam than he is; so ifthe Imam sees what is happening, let him come himselfto
remedy our affairs! Why should I do anything?'"33 In an attack on such a
cowardly and priestly position, Khomeini responded, "that is the logic ofpeople
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who want to avoid responsibility... they have not read the Qur'an...because such
traditions are contrary to the custom of the prophets. "34 Khomeini was not
prepared to wait until the return of the Imam in order to end the tyranny of the
Shah. Desires for an eschatological salvation was not going to change the
situation in Iran. This would have to be done by very earthly means.
Furthermore, Khomeini believed the Mahdi would only reappear when Muslims
through off the shackles of mental and cultural colonialism and returned to Islam,
producing a just society and exporting revolution abroad. 35
Despite his inability to attract many important senior clerics to his mission,
Khomeini continued to try to woo others to his prophetic stance against the Shah.
Khomeini believed that the prophetic model demanded prophetic action against an
illegitimate and irrational authority, much like 'Ali and Hussein's battle with the
Umayyads. The goal of other clerics was self preservation, by maintaining and
preserving the status quo through staying out of politics and/ or compromising
with the regime. For Khomeini, those who follow the Prophet and Imam Hussein
are people of prophetic action, while those who follow the priestly model dedicate
their lives to "filling their stomachs."
Khomeini was often perturbed by those apolitical clerics that would
question his motives by citing the Qur'anic verse that reads: "obey God, the
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Prophet, and those who have authority over you. "36 In refuting their exegesis,
Khomeini makes a clear distinction between those who have authority and those
who have power. He said, "such question[s] involved a clear denial of the
Qur'an", because Pharaoh had kingship, but Allah sent Moses to oppose him.
Nimrod had kingship, but Abraham opposed him. Even Mu'awiyah was a "holder
of authority", and the "Commander of the Faithful", yet Imam Hassan and later
Imam Hussein both opposed his "authority."37 For Khomeini, those who had
authority were not those who simply held power, but were the "shadow of God."
He explained that the
Islamic ruler is the shadow of God, but what is meant by shadow is
something that has no motion of itself Your shadow does not move by
itself; it moves only when you move. Islam recognizes a person as the
"shadow of God" who abandons all individual volition in the sense that he
acts only in accordance with the ordinance of Islam, so that his motion is
dependent, not independent.

For Khomeini, an unjust man, a tyrant, an exploiter and an oppressor can all have
power; but since none of them can claim to the be the "shadow of God" because of
their personal submission to the will of the divine, they will never have authority
over believers. 38 Therefore the prophetic model of Islam, most explicitly
represented by the martyrdom of Hussein, does not recognize simple power as
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authority, and hence it is not a contradiction to Qur'anic principles to oppose such
power. He goes on to say that
we constantly read in the Qur'an that the Pharaoh acted in a certain way
and Moses in another way, but we don't think about why the Qur'an tells
us all this. It tells us this so that we may act like Moses toward the
Pharaoh of our age; let us pick up our staffs and oppose this vile Shah. 39
For those priestly clerics, who espouse the "capitulation" point of view, and do not
want to oppose the "Pharaoh of our age", Khomeini says they "have not read the
Qur'an properly and have not understood the logic of the Qur'an.',4-0

Conclusion

In summary, Khomeini's prophetic charisma was based on six
characteristics. 1) He was perceived to be extraordinary with "exceptional powers
or qualities" not accessible to the masses. 2) He stood outside of the prevalent
religious and secular institutions of power and uncompromisingly spoke truth and
demanded change. 3) He offered an alternative vision for the future and, although
there were setbacks, he attained stated goals. 4) He demonstrated congruency in
the theory - praxis dialectic, often in contrast to "priestly" clerics. 5) He was seen
as a "suffering charismatic" who experienced the same pain and humiliation as the
masses And lastly, 6) he was perceived to be, as Hamid Algar says, "a complete
embodiment of the human ideal of Islam" - through words and actions, fulfilling
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the model of prophetic behavior furnished by the examples of Muhammad, 'Ali,
and Hussein, including the willingness to become a martyr.
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CHAPTER V
CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY IN THE SHI'A TRADITION:
ALLAH, MUHAMMAD, 'ALI, TWELVE IMAMS, AND THE ULAMA
Unlike many charismatic religious figures throughout history, whose
authority was based solely on their personal relationship to the divine, this was not
the case for the Ayatollah Khomeini. Furthermore, outside of Prophet
Muhammad, it is problematic in the Islamic tradition to maintain the idea of any
kind of authority being based solely on a direct and personal relationship to the
divine. As we will see with the Ayatollah, the sources of charismatic authority are
much more complicated.
In order to understand the complex nature oflslamic authority, we must
begin with the Prophet Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah of 7th cent. Arabia, to whom all
Islamic authority traces back. The Prophet did not have authority over his
community due to his Karamah (charisma), or "divine gi:fts." 1 Karamah as a term
is deficient in explaining how and why Muhammad would have political and
religious authority over his followers, and could consequently demand their
obedience. Within the Islamic tradition, any concept that attempts to explain
Muhammad's charismatic authority must be unique to him. It must express the
peculiar relationship between Muhammad and Allah. If this concept can be applied

The following analysis is based on the work of Hamid Dabashi in his Authority in Islam (New
Brunswick U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers, 1989) pp. 33 - 45.
1
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to others, such as the 'Ulama, Sufis, or Shaykhs, than it does not adequately
describe Muhammad's unique and personal charismatic authority. If it is not
unique to the Prophet, than it cannot explain why, within the Islamic tradition, his
peculiar authority is binding on all Muslims while other Muslims' charismatic
authority is not. Weber says that
the "natural" leaders in moments of distress... [are] the bearers of specific
gifts of the body and mind that were considered "supernatural" (in the
sense that not everybody could have access to them. )2
In the Islamic tradition, all Muslims are open to "divine gifts" (karamah) because
Allah is active in history and takes an active role in the lives of individuals.
Furthermore, individuals who show their dedication to the Islamic path are the
recipients of divine favor and gifts. These gifts can range eloquence of speech to

Jana' (annihilation) in Allah for mystics, from beauty in Qur'an recitation to the
cunning logic and legal creativity of a jurist. However, receiving divine gifts does
not make the receiver's personal religious authority binding on other Muslims. For
example, because a Sufi has obtained a certain level of"reality" (haqiqa), does not
mean he can bind the whole of the Muslim ummah (community) to his
"enlightened" interpretation of Islam. His "gifts" do not come with the authority
to do such a thing - his "gifts" are personal and non-binding on others. Therefore,
this term is inadequate in describing Muhammad's authority because, despite the

Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. ed. by Guenther
Roth and Clause Wittich. 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). pg 1111 1112. Cited in Dabashi, p. 36.
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fact that Muhammad received karamah, it is open to all Muslims. Thus Weber's
notion that "not everybody could have access to them" do not apply to the term
karamah/charisma in the Islamic context.
Seeing the deficiency ofthe term karamah, scholars have proposed another
term to explain Muhammad's charismatic authority- wilayah. 3 Wtlayah is often
translated as "authority" or "protection." It comes from the tripartite Arabic root
of"WLY" which generally implies "to be in charge," ''manage," "run,"
"administer," "govern," or "rule.',4 Another variant form ofthe "WL Y" is "wali"friend, or "awilyah- friend ofGod (saints)." In various places, the Qur'an states
that Allah is the friend ofbelievers as Shaytan is the friend ofdisbelievers. The
biggest problem with this term is that 1) it lacks any reference to "charisma", 2) it
does not address the issue oflegal use offorce to establish charismatic authority,
3) it is not specific to Muhammad.5 Since protection and friendship is a mode of
relationship between humanity and God, it does not express any specific or unique
relationship. Therefore personal "charismatic authority", based on a special
relationship, cannot apply. Secondly, any notion ofthe legitimate use offorce to
establish charismatic authority is absent in the term. In none ofits Qur'anic forms
does wilayah entitle the bearer to use violence to enforce his authority.6
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Furthermore, charismatic authority is never implemented by force, violence, or
terror. Thirdly, Muhammad does not have a monopoly on the title wali Allah
(friend ofGod). In the Qur'anic sense, all those who submit to Allah and follow
the Prophet are described as wali Allah, and Islamic saints, including scholars and
Sufis, have been traditionally categorized as awaliya Allah, or "Friends ofGod."
Because the concepts karamah and waliyah can not in and ofthemselves
account for Muhammad's unique "charismatic authority," five criteria can be
established in order to point us in the direction ofa proper term. 1) The term must
directly convey the idea of"authority"; 2) it must identify the nature ofthis
authority as "charismatic," that is, as a "personal gift" received from the source of
legitimacy; 3) it must entitle the recipient ofthe "charisma," Muhammad, to use
physical force in order to establish his authority; 4) it must be specific to
Muhammad, so that no one else within the Islamic context can claim a similar
"charismatic authority"; and, finally, 5) it must be a clear and distinct term, immune
to oscillating interpretations and readings [like the term wilayah]. 7
The most distinctive quality ofMuhammad's relationship to the divine was
his given status ofprophethood or messengership (risalah). Although there are
many instances in the Qur'an where the term risalah or other variations ofthe
term are employed, the most important for our study is the Qur'anic statement
found in Sura VII: 158:
"Say [O Muhammad]: 0 mankind! I am sent to all, as the messenger of
7
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Allah (rasul Allah), to whom belongs the sovereignty of the heavens and
the earth; there is no god but Allah; the giver of life and death. Believe in
Allah and his messenger (rasuluhu), the illiterate (ummi) Prophet (rasul),
and those who believe in Allah and his message, follow him so you may be
guided. 8
According to Dabashi, all five criteria are addressed in this one verse. Because
Allah is the sovereign of the heavens and earth, all authority belongs with him.
Furthermore, because Allah sends ('arsala) Muhammad out as a Prophet,
Muhammad is the carrier of divine authority. Salvation thus comes from
submission to the will of Allah as expressed through the dictates and actions of
Muhammad. Muhammad's authority is legitimated because it represents the will
of the ultimate sovereign of the universe. Thus it is necessary for those who
recognize the sovereignty of Allah to recognize the divine messengership of
Muhammad and submit to his leadership. Because he is the carrier of Allah's
authority, his call for the use of force is legitimate. Furthermore, he is perceived
charismatic by way of his personal status as rasul. Dabashi says, through
Muhammad, the authority of Allah is sought to be established on earth, and
through Allah the authority of Muhammad is legitimated. Consequently, his
unique and personal position as rasul Allah, indicates the charismatic authority
that Muhammad maintains as the divinely guided messenger - the bearer of God's
will. This charismatic authority is distinctive to Muslims and not

8
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open to all Muslims. 9
In the Islamic tradition, Muhammad is the last and final prophet - the seal
of the prophets. No new prophet will come after him, because he has delivered the
"perfected" religion of Islam to all of humanity. Unlike "national prophets" who
were sent only for their given community, Muslims believe that Muhammad's
message, and therefore the message of Allah, is universal: i.e. Muhammad is seen
as an "international prophet." Therefore the message of the Qur'an is universal
and applicable to the human condition regardless of time, race, geography,
language, etc. Although the status of rasul Allah ends with Muhammad, in the
Shi'a tradition Muhammad's charismatic authority continues and is vested in the
Twelve Imams.
Throughout history, the death of a charismatic leader has proved to be a
difficult issue for followers. The early Islamic community went through a "crisis of
leadership" episode just after the death of Muhammad in 632 CE. For the majority
of Muslims, the most legitimate way to find a leader's through election. Thus the
Sunni majority elected Abu Bakr al-Sadiq to be the first Caliph (successor) to
Muhammad.1 ° For the first four Caliphs, authority came through election and
through embodiment of the sunnah (Muhammad's modus operandi). However,
this was not the case for the Shi'a, those who supported 'Ali ibn Abu Talib,

Dabashi, pp. 43 - 45.
According to Islamic history, Abu Bakr was Muhammad closest companion, one of the first
converts to Islam, a military general, and Muhammad's father-in-law through Muhammad's
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Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law.11 They believed that Muhammad had
designated 'Ali to be his successor, and thus he was appointed to "general
guardianship" (walayat-i 'ammah) of the community. Weber says, "designation on
the part of the original charismatic leader of his own successor and his recognition
of the part of the followers...in this case legitimacy is acquired through the act of
designation." 12 Leaving aside for the moment the opposition to 'Ali as
Muhammad's successor, let us focus on the notion of"legitimacy through
designation." Because Muhammad clearly designates 'Ali, according to the Shi'a,
'Ali is henceforth the carrier of Muhammad's prophetic authority. However, since
'Ali was not given that authority directly by Allah, he is not considered a rasul.
He is given ''prophetic authority", not Muhammad's personal "charismatic
authority." Charismatic authority, as was described above, can only come directly
from the source ofall authority i.e. Allah, and that direct access is manifested into
a scripture - the Qur'an. What Muhammad passed to 'Ali was the authority of his
charisma, not his personal charisma, or the divine gift of messengership.
Consequently, 'Ali's authority was not equal to Muhammad's, becasue he did not
receive a divine revelation. For the Shi'a, the word Imam, which will play an
important part of the Shi'a tradition, meant the Prophet's successor in worldly and
other-worldly affairs. Thus, successor to the Prophet means perpetuation of

The term Shi'a come from Shi'at a/-'Ali or the "Party of Ali." 'Ali himself was partially
raised by Muhammad when Muhammad was living with his uncle Abu Talib the father of'Ali.
'Ali was also a military general and was a close companion to Muhammad. I will refrain from
using the westernized term Shi'ite when referring to the Shi'a community.
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charismatic authority. 13 Thus, 'Ali acquired his authority though his designation as
successor by Muhammad. Muhammad received his charismatic authority from
being "called" to prophethood by Allah, the ultimate source ofauthority. This
leaves the question: How did the descendents of 'Ali acquire their authority?
For the question ofsuccession, Weber formulates the idea of"hereditary
charisma," which plays an interesting part in the story of 'Ali's children and
descendents. Weber says,
the conception that charisma is a quality transmitted by heredity; thus that
it is participated in by the kinsmen ofits bearer, particularly by his closest
relatives. This is the case ofhereditary charisma. . .In the case ofhereditary
charisma, recognition is no longer paid to the charismatic qualities of
the individual, but to the legitimacy ofthe position he has acquired by
hereditary succession. This may lead in the direction ofeither
traditionalization or legalization. The concept ofdivine right is
fundamentally altered and now comes to mean authority by virtue ofa
personal right which is not dependent on the recognition ofthose subject to
authority. Personal charisma may be totally absent. 14
According to Weber's theory, the personal charisma ofHasan and Hussein, the
sons of'Ali and grandsons ofMuhammad, is secondary to the fact that their
legitimacy is based on heredity. Their authority, based in their biology, becomes
more important than the issue ofpersonal charisma. They were simply born into
legitimacy; they did not have to acquire it like 'Ali, nor were they called to it like
Muhammad. Therefore, the "charismatic qualities ofthe individual" mattered less
than who their father is. Although in the Shi'a tradition both Hasan and Hussein
were "gifted" with certain charismatic qualities, for Weber, those qualities were
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not necessarily what legitimated their rule - it was the fact that their legitimacy
came from the blood of 'Ali, whose own authority was bestowed on him from
Muhammad. Indeed, for the Shi'a, being the only grandchildren of the Prophet is
what made Hasan and Hussein legitimate leaders of the Islamic community.
Although Muhammad was not survived by a son, 'Ali from the moment of
his birth to the death of the Prophet was Muhammad's closest male kin. He was
also raised by the Prophet after the death of Abu Talib ('Ali's father) and he later
married the Prophet's daughter Fatimah, thus producing Muhammad's only
grandchildren Hasan and Hussein. Only second to Khadijah (Muhammad's first
wife) did 'Ali, as a small boy, accept Muhammad's prophetic call to tawhid
(oneness of God). It was 'Ali who risked his own life by disguising himself as
Muhammad when the Meccans where attempting to assassinate the Prophet. The
only other male of the first Muslims who could even be considered as
comparatively close to Muhammad was Abu Bakr, Muhammad's best friend, who
subsequently was elected the first Caliph by the Sunni majority. 15 However, for
the Shi'a, 'Ali, Fatimah, Hasan, and Hussein comprise the ah/ a/-bayt (people of
the house), or the holy family of the Prophet. Their legitimacy stemmed from their
proximity to the Prophet and to the references about them in the Qur'an (Surah 33,
ayat 33).
The transfer of authority from 'Ali to his children began the Shi'a tradition

There is a Shi'a tradition that when the Muslims elected Abu Bakr, 'Ali was busing preparing
Muhammad's body for funeral and therefore missed the opportunity to publicly argue his claim to
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of hereditary charismatic authority. From this point on, the descendents of
Muhammad through 'Ali, up to the twelfth Imam benefited from being born into
legitimacy. On top of this "natural" legitimacy from birth came the notion that all
subsequent Imams were endowed with 'ismah (infallibility) and the exclusive
knowledge of the hidden meanings of the Qur'an. 16 This would have continued the
belief that salvation comes from submission to the Imams because they are the sole
recipients of divine knowledge and guidance. Concretely, this is a perpetuation of
Muhammad's charismatic authority through his male descendents.
To summarize, the twelve Imams of the Shi'a tradition, including Hasan
and Hussein, received their charismatic authority on the basis of the them being
born a descendent of Muhammad through 'Ali and Fatimah. 'Ali received his
charismatic authority from being designated the successor (caliph) to the Prophet
by the Prophet himself Muhammad received his charismatic authority from being
called into prophethood or messengership (risa/ah) by Allah. And Allah is the
ultimate source of all authority and thus the giver of charismatic authority.
Through this silsilah (lit. "chain", transmission of authority), the charismatic
authority originally given by Allah to Muhammad is sustained and perpetuated
though slightly transformed. Because none after Muhammad were given
charismatic authority directly from Allah and thus didn't receive revelation, none
were considered Prophets - yet they were the divinely designated carriers of
prophetic authority and therefore legitimated through this chain that begins with
16
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Muhammad's original call to prophethood.
After the "occulation" (ghayba) ofthe twelfth Imam, authority in political
and religious matters rested in the hands ofthe Shi'a 'Ulama. They were not the
recipients ofdirect authority given by Allah, but nonetheless represented the
prophetic authority ofthe Imams as it is embodied in the Shi'a religious tradition.
Because the last Imam had to flee and go into occultation, the 'Ulama were to lead
the Shi'a community. From the death ofthe twelfth Imam to the present, the
'Ulama have served as guardians oftraditional religious learning and devotion that
has been the whole basis for social and political action. 17 However, unlike the
Prophet, 'Ali, and twelve Imams, the Shi'a 'Ulama were not infallible. They
represent the charismatic authority that began with Muhammad and ended with the
last Imam, but they do not personally possess that absolute authority. Their
authority rests in their spiritual chain oftransmission (si/silah) which ties them
back to the Prophet Muhammad. Yet they are the sole possessors ofthe secret
meaning ofthe Qur'an and are thus weild legitimate authority over worldly and
other-worldly matters. In the absence ofthe Imam, they are the spiritual guide of
the people. Furthermore, authority in the Islamic tradition is found in the law,
therefore Islam, including the Shi'a minority, is considered an orthopraxis religion.
This means that all Muslims are bound to the authority ofShari 'a (religious law),
but are not bound by other forms ofauthority such as the authority ofthe mystic,
or of the philosopher, etc. Because 'Usual al-jiqah, (science oflaw) and Kalam
17
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(theology) are not separated in the Shi'a tradition, theologians are also authorities
on legal matters, which further legitimates their rule. They are in fact both
theologians and jurists.

Khomeini's Charismatic Authority

Khomeini's legitimacy as a revolutionary leader is more complicated.
Because his authority was not derived from one source of legitimacy. It is partly
based on his education, titles and status, as well as his actions, and partly on how
he was perceived by the Iranian people.
In the Islamic tradition, in order for a Muslim to engage in certain
activities, he or she must have met certain qualifications. For example, in order to
issue afatwah (legal ruling), a Shi'a cleric must have been given the authority to
do so after years of study and mastering the traditional curriculum of Shi'a
education. It is the education of the individual and the subsequent permission
given by other high authorities that allows the Muslim to issue legal rulings. All
"fatwahs" given by individuals who do not have the appropriate permission lack
authority and are thus null and void. However correct in insight those
"illegitimate" fatwahs may be, no Muslim is obligated to submit to such rulings
because the particular formulators of those rulings lack the appropriate authority
to issue them. Furthermore, those lacking appropriate authority cannot unilaterally
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overrule the judgments of those who do have appropriate authority, even if the
latter's rulings are questionable.
Khomeini's own traditional education based in fiqh, hadith, tafsir, theology,
philosophy, and mysticism became the basis for his own clerical authority, as the
latest representative of the originalcharismatic authority. 18 In fact, because of his
excellence in the highest curriculum of the Shi'a tradition, he was granted the title
of Ayatollah (sign of Allah), and later Ayatollah al-Uzma (the greatest sign of
Allah). He was also considered a Marja '-i Taqlid (lit. reference point of
emulation). This last title designates him as a first-rate religious authority who is
capable of producing original and unprecedented decisions in matters of theology
and law. Because of this, he is also considered a figure to be emulated by lesser
scholars and laymen. 19 His mastery of the traditional Shi'a curriculum places
Khomeini firmly in the prophetic line stemming back to Muhammad's original call.
Although his status as an "Ayatollah" is not exclusive, his education, various titles,
and "offices" makes him a legitimate representative of the highest order of the
prophetic charisma handed down through the silsilah (chain). He, like the other
Ayatollahs of his day, represented the latest phase of the ''routinization" of
charisma.

18

Ibid., p. 48. Because of his excellence in the "purely learned dimensions" of the Shi'a
tradition, added to that his social and political importance, Hamid Algar describes Khomeini as
the "culmination of the tradition."
19
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However, clerical authority based on excellence in the traditional
curriculum is not what made him a prophetic individual and leader of the
revolution, although it certainly and unmistakably must be seen as an important
basis for his legitimate authority. For without his prestige as a great scholar and
representative of the chain (silsilah) of clerical authority, he would not have had
such a concrete platform from which he could mount such a powerful attack on
the legitimacy of the Shah's rule. Ultimately, his clerical authority served as a
basis for his prophetic authority. His clerical authority stems from his educational
achievements and status as a Marja-i Taqlid, where as his prophetic authority did
not.

Khomeini's Prophetic Authority

Khomeini's prophetic authority must be distinguished from his charismatic
authority because the former cannot come from scholarship, offices, or titles; was
not biologically passed onto him like Hasan and Hussein; nor was he designated
by a charismatic leader as his successor as was 'Ali; nor was he directly called to
prophethood like Muhammad. Khomeini's prophetic authority is based on his
followers' perceptions of him- and those perceptions are based on four important
conditions. 1) An environment of alienation and prevailing chaos that readies the
people for prophetic
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leadership. 2) A criteria for recognizing "prophetic" leadership pre-exists in Shi'a
Islam. 3) The populace recognizes that this criterion is met by Khomeini. 4) The
people transfer leadership authority to Khomeini because oftheir perceptions.
Firstly, the environment within which Khomeini's leadership grew was one
of widespread alienation due to political coup d'etats, western cultural invasion,
massive industrialization, population shifts, militarization, and political repression.
When we look at the period between 1961 to 1979, from the "White Revolution"
to the "Islamic Revolution" we see massive destabilizing changes in Iran. For most
of the early Twentieth century, Iran was going through major difficulties, including
the fall of the Qajar dynasty, the First World War that led to Britain and Russia's
dividing Iran up into "spheres of influence", the deposing of the Reza Shah Pahlavi
(Muhammad Reza Shah's father), and the deposing of the Socialist Mossadeq
regime in 1953 - which then saw the re-installment of the Pahlavi :fu.mily to the
throne. However, it was the "White Revolution", under Shah Muhammad Reza
Pahlavi in 1961 that set the immediate stage for Khomeini's rise and the Islamic
Republic that would follow.

Political Environment of Pre-Revolutionary Iran

To understand the environment that led to Khomeini's leadership, we need
to examine the class structure oflran during the "White Revolution" as well as the
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economic, cultural, and political issues affecting Iranian social classes. There
were four major classes. The first was the aristocracy, which included about sixty
families, mainly related to the Shah. 20 Just beneath them were the several hundred
families oflesser nobility, ranked according to their degree ofcloseness to the
monarchy. 21 These and other well-to-do noble families obtained the majority of
their wealth from land-holdings and investments. Lucrative government contracts
were frequently given to the businesses ofthese families.22 Overall, the "upper
class constituted less than 0.01 percent ofthe population" but overwhelmingly
benefited from the regime. "23 Furthermore, the upper class was nominally
religious, rarely contributing sons to the religious seminaries, and generally
Western-oriented in culture.
Second, the traditional middleclass was comprised oftwo main groups. 24
The Bazaaris, were mainly traders and craftsman, and were members ofthe
powerful bazaar guilds and associations. 25 The second group mainly consisted of
small workshop owners who were generally not associated with any guilds and
were often carpet-weavers and moderate to small-size farm owners. 26 Unlike the
upper class, the traditional middle class was deeply religious and a reliable source
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for money and students for theological schools.27 Much oflran's ulema came from
this middle class, including mujtahids (interpreters of Qur'an) and Ayatollahs, and
was seen as an honorable occupation for middle class men. However, despite their
religiosity, the traditional middle class was usually politically moderate, preferring
stability over revolution.
Unlike the traditional middle class, modern middle class Iranians generally
had advanced degrees and were in skilled professions. These included engineers,
bureaucrats, doctors, managers, lawyers, teachers, and intellectuals, many of
whom were educated in the West.28 This high degree of secular schooling was the
result of the education modernization process in Iran, which greatly increased the
number of students in high school and college. 29 However, as the sons and
daughters of the traditional middleclass got education, they were less likely to
return to the countryside to operate their family farm and businesses, thus making
it easier for the government to appropriate more fertile land for agribusiness and
the growth of export crops, and the further decay of traditional rural life. The
growth of education was not all beneficial to the regime, and proved to be a mixed
blessing. Although those who specialized in "instrumental rationality" i.e.
technology, engineering, etc. - were able to contribute to the industrialization and
modernization of Iran, those who studied abroad and specialized in
"communicative rationality" - i.e. the social sciences - often were exposed to
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radical ideas such as Karl Marx, Herbert Marcuse, Franz Fanon, Vladimir Lenin,
Jean Paul Satre, and other leftist philosophies.30 As we shall see, many of these
students and the ideas they brought back to Iran would contribute to the downfall
of the Shah.
Lastly, the industrial working class rose dramatically during the "White
Revolution." They grew from 26.5% of the population in 1966 to 34.2% in 1976,
with most of the new workers arriving from the countryside in search of
employment.31 The fastest growing segment was the unskilled newly-urban wage
laborer, who toiled in unsafe conditions and lived in primitive housing.32 A very
interesting facet of the population shift from the countryside to the city was the
fact that the majority of those new migrants brought with them their deeply held
religious sensibilities. The urban elite, long since abandoning religion, was
confronted with a growing population in the cities that was conservative and
religious, and in no way optimistic about ''westernization." By 1978, this
underclass was disproportionately involved in the revolution. 33
The growing class divide was augmented by the immense wealth that was
pouring in from oil sales. In 1963 Iran earned $450 million in oil income, but by
1973, the year of the Arab oil embargo on the U.S., in which Iran did not
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participate, its profits were up to $4.4 billion. 34 With this newly acquired wealth
and closer relations with the U.S., the Shah and his advisors used the money to
rapidly industrialize and expand its military hardware, offering major contracts to
the "American Military Industrial Complex." With these new weapons came
military advisors and an estimated 60,000 foreign technicians to service those
weapons.35 The salaries of these highly paid foreigners contrasted sharply with
the vast numbers of urban poor who were steadily increasing the cities'
populations, and caused a dramatic rise in inflation. The income gap became a
bitter issue contention. By 1975 Iran's oil exports dropped by 12.5 percent. Yet
the Shah continued to import military hardware at an unsustainable rate and even
ordered a26% increase in spending.36 On top of that, the Shah continued to
increase the amount of foreign technicians, from 1,207 in 1975 to 4,473 in 1977 a270% increase. 37 Predictably, inflation soared beyond control and by 1977, it
had reached 30%. 38 This had a devastating effect on the poor, especially in cities
like Tehran where the poor and lower working-class families had to compete with
the wealthy foreigners for housing. As more foreigners moved in, property value
increased thus pushing out those who could not afford to pay the inflated amounts.
This phenomenon continued to send more Iranians to the slums, a deepening
source of resentment and a haven for radical activity.
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Because inflation was increasing faster than wages, the middle-class began
to encounter financial difficulties as well, including a fall in their income.39 This
inevitably led to tensions between the regime and the middle class, which usually
served as a moderating factor and a buffer between the aristocracy and the
working poor. Now the Shah had begun to alienate his trusted middle class
constituency. To make matters worse, at a time of decreased social spending and
high inflation, the Shah continued to spend millions on armaments, provoking
more accusations of corruption.40
Compounding the already existing financial tensions, the middle and lower
classes were also appalled and offended by the "liberal" behavior of the
Westerners, who would frequently engage in "public drinking, revealing clothing,
sexually explicit movies", all of which are anathema to traditional Islamic
principles.41 This cultural penetration was seen by many as another assault on their
Islamic and Iranian identity, and just another tool of submission to all thing
Western. To make matters still worse, some Iranians had begun to copy these
Western practices." Abandoning traditional heritage and culture was termed

gharbzadegi, or "Occidentosis," meaning - a plague from the West, by the
intellectual Jalal Al-i Ahmad.42 His book, bearing the same title, was circulated
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among students and intellectuals and was widely read. In it, Al-i Ahinad reflects
much of the growing discontent with blind imitation of the West at the expense of
traditional culture. Furthermore, popular scholars such as Ali Shari'ati also
contributed to the formulation of critiques against this plague from the west which
were carried into mainstream thought, even having an influence on Khomeini
himself 43 Their work, and the work of others like them, contributed to the
growing animosity for the Shah and the influence his policies were having in Iran.
Coupled with the onslaught of Western culture was the Shah's continual
glorification of pre-Islamic Persian culture. The Shah's propaganda machine
increasingly portrayed him as the grand successor of the empires of the
Achaeminids and Sassanids, as if Iran's Islamic heritage and the religious
sensibilities of its people were of no consequence. 44 In October of 1971, the Shah
staged an elaborate ceremony at the ancient Persian capital of Persepolis, in
celebration of the 2,500 year of the monarchy. The international guests of honor
dined on French food and wines under a huge tent city designed in France.45 The
celebration culminated on the "tomb of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian
empire, where the Shah reassured his predecessor that he could sleep in peace 'for
,
we are awake!" 46 Elaborate and expensive schemes like these at a time of
economic crises for so many people only increased the resentment of the Shah and
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further alienated him from his Islamic populace.
As the Shah carried on with his militarization policies, he brutally
suppressed dissention and protest with his secret police SAVAK. Known to have
killed thousands of Iranians and having close ties to Israel, SAV AK was the
domestic hammer in the Shah's policies. As the economic and cultural alienation
continued, the repression of dissent followed - and with every violent counter
protest, the opposition to the Shah grew. Furthermore, not only were the religious
parties protesting the Shah, but secular liberals, Mossadeqists, democrats,
Marxists, baz.aaris and laborers all banded together in opposition to the monarchy.
With all this in the background, on November 27, 1977, U.S. President
Jimmy Carter added insult to injury when he proclaimed in a New Year's toast to
the Shah: "Iran under the great leadership of the Shah is an island of stability in
one of the most troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your
Majesty, and to your leadership, and to the respect, admiration and love which
,
your people give to you.' 47 This speech, meant to show the world that the United
States stood by its ally in Iran, affirmed, in the minds of many Iranians, the United
States support for the unpopular policies of the Shah.
Because of the growing sense of instability due to financial decay,
"occidentosis", and political repression, the two largest social classes were moving
increasingly into the hands of Khomeini and those parties that wished to overthrow
the Shah. This expanding environment of alienation and discontent prepared the
47
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people to accept "prophetic leadership" as the only means to rid them of the
Shah's chaos.

Criteria for Establishing the Prophetic Authority

For the sake of not repeating too much of what has already been covered in
the previous chapter, it would be appropriate here just to briefly review the
"criteria" of the prophetic.
Khomeini, through his public speeches and acts, demonstrated to alienated
Iranians his "prophetic" credentials by: 1) opposing the Shah and his corrupt
regime, i.e. speaking truth to power; 2) offering an alternative vision of the future
and bringing forth successes i.e. velayat-i faqih and the Islamic Republic; 3) he
demonstrated congruency in the theory - praxis dialectic, often in contrast to
quiestist clerics; 4) identifying with the suffering and humiliation of the masses, and
likewise suffering with them; 5) being perceived as the "embodiment oflslam"
through his willingness to be martyred, based on the prophetic examples
established by Muhammad, 'Ali, and Hussein.
Because of these criteria, the Iranian peoples found it easy to identify
Khomeini as a legitimate leader.
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Khomeini is Recogniud as being Prophetic

The single most important aspect of Khomeini being "recognized" as
prophetic is the fact that it is through this recognition by the people, he acquires
prophetic authority. Despite scholarship, titles, publications, etc., prophetic
authority can only be achieved if it is recognized by a body of potential supporters.
As the economic, cultural, and political situation in Iran continued to
worsen, the Iranian people looked for guidance from those who had historically
been their guides. What they found was a mass of clerics who wished not to get
politically involved with the Shah's regime, and therefore stopped at vocal critique.
Nevertheless, some religious voices, breaking free from the "clerical herd",
provided the guidance that the people were searching for. In contrast to the high
ranking clerics around him who insisted on quietism, Khomeini was easily
recognized as being a leader. Furthermore, as he intensified his verbal critique of
the Shah, the regime intensified its repression of the Ayatollah, thus unwittingly
heightening his profile.
Yet other groups also rigorously opposed the Shah, such as the pro-Soviet
Communist Tudeh party, secular "Mossadiqist" nationalists, and the Marxist
guerilla fighters Fedayeen-i Khalq (Self-sacrificers of the People). Although these
groups and many others were instrumental in the overthrow of the Shah, Khomeini
and the religious opposition had certain advantages over their more political
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platforms. First, Khomeini's following was seen as organic movement, deriving its
principles from Islam, Shi'ism, Iran, and Iranian history, and thus not dependent of
western analysis. 48 Second, despite their often cited quietist tradition, clerics were
still seen by many as the historical guardians oflranian and Shi'i society, and thus
where fulfilling their historical role. Third, unlike the others, the clerics constituted
a well established "organizational network permeating most classes and social
groups, urban and rural.',49 Fourth, because the clerics and masses shared a
common religious tradition, the Ulema could activate latent revolutionary concepts
inherent in Shi'a Islam, whereas the secular and western oriented opposition
groups would have to "convert" people to their ideologies. 5° Fifth, the secular and
western-oriented opposition groups had very little following in the countryside and
among the newly urbanized workers, who had religious educations but were
neither familiar, nor very receptive to, secular or Western derived ideologies. 51
Finally, Khomeini enjoyed support from the bazaaris, who had suffered great
economic losses due to the Shah's policies. The bazaaris, who were religious,
were also skeptical of the "communist" orientation of some of the groups as they
where ofMossadiq's socialist regime; fearing loss of their property and business
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rights.52 These six aspects gave Khomeini's religious opposition clear advantages
over their fellow revolutionaries.
Moreover, Khomeini attracted followers by addressing the specific issues
that were plaguing the country in religious terms that were understandable by the
masses. Both the secular and religious could easily grasps the principles and
dynamics he was speaking of. For example, in a 1967 open letter to the Shah's
Prime Minister Hoveyda, Khomeini chastised the bureaucrat saying,
...with your empty claims ofprogress and advancement, you have kept
the country in a state ofbackwardness. .. .I must point an accusing finger
at those responsible for them, so that those who are unaware (or pretend
to be unaware) come to recognize their duty and are no longer taken in by
your hypocrisy and deceit.
Sitting in your opulent palaces, which you change once every few years,
you spend millions oftumans with an extravagance our people cannot even
imagine and steal it all from the purse ofour wretched nation. You witness
complacently the hunger and poverty ofour people, the bankruptcy ofthe
bazaar, the unemployment ofour educated youth, the sorry state ofour
agriculture and industry,... You see that most ofthe villages near the
capital, let alone those in remote regions, lack the basic necessities of life clean drinking water, bathhouses, and medical care. You see the diffusion
ofmoral corruption, dishonesty, and irreligion in the depth ofthe
countryside. You see the funds set up that are supposedly cooperatives,
but in fact are a means for government officials to rob and plunder the
peasants, who come ruefully to understand that they have been cheated.
Finally you see all the illegal imprisonment, terror, and threats that are
inflicted on the people, while you are immersed in your pleasures,
enjoyments, and shameful games and recite the funeral prayers over this
cemetery called Iran.53
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As you can see, in this small section ofa letter, Khomeini linked the economic,
culturaL and political malaise oflran to the hypocrisy and deceit ofthe Shah. For
those who would read or hear these words, the perception ofKhomeini would be
one ofleadership in the face oftyranny. Because he routinely put into words the
experiences ofthose who where victims ofthe Shah's-policies in a language that all
could understand and was prepared to follow it up with action, he was recognized
as being a "prophetic" leader in the mold ofthose heroes ofShi'a Islam.

People's Acceptance of Khomeini as "Revolutionary Leader"

The last ofthe four-part conditions is the transfer ofrevolutionary
authority and leadership to Khomeini. One by one, as people "recognize"
Khomeini as being the most viable opposition and the one most attuned to their
grievances, authority to speak in the name ofthe Iranian nation is given to the
Ayatollah. Even secular, Marxist, and liberal opposition groups rally behind
Khomeini because he is the most capable and most likely to succeed in bringing
down the Pahlavi regime. It is not because oftheir acceptance ofhis religious
platform that these secular groups accept his leadership, but rather it is a strategic.
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They see that the majority oflran's people are less likely to submit to
philosophically Westem�derived opposition movements and are more in tune with
the religious opposition. We should make this clear: that the official decisions of
these groups to back Khomeini were strategic, while the decisions to support
Khomeini by a majority of the people was because they recognized his ''prophetic
leadership" through his embodiment of the prophetic criteria. In any case, it is
because of the popularity and growing strength of his prophetic leadership that
the opposition groups follow him and ultimately submit to his authority. They had
the choice of either strategically submitting to his leadership, and joining forces
with him in the common effort to remove the regime, or they could remain
separate in their opposition to the Shah and hence divide and weaken the
opposition movement. Because their hatred of the Shah's regime was greater than
their reservations about Khomeini, most of the opposition groups submitted to
Khomeini's inevitable leadership of the revolution in the hope that they would
somehow be rewarded after the success of the revolution. 54
As we have seen, Khomeini's authority is twofold. First, his charismatic
authority stems from his position as Ayatollah and Marji-i taqlid, both making him
the legitimate representative of the original charismatic authority handed down
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through the si/silah (chain of transmission); thus representing the latest in the
"routenization" of charisma. This authority serves as a basis for his prophetic
authority which is recognized by the people because of his fulfillment of the
"prophetic" criteria during his opposition to the Shah. As the economic, cultural,
and political chaos prevalent in the society led to further alienation, the people
were ready for prophetic leadership and ultimately accepted Khomeini as their
leader.
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CHAPTER VI
KHOMEINI AND THE POLITICAL LEFT

In her well argued article Can Revolutions Be Predicted; Can Their
Causes Be Understood, the University ofCalifornia historian Nikki R. Keddie
postulates three important factors that uniquely contributed to the overthrow of
the Shah: " l) the evolution ofthe Shi'ite clergy in Iran, which made a Khomeini
and his network possible. 2) ''the particularities ofthe Shah and the way he ruled,
and, 3) probably the most important, the major contradiction between an
increasingly autocratic political structure and forced, inequitable, and rapid
socioeconomic change that to some degree alienated all classes in society." 1 While
I agree with her general thesis, I believe there is an important factor that she fails
to account for, and that is the degree to which the Iranian under classes absorbed
leftist class struggle and anti-imperialist ideology. This was delivered to them
through Khomeini's "Islamization" ofleftist concepts and critiques. Ifone looks
into the many opposition groups that struggled against the rule ofShah, one sees
that they we all influenced in some way by Marxist-Leninist anti-imperialism and
class struggle ideology. Furthermore, leftist intellectuals like Jalal Al-i Ahmad and
Dr. 'Ali Shari'ati had a large impact on revolutionary leftist and religious
movements during the time leading up the revolution. Despite this, the prevalence
1
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of this ideology among the urban middle class does not explain how many of these
ideas were absorbed by the lower classes, including the peasants and newly urban
wage laborers, who did not have access to privileged information, nor did they
attend Western schools.2 We must then ask, how did this class, whose education
and culture is based primarily in the rural traditional religious setting, come to
accept many of the core beliefs of the Marxist-Leninist tradition. Who was
responsible for this, and how did this phenomenon serve the revolution?
But before we answer the "how" and ''why" of this phenomenon, it would
be beneficial to examine the most important philosophical, sociological, and
political issues of Marxist-Leninism, as they were manifested in the third world
during the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's. Secondly, it is important to see the major
opposition groups' and intellectuals' connections with those issues, from what
classes they derived, what was their platform, and how they responded to
Khomeini. And finally, we will answer the question of how the religious poor and
working class of Iran came to accept thoughts and ideas that are generally
associated with the Western Marxist intellectual tradition.

2

Due to their alienation and lack ofclass consciousness, Marx believed the revolutionary
potential ofthe peasantry was nearly nonexistent, and that they were mostly reactionary and
counterrevolutionary.
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Marxist-Leninist Philosophy

Throughout the 50's, 60's, and 70's, the world saw massive changes,
among them being various struggles against colonization, apartheid, and
imperialism. There were successful revolutions in China, Algeria, Vietnam, Cuba,
Egypt, Congo, Guatemala, etc, and in many other places there were vigorous
struggles. In America and Europe, the ''New Left", intellectually led by members
ofthe "Frankfurt School", engaged in radical political action designed to bring
about progressive change. 3 Furthermore, America saw the ethnic struggles ofthe
massive civil rights movement led by Dr. Martin Luther King, and the Black
Nationalist movement led by Malcolm X, Fred Hampton, H. Rapp Brown, and the
Black Panthers. On a global scale, colonized countries were slowly gaining
independence from their former masters and beginning to run their countries
independently. Behind much ofthis change was the growing influence ofanti
imperialist and anti-capitalist Marxist-Leninism, sometimes sponsored by the
Soviet Union. 4 However, regardless ofsponsorship, the "liberation" movements
ofthe mid twentieth century seemed to be the sign oftimes.
Without extensive analysis ofMarxist-Leninism, which is well beyond the
scopes ofthis study, we will have to do with a general conceptual understanding of

Tom Bottomore, The Frankfurt School (New York: Tavistock Publications, 1984) 27-54.,
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the motivations and desires of this radical philosophy.
In most Third-World countries, awareness of Marxism was due to the
colonial experience and is thus bound to anti-imperialism.5 The primary concerns
of this development in Marxism is the "impact of metropolitan capital on pre
capitalist social structures, the emergence of new classes, and the resulting patterns
of class alignments and class contradictions that underlie the development of those
,
societies and the conditions of revolutionary struggle.' 6 These movement are
deeply concerned with the removal of exploitative and oppressive regimes, often
times seen to be in the service of the ruling class and or a foreign power, and in
their place the establishment of a government that is based in popular sovereignty
and is socialistic in economic, politics, and culture. Because imperialism is seen as
the "highest stage of capitalism", the fundamental right of self-determination of the
indigenous people is suppressed in order to serve foreign and ruling class
interests.7 Consequently, liberation movements maintain that the imperialists and
their paid ruling class must be removed from power. These movements are further
interested in establishing a political system to control if not eradicate the "private
accumulation of collective surplus value" i.e. capitalism, thus often emphasizing
social equality over individual freedom. In order to do this, it becomes imperative
that a strong centralized government be put in place that will regulate the political

5
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and economic activities of civil society.
Many of these Marxist movements, in which Iranian's movements would
be included, see "cultural imperialism" as just as threatening as physical and
political imperialism. Many theorists saw "cultural penetration" by the imperialist
as a method of diminishing or eradicating indigenous ideologies and cultural forces
that would oppose the imperial power. Throughout his campaign against the Shah,
Khomeini would routinely state that Western culture, especially secularism and its
privitiz.ation of religion, was a tool to castrate Islam of its political and cultural
power, thus leaving Iran open to exploitation from foreign imperialists with little or
no opposition. It is interesting to note that Jalal Al-i Ahmad, though once a
member of the Tudeh (communist) party, later believed that the Shi'a Islamic
tradition was the one cultural force that had not been penetrated by the corroding
effects of Western culture, and thus it was the only viable opposition force to the
Westemiz.ation oflran. Both Ahmad and Khomeini subscribed to the theory that
Iran was struck with gharbzadagi or ''westoxification" or even "occidentosis",
which undermined Iran's ability to defend itself from the West.
The class analysis, as in all Marxist thought, is essential to understand the
Third-World orientation of Marxist-Leninism. The minority ruling class is
generally, but not always, associated with an imperial power, especially when
economic conditions within the country overwhelming benefit the ruling class and
those foreigners who are connected to that class. When the policies of the ruler
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brings ruin to the people, yet enriches the ruling class and its benefactors, the
logical connection is that enemies exist within the state as well as outside it.
Therefore, just as the foreign imperialist is an enemy, so there is a domestic enemy.
In the case oflran, it was the Dictatura Coronada (crowned dictator), and his
American handlers that were perceived to be the common enemy of the people.
Consequently, in order for there to be socioeconomic and political development
that will benefit the masses as opposed to the ruling class, the old regime has to be
transformed or removed. The method of its transformation or removal is also a
subject of debate within the Marxist communities.
Many communist parties, especially in Latin America, preferred a gradualist
and legalist penetration into national politics that would slowly assemble a base of
support and prepare a easier transition to communist rule.8 Many of these
moderate groups compromised with their governments by accepting official
positions and cabinet appointments. 9 However some communist groups, including
at least two in Iran, rejected this "gradualist" approach for a more radical and
violent overthrow, forming small units of fighters in order to stage "guerilla

The Iranian communist ''Tudeh" (Masses) party and the Socialist-Nationalist "National Front"
party at various times held this position.
9
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warfare" against the regime. 10 Modeled after the Cuban Revolution led by Fidel
Castro and Dr. "Che" Guevara, these groups operated under the foco theory of
guerilla warfare, which argues that a "small guerilla army operating in the
countryside could spark a revolution that would then spread to the cities."11 Che's
theory proved to be too simplistic. He did not consider the unique socioeconomic
and political factors of every country in which he wanted to spark a revolution
because he believed the experience of the Cuban Revolution could be universally
replicated. However, when his approach was tried in other countries such as Peru
and Bolivia, it proved to be inapplicable and ended in failure. Likewise, in Iran,
Khomeini could not accept the idea that small groups of guerilla fighters would be
able to bring down the Shah, and he was proven to be correct. However, the basic
premise of Che's work remains, that only a violent campaign against oppressive
government will be able to remove it, and that it is the job of the guerilla fighter to
contribute to its removal.
These groups deviated significantly from Marx. Marx believed that history
moved in a certain predictable pattern, from feudalism through capitalism and
finally to communism. Like Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who attempted to
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demonstrate that it was possible to bypass the capitalist stage and bring a
feudalistic country directly into communism, these groups believed they could
create the conditions that would spark a revolution, as opposed to waiting for
capitalism to rise and finally decline due to its systemic contradictions. Fidel
Castro once said, "The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution. It is
known that the revolution will triumph... but it is not for revolutionaries to sit in
the doorways of their houses waiting for the corpse of imperialism to pass by." 12
In the case oflran, socioeconomic and political conditions beneficial to
revolutionary movements were quickly developing, partly due to the Shah's
"White Revolution" which brought rapid modernization and industrialization.
These destabilized conditions were not the work of radical communist guerilla
fighters attacking military units in the jungle, but were more the result of the
Shah's policies that alienated the population. 13 These more radical groups often
found themselves in conflict with the "official" communist parties in their
countries, not only concerning tactics but also about allegiances. For example, the
Tudeh party in Iran was perceived by many to be the pawn of the Soviet Union,
therefore acting as an agent of another imperial power and hence likewise to be
distrusted. In contrast, non-Soviet supported communist groups were deeply
12
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effected by nationalism and swore allegiance only to Iran. Because of their
autonomous stance, Moscow refused to support financially or politically many of
these groups until it became apparent that they would be successful in their
revolution. In the case of Cuba, the Soviet Union supported Fidel Castro's 1959
revolution only after they seized power from Fulgencio Batista and began to call
itself a "socialist" revolution. 14 Likewise in Iran, despite the fact of substantial
Marxist influence among the revolutionaries, the Soviet Union switched from
indifference to Shah to supporting the revolution very late in the process, much to
the worry of Washington D.C., who feared growing Soviet geo-political influence
in the oil rich Persian Gulf In either case, the officially Soviet recognized
communist party was neither a decisive factor in guerilla warfare, nor a significant
contribution to the successful overthrow of the government.

Five Marxist-Influenced Iranian Opposition Groups

In order to demonstrate the prevalence of Marxist influence in Iranian
society during the revolutionary process, I've identified five major groups that

It is interesting to note that the "official" communist party in Cuba did not support Fidel
Castro's July 26 Movement (the revolutionary name that commemorates Fidel's unsuccessful
attack on the Moncato military barracks in 1953). See Coltman, Leycester. The Real Fidel
Castro. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2003.
14
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were operating during this time, based on their historical significance to the Iranian
revolution. Although it is impossible to quantify the influence of each group, I
believe these five best represent the Iranian-Marxist tradition and all its variations.

Tudeh Party

The oldest of the Marxist parties was the Tudeh Party (Hizb-i Tudeh-i

Iran: Party oflranian Masses), which was officially established in 1941 - 42, but
had its genesis between the two world wars in the 1930's under Reza Shah. 15
Although it especially admired Vladimir Lenin and his political philosophy, it did
not openly announce its Marxist or communist orientation in the beginning of its
existence for fear of alienating potential members who held religious views. 16
However, once it had its support from the Kremlin, the political platform it
espoused became one of typical communist opposition groups, calling for a
democratic government, electoral law reform, political rights for women,
redistribution of wealth, eight hour work days, and recognition of trade unions. 17
Furthermore, it advocated specific reforms to Iran under Reza Shah, including
"restoration of civil liberties, in accordance with the Iranian Constitution, and
cancellation of the "anti-democratic" laws..., including the 1931 law banning
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communist activities." 18 From 1941 to 1953, the Tudeh party organized massive
Iranian May Day parades that celebrated and demonstrated the massive power of
the workers and their Unions. 19 According to Stephen Kinzer, the growing power
and popularity of the Tudeh party was cited as one of the major reasons for the
1953 CIA backed Coup d'etat that overthrew Dr. Muhammad Mossadeq. Fearing
the spread of Soviet influence, the Eisenhower administration felt that the Tudeh
party could possible overthrow or seize power from Mossadeq and install a Soviet
backed communist state in the heart of the Middle East. Because of this, the
administration believed it imperative to install a more stable and pro-U.S. regime
as soon as possible.20 Therefore, in 1953, Mossadeq was forced to abdicate power
and Muhammad Reza Pahlavi was installed as dictator of Iran. From 1953 to 1958
Tudeh went underground as the pro-West Shah suppressed communism with the
help and blessing of the U.S.21 Until disillusionment with the Shah became much
more pervasive, the Tudeh party quietly continued to resist the monarchy and its
pro-Western capitalism policies, doing whatever it could to hurt the Shah and his
regune.
Although the Tudeh party lasted all the way through the Islamic
Revolution, the power it had during its height in the l 940's never returned.
Furthermore, the general public viewed as subservient to the Soviet Union and
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atheistic, neither of which was very popular in deeply nationalistic and religious
Iran. 22 Even during the tumultuous events of the "White Revolution", where
political alienation ran at its highest, the Tudeh party could find little support in the
countryside or among the newly urbanized rural workers. 23 By the 1960's and
70's, its base of support continued to be older secular intellectuals who were
generally associated with the constitutional period oflranian history. Many
children ofTudeh party members would inherent their parents' left-wing politics,
but would reject their atheism, preferring to maintain a religious affiliation.
Despite its marginalization, the Tudeh did indeed support the leadership of
Khomeini, believing he shared their anti-imperialist position. Its official paper

Navid even participated in the November 27th, 1978, collective hallucination that
saw Khomeini's face on the full moon. They wrote, "Our toiling masses, fighting
against world-devouring Imperialism headed by the blood-sucking United States,
have seen the face of their beloved Imam and leader, Khomeini the breaker of
Idols, in the moon. A few pipsqueaks cannot deny what a whole nation has seen
with its own eyes. "24 Though many mullahs saw this episode as a cheap
psychological trick foisted on the people, Khomeini refused to deny the event and
the "spontaneous initiatives of the people."25 In the end, the Tudeh party would be
the last of the major opposition groups to join Khomeini's movement. However,
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once they did recognize the "supreme leader", they brought invaluable expertise in
"psychological warfare, sabotage, ... [and] industrial strikes" to the movement. 26

National Front

The National Front (NF) was the secular party closely associated with Dr.
Muhammad Mossadeq. Founded in 1949, the NF was both socialists and
nationalist, calling for an "end to foreign political influence and economic
exploitation."27 It rigorously opposed monarchal prerogatives and the
abandonment ofthe 1906 constitution; calling for the end ofthe one party system,
for freedom ofpress, and for an elected government. 28 Dr. Mossadeq, an
aristocrat and doctor oflaw, became Prime Minister in 1951 as the result ofthe
popularity ofhis nationalist appeals that demanded the nationalization oflran's oil,
taking it primarily out British control, and the imposition ofpower limits on the
monarchy.29 Although originally supported by important clerics such as Ayatollah
Kashani and the younger Ayatollah Khomeini, because ofhis anti-imperialism
stance, the alliance was later broken when the anti-clerical views ofDr.
Mossadeq's followers were made public. 3° Furthermore, the Bazaaris distrusted
Mossadeq's communist sympathies and saw the Shah as a potential counterweight
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to his leftist politics. By 1953, with National Front alliances broken and support
dwindling, the CIA-backed coup d'etat brought the NF government to an end and
installed the Shah back in power. However, the NF continued to have influence in
national politics through the Islamic Revolution, despite the Shah's 1963
repression of their leadership. 31 Although the Shah was personally more worried
about renewed attempts by the NF to regain power, their inability or unwillingness
to directly confront the Shah with massive resistance led many of its followers to
other groups more willing to do so, including the guerilla forces and Ayatollah
Khomeini's clerical leadership. 32
Though not as dogmatic as the Tudeh party, the NF was heavily influenced
by Marxist-Leninist anti-imperial philosophy. Its supporters detested the Pahlavi's
authoritarian rule, supoorting as an alternative the constitutionalism of 1906. Not
in favor of violent revolutions or guerilla warfare, the NF preferred to seize power
through more non-violent means. However, much like the Tudeh party, the NF
was mainly from the urban, educated, new middle class; it had little influence on
the rural peasantry or working classes and therefore its influence was restricted
mainly to the cities. 33 The nationalism of the NF distinguishes it from the Tudeh,
which was almost entirely subservient to Moscow. The NF was completely
independent of foreign support and relied heavily on its reputation for nationalist
independence to attract participants and funding. This fierce nationalism, which
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celebrated Iranians' ability to solve their own problems without the help (or
control) of other was the message that most appealed to the political left. 34
Because of this, many Iranians remained loyal to the NF from the time of the
1960's repression up through the success of the Islamic Revolution.

Freedom Movement of Iran

In 1960, Nehzat-i Azadi-ye Iran (Freedom Movement oflran) was formed
by Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, and Dr. Yadollah Sahabi. 35
These men, who represented "modernist" or "progressive" Islam, believed that if
Islam was properly interpreted, it could 1) modernize Iran, 2) achieve an equitable
distribution of wealth, and 3) protect Iran from "foreign cultural domination and
economic exploitation. "36 The proponents of "modernist Islam" believed that their
way was the only serious engagement between Islam and modernity, and thus was
the only version that could unify all sectors and classes of the population, both
preserving that which is essential in Islam and Shi'ism, and critically adopting parts
of modernity. Unlike some clerics who were completely hostile to Western
science, those of the Freedom Movement believed that Islam and science were not
only compatible, but complimentary - that, if taken in moderation, modem science
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could benefit Iran. 37 Furthermore, the system of government they proposed was
different from the vilay at-ifaqih (rule of thejurist) of Khomeini. They believed
that a future Islamic state should not be run by clerics, but by Islamicly- committed
laymen who are highly educated and trained in administration and technology. 38
For them, this would preserve the historical role of the clergy, which had advised
rulers without being directly involved in politics, while ensuring that the Islamic
point of view was the guiding force in government. This scheme was designed to
wed the instrumental-rationality of the bureaucrats and technocrats with the
communicative-rationality of the Islamic tradition - both needed to form a 'just"
and functioning modem government. Knowing that the Shi'a tradition maintains
that all forms of government are illegitimate without the twelfth Imam (Imam al
Mahdi), it also serves as a necessary alternative to letting tyranny rule until his
return.
Unlike the Tudeh and National Front, which constitute the secular political
left, the Freedom Movement was committed to a religious political platform. 39
Although much of its policies resembled those of the Marxist-Leninist anti
imperialist movements, the Freedom Movement remained motivated by religious
beliefs. Using the Prophet's Medina community as a template, Ayatollah Taleqani
believed that "Islam properly interpreted supported a socialist system": a
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religiously based socialism, not dependent on Western forms of socialism, but one
organically derived from Islam, Shi'ism, and Iranian history.40
During the revolution, the Freedom Movement often served as a bridge
between the secular and religious factions.41 The leadership of Ayatollah Taleqani,
a highly esteemed religious scholar, and Muhandis Mehdi Bazargan, a religiously
trained engineer (though not a cleric), demonstrates the movements secular
religious alliance.42 They remained committed to the constitutionalist position of
Dr. Mossadeq, yet were driven by religious based nationalist motivations. They
saw Islam's emphasis on universal moral values as preceeding the cosmopolitan
values proclaimed by the bourgeois revolutions in Europe and America. They said,
We are Muslims ... our entry into politics ... is prompted by our national
duty and religious obligations. We do not consider religion and politics
separate, and regard serving the people [as] ... an act of worship ... We
are Muslims in the sense that we believed in the principles ofjustice,
equality, sincerity, and other social and humane duties before they were
proclaimed by the French Revolution and
the Charter of the United
Nations.43
Social awareness for them was not an invention of the West, but was inherent in
the Islamic tradition; and consequently there was no contradiction in affirming
certain Western values when they coincided with similar Islamic values.
In the 1960's the Freedom Movement was suspicious of much of the clergy
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due to the clergy's role in the 1953 overthrow ofDr. Mossadeq. However, its
supporters were impressed by Khomeini's political commitment and would later
acknowledge him as the "supreme leader" ofthe revolution.44 Using modem
Persian and Marxist language, the Freedom Movement attempted to rescue Islam
from linguistic obscurantism and abstraction, with the effect of politically
radicalizing the clerics. "The Ayatollahs", they said, "should not restrict
themselves to campaigning against the local election bill, but refer as well to
autocracy and authoritarianism, the real source ofthe nation's malaise."45 Taleqani
was influenced by the leftist writer Jalal Al-i Ahmad, and often peppered his
speeches with Ahmad's fiery revolutionary language, focusing on social issues, as
opposed to abstract theological speculations. 46 Along with the reform cleric
Motahhari, Taleqani established a series oflectures to ''wake up the religious
community, to put an end to the lethargy that had characterized it and to attempt
,
to make Islam relevant to sociaL economic, and political problems ofthe day.' 47
For their actions, Bazargan and Taleqani were sentenced to long prison terms
during the Shah's 1963 suppression. After the suppression, nine members ofthe
Freedom Movement would defect to create a more radical guerilla group called
Mujahideen-i Khalq. 48
One ofthe most important aspects ofthe Freedom Movement was their
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extensive network of young radicalized students abroad. According to Hamid
Algar, Bazargan was active in organizing student and opposition groups abroad
and was the chief patron of the Muslim Student Association (MSA), which had
branches in the United States and Europe. 49 Because Khomeini saw the benefit to
having allies in Western countries who would defend the revolution and provide
intellectual and financial assistance, he actively courted their support.
Furthermore, student groups outside of Iran were openly critical of the regime in
ways that students inside the country could not be, and frequently protested official
visits to European and American capitals in an effort to embarrass the publicity
conscious regime. 50 Being impressed by the Paris riots of 1968 and the anti
Vietnam war protest movement in the United States, the students returning to Iran
drew a sharp philosophical distinction between patriotic loyalty to the country and
allegiance to the regime. This was important because these students would return
home to jobs in the government, business sector, and universities with divided
loyalties. 51 Consequently, a disproportionate number of foreign-educated workers
of the modern middle class would participate in the overthrow of the Shah. As
the revolution continued to intensify, the Freedom Movement, still based in the
universities and disillusioned with the political process, became increasingly
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sympathetic to the young student-led guerilla forces. 52
After the revolution was successful, Ayatollah Khomeini appointed
Bazargan as the new Prime Minister, a move he would later regret because of their
clashes over the form of the new government. 53 The removal ofBazargan's
government by Khomeini effectively consolidated his power after the revolution,
and fully opened the door to his system of government - the vilayat-i faqih.

Mujahideen-i Khalq

Although not organized until the 1970's, Mujahideen-i Khalq, or Holy
Warriors of the People, grew out of the 1963 protests. 54 This group, best
described as a leftist Islamic anti-Shah guerilla movement, blended revolutionary
Marxist theory with traditional Shi'a notions of martyrdom and oppression.
Influenced by Mao, "Che" Guevara, and Castro, the Mujahideen-i Khalq engaged
in low-level guerilla warfare against the Shah and his well-equipped and well
trained secret police SAVAK, becoming more of a nuisance for the regime than a
major threat. The founders of Mujahideen-i Khalq, as Baqer Moin points out,
where "impressed by the logic of Marxism, [and] attempted to show that the true
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Islam ofMohammad, Ali, and Hossein was as revolutionary as Marxism without
abandoning the spiritual dimension oflife. "55 They believed that struggling to
create a classless society and to end imperialism and despotism was the duty ofall
Muslims and would continued the struggle started by the Imams. 56 First beginning
in Bazargan and Taleqani's Freedom Movement, the nine founders ofMujahideen
drew on a modernist ideology, but later broke away in disagreement about tactics,
preferring guerilla warfare to less-violent "gradualist" and "legalist" means. They
wrote a famous pamphlet called Nahzat-i Husseini (Hussein's Movement) which
likened Che Guevara's struggle against Latin American dictators to the early Shi'i
martyrs that had violently resisted an oppressive regime. This, they argued,
provided an example that should encourage Muslims and oppressed peoples
everywhere to struggle against oppression.57
Most ofthe young revolutionaries in Mujahideen came from the "highly
religious traditional middleclass. "58 Influenced by many leading Iranian
intellectuals, including 'Ali Shari'ati, they staged their first military attack in 1971
and nearly lost all their original members. However, their daring attempts to
destabilize the regime proved to be potent tools for recruitment, and they attracted
many young college educated students, mainly with physical science degrees. 59 As
a result ofto the growing appeal of"Islamic Marxism" (as the Shah called it) to
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college educated youths, the monarch grew increasingly paranoid that this socialist
ideology would spread from the college to the countryside, thus sparking a urban
rural coalition force against him.60 According to Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeini
criticized his apolitical colleagues for being "asleep" while college students actively
resisted the Shah. 61 "We cannot remain silent", he proclaimed, ''until college
students force us to carry out our duty."62 Because ofthe threat oflosing so many
young minds to Marxism, Khomeini believed the clergy had no choice but to
engage in oppositional politics and offer an Islamic alternative to atheistic Marxist
theory. Furthermore, because oftheir mass appeal, Khomeini was increasingly
under pressure to correspond with the leadership ofthe Marxist groups, including
the Mujahideen. 63
Yet Khomeini disagreed with the guerilla groups' violent tactics against the
Shah, believing they were ineffective and would alienate the public. He denounced
the Mujahideen 's attacks on the Iranian military as counterproductive, and instead
advocated "moral attacks" in order to persuade them from their loyalty to the
regime. 64 Ifhe could divide the Shah's forces, he thought, at least getting some
military men to defect, then he would weaken the Shah's ability to make war on his
own people. He believed that to attack them would only strengthen their loyalty to
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the Shah and that therefore this was not a strategically viable option. On top of
this, Khomeini did not believe the guerilla forces had either the legitimacy or the
influence to topple the government. In a meeting with guerilla representatives, he
said "the regime would only fall when the clergy as a whole joined the
opposition."65

It would be the leadership of the clergy, the traditional guardians

of Shi' a, that would take down the Shah, not a fraternity of guerilla fighters.
Although Khomeini demanded the Mujahideen-i Khalq withdraw anti
clerical polemics in their publications, which had criticized apolitical and pro
regime clerics, he did dispense funds to the families of Mujahideen political
prisoners in a gesture of solidarity.66 Regardless whether or not Khomeini
personally liked the guerilla groups, they did provide a great service to the
revolution. They, if anything, demonstrated the chaos that the increasingly
despotic Shah would bring to the nation, and showed that this chaos would only
end if the people united under the banner of opposition. In the end, the
Mujahideen-i Khalq would ultimately join forces with the Khomeini's clerically-led
opposition, providing many young revolutionaries who were ready to face the
Shah and his military might directly.
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Fedayeen-i Khalq

The story of the Fedayeen-i Khalq is similar to the Mujahideen-i Khalq,
except that the Fedayeen were not religious, but rather a secular Marxist anti-Shah
guerilla force.67 Born out of the 1963 protests, they were founded by Bijan Jazani
and Mas'ud Ahrnadzadeh and officially organized in the 1970's.68 Portrayed as
"atheist terrorists" by the Shah, the mission of the Fedayeen was to remove the
regime and install a government based on Marxist principles.69 Attempting to
bring a sense of agency to the people, one leader proclaimed "to inspire the people
we must resort to a revolutionary armed struggle ... to shatter the illusion that the
people are powerless."
The Fedayeen developed out of a coalition of three university Marxist
groups initially organized by activist students and writers in Tehran, Tabriz, and
Mashad. 70 Mainly children of the modem middle class whose parents had been
involved in the left-wing politics of Tudeh and National Front, the Fedayeen
ideologically drew on the Guevara theory offoco guerilla warfare.71 These young
activists, who were inspired by the liberation movements of China, Vietnam, and
"Fidayeen" comes from the Arabic word "Fidyah" which literally means "expiation by
sacrifice" or "redemption." However, in this case, the word "Fidayeen" means "men of sacrifice"
signifying their willingness to sacrifice their lives for a cause. Glasse, p. 126.
68
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Cuba, were generally college-educated with advanced degrees, often from Western
universities. 72 Their adoption of the foco theory expresses their rejection of the
"gradualist" school of political thought represented by the Tudeh and National
Front. Like Che Guevara, they believed a small band of revolutionary guerillas
could spark the revolution that would bring down the regime. This could only
occur by means of a violent guerilla struggle against the well-equipped military;
hencethey attacked foreign corporations, banks, and assassinated officials. 73
However, having lost many members as of 1976 to hit-and-run operations against
SAVAK and seeing little political results from such operations, the Fedayeen
ceased all military operations until such time as there would be more favorable
conditions for such operations. As with the case with Mujahideen-i Khalq,
Khomeini disagreed with their attacks on the Iranian military, and didn't believe
they could succeed in Iran as Guevara succeeded in Cuba without the support of
the clergy. Although he didn't condemn this group during the revolution, it was
clear that Khomeini did not approve of its dogmatic Marxism and its anti-religious
views. 74
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Marxist Intellectuals Behind the Revolution:
The Politics of Return

Two Iranian Marxist intellectuals had a major impact on the Revolution.
They are Jalal Al-i Ahmad (1923 - 1970) and 'Ali Shari'ati (1933 - 1977). The
intellectual traditions of these two men have been the subject of countless studies
in the West and in the Islamic world. Because of their impact on Iranian society
during the reign of the Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, no study of Khomeini or
the Iranian Revolution is complete without examining their role. Although I
cannot do a thorough study of these two scholars here, I will briefly review their
unique contributions to the revolution and how they affected Khomeini a:nd his
leadership. 75

Jalal Al-i Ahmad

Of all the modem Iranian writers, Jalal Al-i Ahmad was probably the most
often read by all sectors of society, from secular leftist intellectuals to scholars of
religion. Born in a clerical family, Al-i Ahmad disregarded his father's desires for
him to become a cleric. Instead he left religion altogether and joined the
communist Tudeh party. Under the influence of Khalil Maleki, a German-educated
social democrat, Al-i Ahmad became a major player in the party, writing many

A third intellectual whose work in many ways mirrored Al-i Ahmad and Shari'ati was Ehsan
Naraqi (b. 1926) but because of his involvement in state institutions and NGO's, his writings
made a minimal contribution to the revolution. See Gheissari, pp. 92-97.
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articles for the communist publications Mardum and Rahbar. 76 After he graduated
from the Teacher's Training College in 1946, he became a school teacher and
begun to write short stories and novels. 77 Most ofhis fictional stories were based
on his own life experiences, and addressed the problems and dynamics oftradition
Iranian life. His two most famous workers were Mudiri-i Madrasa (The School
Principle) and Did va Bazdid (Visitis Exchanged), both ofwhich ridiculed the
"superstition" ofreligion as exemplified by his father. 78 In the late 1940's, at the
height ofTudeh's power, Al-i Ahmad and other important members left the party,
disillusioned with the party's insistence on defending the Soviet Union's refusal to
resist the Iranian military's takeover oflranian Azerbaijan. 79 After he left the
party, Al-i Ahmad concentrated on teaching and writing, publishing three volumes
ofshort stories between 1945 and 1948. 80 In these stories, Al-i Ahmad expresses
his deep love affair with Persian culture and language, a relationship that is
mutually shared by his readers. Despite his growing alienation from politics, he
remained in contact with his intellectual father Khalil Maleki, who had also left the
Tudeh party. Together, in 1950 and 1951, they formed the Hizb-i Zahmat
Khashan (Toilers' party) in support ofthe nationalist work ofDr. Muhammad
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Mussadeq. 81 He would later follow Maleki out of the Toilers' party in to a new
Niru-yi Sivvum (Third Force) party, but likewise found the politics ofthat group
disheartening. Soon after he left that party, Dr. Mossadeq was overthrown by a
coup d'etat and Al-i Ahmed returned to his intellectual endeavors, leaving politics
behind. 82 This drifting from one party and ideology to the next was the general
course ofAl-i Ahmad's life and was described by his widow as his hadisaju 'i,
"search for happenings or events. "83 He was a perpetual student, always searching
for an insight that would assist him in understanding himself, his country, and his
culture.
Wanting to reconnect to the culture of his youth, Al-i Ahmad traveled to
his ancestral village ofAurazan in order to do anthropological work on rural
Iranian lifestyles. 84 This work led him to believe that the "real Iran" lay not in the
urban cities, but in the age-old, neglected, and forgotten villages that had not been
seduced by materialism, commercialism, and superficiality. 85 After the publication
ofAurazan, followed by Tatnishinha-yi Buluk-i Zahra, and Jazira-yi Kharg, both
studies of rural villages, he was invited to edit a series ofanthropological
monographs at the Institute of Social Research at the University ofTehran. 86
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Although his time spend at the Institute was very productive, his hadisaju 'i
was overpowering and he wanted to begin work on a new subject he had become
intrigued with: gharbzadegi. This term, having been translated as "Occidentosis",
"Westoxication", or the innocuous "Euromania", was partly inspired by the
direction of the institute in Tehran, which he believed wanted to produce
monographs that would be acceptable to Western scholars.87 He said, '"they
wanted to make the monographs into something worthy of being presented to
Westerners, i.e., inevitably written according to Western criteria."88 Being
philosophically opposed to this Euro-worship, he said he "was aiming at ... gaining
renewed acquaintance with ourselves, a new evaluation of our native
environment in accordance with criteria of our own."89 This turning away from
Western- oriented positivistic anthropology toward a political philosophy of social
criticism, was the beginning of Al-i Ahmad's rediscovery oflran and Iranian
culture.
Gharbzadegi, which by no doubt was the most important theoretical
contribution of Al-i Ahmad to the revolution, took up an idea first expressed by
the Iranian scholar Ahmad Fardid, who explained it in philosophical terms of the
West's worldview (Weltanschauung). Fardid believed the problem of gharbzadegi
originated in the ancient Greeks "existential separation between the human mind as
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the knowing subject and the external world as the object of study."90 He believed
that this worldview was in contrast to the East's "totalizing, harmonious, and
illuminative qualities," and because of the separation, "began a period of universal
darkness that has since concealed the original unity and totality of
Being."91
In the spirit of Marx's relationship with Hegel, Al-i Ahmad, although
impressed by Fardid, turned his theory from the abstract to the concrete, making it
into a critical political social philosophy. For him, gharbzadegi can be
characterized as the "abandonment of traditional cultural identity and the blind
imitation of all things Western." In terms of popular culture, he saw that most of
the imitation was blind, simply borrowing images from the West without having
any knowledge of how these phenomenon came to be. The historical forces that
served as the basis for Western political and economic progress, which the Shah's
"White Revolution" was attempting to emulate, were not understood either. He
therefore identified the fundamental contradictions between traditional Iranian
society and the massive tension arising from the pull of Western modernity. He
was appalled by the abandonment of traditional cultural values, language, dress,
tastes, foods, and the decline in traditional ways of living; believing that Iranians
had forgotten who they were while attempting to be something they were not. In
defining "gharbzadegi'', he spoke in terms of a disease, writing it is "like cholera
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[or] frostbite. But no. It's at least as bad as sawflies in the wheat fields. Have
you ever seen how they infest wheat? From within. There's a healthy skin in
places, but it's only a skin, just like the shell ofa cicade on a tree."92 To be
plagued with gharbzadegi is to be sickened with disease that kills from the inside,
a disease ofthe heart and mind.
Al-i Ahmad declared the cultural "Westemiz.ation" oflran to be a
subversive attempt, disguised as progress and development, to weaken internal and
traditional opposition forces (Shi'a Islam and Iranian nationalism) that would
oppose any colonial or imperial attempt to control Iran. This "cultural invasion"
occured alongside ofthe political and economic invasion oflran. Thus,
Westemiz.ation made Iran politically, economically, and culturally subservient to
the Western powers. In their attempt to be "modem", Iranians were paying the
price by losing their cultural identity and their national sovereignty.
This notion of"cultural invasion" or "cultural imperialism" not only played
a major role in Al-i Ahmad's critique oflran, but also played a major role in third
world Marxist critique in general. For example, Paulo Freire, the Brazilian founder
of "liberation pedagogy", described "cultural invasion" as such,
...the invaders penetrate the cultural context ofanother group, in disrespect
ofthe latter's potentialities; they impose their own view ofthe world upon
those they invade and inhibit the creativity ofthe invaded by curbing their
expression. Whether urbane or harsh, cultural invasion is thus always an
act of violence against the persons ofthe invaded culture, who lose their
originality or face the threat oflosing it. In cultural invasion ...the
invaders are the authors of, and actors in, the process; those they invade
92
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are the objects.
All domination involves invasion - at times physical and overt, at times
camouflaged, with the invader assuming the role of a helping friend.
. .. . invasion is a form of economic and cultural domination.

Cultural conquest leads to the cultural inauthenticity of those who are
invaded; they begin to respond to the values, the standards, and the goals
of the invaders. In cultural invasion it is essential that those who are
invaded come to see their reality with the outlook of the invaders rather
than their own; for the more they mimic the invaders, the more stable the
position of the latter becomes.
For cultural invasion to succeed, it is essential that those invaded become
convinced of their intrinsic inferiority. Since everything has its opposite, if
those who are invaded consider themselves inferior, they must necessarily
recognize the superiority of the invaders. The values of the latter thereby
become the pattern for the former. The more invasion is accentuated and
those invaded are alienated from the spirit of their own culture and from
themselves, the more the latter want to be like the invaders: to walk like
them, dress like them, talk like them. 93
For Al-i Ahmad, this "cultural inauthenticity of those who are invaded", and
"alienation from the spirit of their own culture", is what he termed gharbzadegi.
Despite his rigorous critique of the cultural invasion, Al-i Ahmad saw one
aspect oflranian cultural and society that had not been penetrated by the West:
Shi'a Islam. Coupled with his personal rapprochement to Islam, he believed that
the only "authentic" and therefore legitimate way to resist the Westernization and
colonization of Iran lay with the power of the Shi' a clergy and their leadership of a
religiously committed Iran. No other ideology, religion, or philosophy had the
power to united and motivate the people like Shi'a Islam. Although he could
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never fully commit himselfto a religious life, believing his very prayers to be
hypocritical, Al-i Ahmad surprisingly felt comfortable in his own skin when
speaking from the point-of-view ofa Shi'a Muslim.94 For him personally, salvation
ofIslam came through the radicalization oflslam. Without such radicalization,
religion remained superstitious and obsolete, and therefore unable to address the
concrete problems ofexistence, especially the chaos that was prevalent in Iran.
Although he still had his doubts, in 1964 he made a pilgrimage to Mecca where his
relationship with Islam deepened.95
Despite the success and growing popularity ofhis works, Al-i Ahmad was
distrusted by strict conservative clergy and dogmatic communists as well. In life,
he was claimed by no one, and pledged his allegiance to no one. After his death,
religious, secular, Marxist, etc., all seemed to suggest that he was one oftheirs.
However, although he was never claimed by Khomeini , it is obvious that the
Ayatollah was influenced by the rhetoric ofJalal Al-i Ahmad, and frequently
incorporated his gharbzadegi language into his own speeches. In 1962, Khomeini
met Al-i Ahmad at the funeral ofhis father, who had been an important cleric. It is
said that Khomeini spoke with Al-i Ahmad there and told him ofhis admiration for
his book.96 Later, in 1964, Al-i Ahmad visited Khomeini, then under house-arrest
in Tehran, shaking his hand and saying, "Ifwe continue to join hands we will
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defeat the governrnent."97 Many believed these symbolic meetings suggested a
willingness to ally secular and religious opposition in their ongoing struggle against
the Shah's tyranny and the gharbzadegi that follows.98
The influence of Al-i Ahmad on Khomeini is most striking in Khomeini's
address at the Faiziyeh School in Qom on September 8, 1979 marking the "Black
Friday" massacre a year prior. 99 In it, he likens "westoxication" with the
"darkness" spoken about in the Qur'an, Surah 2:257. 100 he says, "all
"westoxication" is darkness, those who turn their attention to the West and
foreigners, have taken the West to be their direction of prayer. They have moved
into darkness and their saints are idols. Eastern societies...have turned to the West
and, having the direction of their prayers, the West, have lost themselves. They do
not know themselves. All the problems of Easterners and, among them, our
problems and miseries, are caused by our losing ourselves." 101 Khomeini goes on
to say that if Iranian books, streets, drug stores, factories, etc., don't have Western
names, then they are not accepted. "Easterners have completely forgotten their
honor", he continues, "They have buried it. In place of it, they have put others.
These are all darknesses which a tyrant transforms us to from light. It is these very
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tyrants - ofthe past and present - who have reached out towards ''westoxication."
They take all their subjects and sources form the West and have given them to us.
Our universities were at that time Western universities. Our economy, our culture
were Western. We completely forgot ourselves." 102 Taking a page directly from
the rhetorical ofAl-i Ahmad, Khomeini states that "as long as we are in this state
ofimitating, we do not wish for independence", and that "it is only the mosques
which do not have Western names and that is because the clergymen, until now,
have not succumbed." As Al-i Ahmad said, the religious institutions were the only
traditional section ofsociety that had not been corrupted by gharbzadegi, a thesis
with which Khomeini agrees. He goes on to explain the kind offreedom
gharbzadegi offers; the freedom ofgambling houses, bars, and prostitutes, the
freedom oflewdness, heroin, and marijuana. 103 This sort offreedom he calls
"colonististic freedom", a freedom that is dictated to countries from their colonial
masters. "An enlightened heart", he says, "cannot stand by silently and watch
while traditions and honor are trampled upon. An enlightened heart cannot see its
people being drawn towards baseness ofspirit or watch in silence while
individuals... live in slurns." 104
It is clear that the rhetoric ofgharbzadegi made popular by Jalal Al-i
Ahmad has a tremendous influence on Khomeini and many other clerics. Though
it is impossible to quantify such influence, it is likewise impossible to ignore the
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overwhelming likeness of Khomeini's argument about cultural invasion to Al-i
Ahmad's gharbzadegi. In Khomeini's speech, he prophetically pleads with his
audience to abandon their infatuation with the West, and "search for and find the
East", the very thesis of Jalal Al-i Ahmad's work. 105
Through the remainder of Al-i Ahmad's life, he continued to publish
socially conscious works, mainly dealing with the plight of rural peasants, and the
role of education in Iran. 106 He did on September 9, 1969, and was later buried in
southern Tehran near the Firuzabadi mosque. 107 After his death, his works would
become more famous than they were when he was alive, and would help shape the
direction of the Iranian Revolution.

Ali Shari 'ati

Much of Jalal Al-i Ahmad's work would be expanded upon by a young
radicalized and very popular scholar, 'Ali Shari'ati. Hated by the Shah and loved
by his students, Shari'ati brought a modern and very radical understanding of
Islam, Islamic history, and Islamic culture. To the younger generation oflranian
radicals, his work represented the salvation of religion - a religion that had become
sterile due to its institutional "ghettoiz.ation." Rejecting the clergy's "security
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blanket" of political quietism, Shari'ati believed that the clergy had the duty, as
representatives oflslam and the Shi'a tradition, to engage in the political and social
life of the nation. Through his radical lectures, he lifted the veil of dogmatism and
superstition to expose the radical nature of the Islamic weltanschauung, and
synthesized it with the best of modem "liberation" philosophy. Applying this
future-oriented remembrance of the radical origin of Islam to the contemporary
Iranian context, Shari'ati become one of the most intelligent and eloquent voices of
opposition. Seen as the "ideologist of the revolt", Shari'ati did the most to prepare
the young revolutionaries for the Islamic upheaval that would engulf the
country. 108
'Ali Shari'ati was born in 1933 in Mazinan, a small village in Khorasan, the
northeast part oflran. 109 Forever influenced by his childhood in the countryside,
he felt forever indebted to his grandfather and uncles, all of who were religious
scholars and pious men. He would often praise his forbearers for their "philosophy
of remaining a human being in an age when life is polluted, when remaining a
human being is extremely difficult, and when a repeatedjihad is needed everyday,
and whenjihad cannot be waged." 110 However, it was his father who had the most
influence on young 'Ali's life. Aqa Muhammad Taqi Shari'ati was one of the
founders of the "Center for the Propagation of Islamic Truth" in Mashad, and was

108

Nikkie R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1981) 215.
109
Ibid., p. 215.
1 '0
Algar, Hamid. Introduction. On the Sociology oflslam, by Ali Shari'ati. (Berkeley: Mizan
Press, 1979) 15.
173

an intellectual giant among the Islamic intellectual movement in Iran. 111 His
mission, to bring young Western-seduced Iranian students back to the Islamic way
of lire without rejecting modernity for religious obscurantism, would have a deep
impact on the thought and work of his son. Together, he and his son would join
the "Movement of God-Worshipping Socialists", a leftist political party that was
not willing to reject religion as other intellectuals had done. 112 'Ali would later say
"it was he who introduced me to his friends - his books; they were my constant
and familiar companions from the earliest years of my schooling. I grew up and
matured in his library, which was for him the whole of his life and his family."113
After receiving his secondary education, Shari'ati at the age of seventeen entered a
teacher's training college and within two years became a teacher, while writing and
translating works on religion and engaging in pro-Mossadeq politics. 114 His work
at the teacher's training college, plus the frequent lectures he gave at the Center
for the Propagation oflslamic truth, introduced him to the problems posed by
Islam and Western modernity. He began to take an interest in the anti-imperialist
and anti-capitalist philosophy of Third World liberation struggles. During this time
he translated from 'Arabic Abdul Hamid Jowdat al-Sahar's book, Abu Zarr:

Khoda Parast-i Sosiyalist (Abu Zarr: The God-Worshipping Socialist), which
praised Abu Zarr, an companion of the Prophet Muhammad who rejected
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Ummayad claim to authority, supported 'Ali's claim to caliphate, withdrew to the
desert, and uncompromisingly spoke on behalf of the poor and destitute.115 At
twenty-three he was accepted into the Faculty of Letters at Mashad, and earned his
bachelors degree three years later, specializing in 'Arabic and French.116 Because
he was one of the top scholars, he was awarded a scholarship to the Sorbonne in
Paris, although he had to wait a full year until he could leave.117
'Ali Shari'ati's time in Paris was one of great intellectual flowering. He
mainly studied religious history and sociology, including the writers and
intellectuals popular at the time; Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Satre, and the French
Islamologist Louis Massignon, with whom he had a deep connection. 118 Through
his study of Marxism and French sociology, he came across Frantz Fanon's The
Wretched of the Earth, which left a lasting impact on him.119 Although Fanon had
first been introduced to Europe by Satre, Shari'ati wrote an article in 1962 praising
his keen insights into the mind of the colonized, and advocated its study by Iranian
students. 120 As he became increasingly interested in Third World anti-imperialist
struggles, he rejected both positivistic sociology and dogmatic Marxism as being
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inadequate to answer the problems of the Third World. 121 His time in Paris
coincided with the violent Algerian Revolution, which was a struggle against
France's control over the North African country, and through which the anti
imperialist struggle would eventually be brought to French soil. 122 For Shari'at�
The Algerian Revolution was a struggle between Muslims and imperialists, and he
actively supported the Algerian resistance. It brought a further insight to him
when the French and Algerian Communist Parties both denounced the rebellion
and supported the extended annexation of Algerian by France, a move that forever
cemented his suspicion of dogmatic communist parties. 123 He joined the Liberation
Movement and the Iranian Students Confederation, organizing many of their
protests in support of the Algerian struggle, resulting in hospital time nursing a
head wound. 124
With his doctorate in hand, in 1964 Shari'ati returned to a chaotic Iran that
had just been through one of the most violent suppressions of domestic opposition
in Iranian history. While Shari'ati was in Paris, the Shah was engaged in his
massive 1963 sweep of dissenters, locking intellectuals and clergy in prison,
banning opposition parties, and killing young protesters. Shari'ati would be no
exception. As soon as he crossed into Iran from Turkey he was immediately
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arrested and put into prison for several months. 125 Shari'ati's reputation as a leftist
and anti-imperialist intellectual preceded his physical arrival, and the Shah was
going to send him a strong message.
After his release in 1965, he taught first in a Khorasan village, then at a
Mashhad High School. 126 However, he was soon appointed to the University of
Mashhad as an assistant professor, and became a very popular professor among the
student body. His popularity and the nature of his subject matters soon caused
alarm in the administration and he was forced to retire. 127 Committed to bringing
his revolutionary ideals to the Iranian people, he forgot his unjust retirement and
moved to Tehran, where he was hired as a lecturer at the Husseiniyah Ershad, a
progressive Muslim teaching institution created in 1969 and firlanced by veterans
of the Liberation Movement. 128 As the Shah's repressive police state continued to
suppress all forms of opposition, the Husseiniyah Ershad was closed down in
1973, Shari'ati's works were banned and he was forced into hiding. 129 Eventually
he was caught and served five hundred days in solitary confirlement without any
trial. 130

After his release in 1977, Shari'ati knew he could no longer stay in Iran

and fled to London in May. In a last desperate attempt to shame Shari'ati, the
Iranian regime refused to let his wife and two of his three daughters join him; he
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therefore met only one of his girls at the airport. 131 Only a month later, on June
19, 1977, Shari'ati mysteriously died, a death that was popularly blamed on
SAVAK acting on orders from the Shah. 132 Although he didn't live to see the fall
of the Peacock Throne (as the Shah's regime was called), Shari'ati has been rightly
credited as being the "intellectual of the revolution."133
Shari'ati's writing style reflects his speaking style; he was first and
foremost a religio-political orator. As a sociologist, he does not load his books
with positivistic facts and statistics, as is often seen in Western sociological
studies; instead he relies heavily of logical and religious arguments. From the wide
range of his writings that where published, most of them after the successful
revolution, we can examine his most important ideas he had about Islam,
liberation, revolutionary struggle, and religion in general.
Shari'ati was foremost an Islamic intellectual concerned about the vitality
and future of Islam as a revolutionary force for good. Just as importantly, he was
a dedicated theorist of liberation, struggling to formulate a universal answer for the
problems of oppressed and colonized peoples of the Third World. Just as Al-i
Ahmad had articulated the dangers of gharbzadegi, Shari'ati believed Iran was in a
precarious situation, increasingly culturally alienated from itself, and putting its self
in constant danger of becoming a colonial state with its destiny dictated by the
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West.
The issue that was most important to Shari'ati was the nature ofthe Shi'a
tradition. Was it as obsolete and obscurantist as Western-educated intellectuals
charged? Or was it a apolitical personal religious tradition, unconcerned with
matters ofthe state, as many ofthe 'Ulema believed? Shari'ati rejected both of
these positions in the beliefthat Islam, and especially Shi'a Islam (which to him

was Islam), was a revolutionary ideology that was as relevant to modem society as
any Western democratic philosophy. Proving his point, he said Shi'ism has a
unique "worldview, ideological foundation, philosophy ofhistory, mission, agenda,
class base, political strategy, system ofleadership, tradition ofparty campaign and
organization." 134 Rejecting the reactionary mullahs, who kept religion a private
matter, Shari'ati believed that it was the responsibility and duty ofall committed
Muslims to engage in the political life ofthe nation, as did the Prophet
Muhammad. This Islamic worldview, drawing on the early Islamic Medina
experience as a template, demonstrates what Shari'ati called the Nizam-i Tawhid a complete social order that stresses justice, peace, equity, solidarity, communal
ownership ofwealth, and finally, a classless society. 135 This complete Islamic
society has the potential to fulfill all human needs and wants in a healthy balance
between individual autonomy and collective solidarity. Furthermore, this
progressive Islam preserves historic Islamic identity while critically adopting
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aspects ofWestern technological progress in order to ensure the viability ofthe
nation in the modem world. Shari'ati saw no future in the "reactionary" stance of
the conservative apolitical mullahs, nor in the vision ofthe anti-religious

gharbazadegi intellectuals who wished to see religion relegated to the dustbins of
history.
Unlike Michel Foucault, whose briefjourney into political journalism
corresponded with the Iranian revolution and believed it to be a concrete negation
ofMarx's statement that "religion is the opiate ofthe masses", Shari'ati knew very
well, that within the Shi'a tradition, there was still an orientation that could be
considered opium Shi'ism. 136 This form ofthe Shi'a tradition was what he called
"Safavid Shi'ism" and it is in stark contrast to the original Shi'ism (Alid Shi'ism)
of'Ali, the first Imam. 137 Alid Shi'ism is Islam in its original progressive and
dynamic state - a tradition that is uncompromisingly radical in its defense ofsocial
justice and its commitment to tawhid (oneness ofGod). In contrast, Safavid
Shi'ism degraded religion into an institution ofstate power, mixing it with
nationalism and ethnocentrism for political means. Because it became an ideology
legitimizing the status quo, it was deprived ofits revolutionary potential.
For Shari'ati, Safavid Shi'ism was also the Shi'ism ofthe Pahlavi Peacock
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Throne. 138 Furthermore, the modern 'ulema that lent their legitimizing services to
the corrupt regime, renounced their roles as "awakeners", ghettoized themselves in
their obscure theological debates, and transformed Shi'ism into a religion of the
''vanquished" and "defeated" (as in the Muharram festival), these were the men
who made Shi'ism the opiate of the masses. For Shari'ati, the essential battle was
not one between religion and secularism as in Marx, but one of religion vs. religion
(Mazheb 'Atiyeh Mazheb). 139 Only rediscovery of the essence of the Shi'a
tradition, exemplified by 'Ali, Hussein, and the Imams, and their radical struggle
against tyranny, could rescue the Shi'a tradition from the ma/a' (priesthood:
Safavid Shi'a clerics).
Like Fromm's analysis of the role of Prophets and Priests, Shari'ati locates
the priests and the opulent (mutri.f) in the exploiting classes, who bitterly opposed
the revolutionary message of the prophet because of their personal stake in the
status quo. 140 The prophet, on the other hand, is the representative of the
oppressed, the downtrodden, the proletariat, and the martyrs. Bitterly opposed to
an oppressive status quo, he represents a perpetual revolution that continually
strives for the perfection of mankind and of his own society. Furthermore, the
prophet bears the worldview of tawhid, which manifests itself in a just society; a
society based on the Islamic principles of equality, solidarity, justice, peace, and
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belief in Allah. In contrast, the society ofshirk (associating partners with God or
idolatry), is the society of inequality, injustice, commercialism, materialism, greed,
war, and unbelief It is the role of the prophet and the prophetic to engage in
worldly activities in order to secure the environment from which the society of

tawhid can flourish. If this historical mission is abandoned or compromised, then
tyranny, like the Ummayads and the Shah, will reign over the lives ofmankind.
Shari'ati not only accused the priestly 'ulema of abandoning the spirit of
'Ali, but he also criticized the Western-oriented intellectuals for depending on the
West for an identity. He believed this made them impotent in the struggle against
imperialism. Rejecting their appeals to racial and ancient past national identity,
Shari'ati stressed the ''return to Islam" as the only legitimate source oflranian
identity. He said,
Our people do not find their roots in these civilizations... [Sassanid,
Achaemenians, etc.] Our people remember nothing :from this distant
past and do not care to learn about the pre-Islamic civilizations...
Consequently, for us a return to our roots means not a discovery of pre
Islamic Iran, but a return to our Islamic, especially Shiah roots. 141

As is evident from this quote, the Shah's :frequent elevation ofpre-Islamic Persian
civilization, and the secular intellectuals' pride in being "Persian" while abandoning
Islam, fell on the deaf ears ofShari'ati. He categorically rejected attempts by the
Shah and the gharbzadegi intellectuals to pit Persian culture against Islamic
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culture, believing they only used these appeals to ancient Iranian history to
legitimate imperial rule. But because the vast majority oflranians saw their
identity not in blood and soil, but in Islam, a return to anything but Islam was
unacceptable.
Likewise, popular religious traditions, or as the Sunni philosopher AbuHamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali (1058-1111 CE) called them, the "religion ofthe
riff-raff', also had to be abandoned because oftheir opiate effect on the masses,
placating their alienation with superstitious ideas and practices, and making them
less likely to be revolutionary. 142 He preferred the intellectual and "enlightened"
Muslim, imbued with the spirit ofprotest, to the static priestly scholar or the
unenlightened superstitious commoner. 143
IfShari'ati was rejecting both "Safavid" Shi'ism and "riff-raff' Shi'ism, as
well as the gharbzadegi infected intellectuals, in preference for the "Alid" Shi'ism,
then we must ask what has influenced this form ofthe Shi'a tradition. Shari'ati
would not be honest ifhe claimed that he was not influenced in many ways by
Western intellectual traditions. His Islam was a hybrid mix ofnon-Muslim and
non-Iranian ideas and concepts, including Marxism, socialism, Leninism,
existentialism, French sociology, and the works ofmany Third World
revolutionaries. 144 Combined with Sufi mystic metaphors and symbols, Shari'ati's
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Islam was a blend ofWestern and Eastern influences.
However, his use ofWestern analysis could cause a problem, especially
because it came from someone who was criticizing others for their dependence on
Western analysis. Yet, Shari'ati saw truth to be truth. Iftruth came from a
Western source, it logically would have an Islamic equivalent, because Islam, as a
comprehensive worldview and system ofthought and action, was capable of
discerning truth from falsehood, and could not reject truth just because it had first
been articulated elsewhere. Shari'ati was well aware ofthe revolutionary potential
ofhis ideology. lfhe was able to imbue the Iranian masses with such ideas, his
ideology could become a real force against the regime and its supporters.
Therefore, in order to communicate with the masses, Shari'ati could not rely on
the language ofthe Western Marxists and socialists; he had to "Islamize" his
analysis. Needing to proceed through the language with which most could
identify, Shari'ati replaced Western terms with terms corresponding to Iranian
Islamic culture, history, religion, philosophy, literature, and the contemporary
situation, giving his analysis an organic origin and depth ofculture-specific
meaning that could not be achieved through Western terminology. 145 There is no
evidence Shari'ati did this systematically, as ifit were a planned strategy to deceive
his listeners; it seemed to have a natural development in which he recognized the
areas in which the Shi'a tradition and Western analysis were congruent.
As we shall see, the "Islamization" ofWestern political analysis would
145
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become very important to Khomeini. Although he didn't accept all ofShari'ati's
views, Khomeini did benefit from the piercing critique provided by Shari'ati and
accepted by the masses, and from the linguistic idiom in which Shari'ati delivered
his critique.

Khomeini's Use of Leftist-Islamic Language

In his 1993 work Khomeinism: Essays of the Islamic Republic, Ervand
Abrahamian rejects the "fundamentalist" label assigned to Khomeini by many in the
West, and instead prefers the term "populist." 146 This is for several reasons: 1) All
Muslims can be considered "fundamentalist" inasmuch as this means that they
believe in the inerrancy ofthe Qur'an as the word of the divine. 2) If
"fundamentalist" implies the layman's ability to grasp religious truth directly from
the sacred text without help or support from the clergy, tradition, or scholarship,
Khomeini rejected this naive view, claiming that even the Angel Gabriel couldn't
fully comprehend the "inner meanings" of the Qur'an. 3) If"fundamentalist"
implies the desire to "return" to a "golden age" of religion, then Khomeini would
not fit the description, for he rejected such "pre-modem" utopian ideals as
inadequate in facing the modem world. 4) If "fundamentalist" entails the calling for
the abandonment of the modem nation-state, than this description does not apply
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to Khomeini's acceptance of modern national boundaries - despite the fact that he
often condemned the "artificial" separation ofMuslims made by imposition of
Western colonial borders. 5) If''fundamentalist" implies rigid implementation of
laws and institutions based on a strict traditional interpretation of sacred text, then
Khomeini was not fundamentalist, because he was open to non-Islamic notions of
government if they were acceptable to Islamic tradition. Hence he supported
many Western democratic and parliamentary ideas. 147 6) If "fundamentalist" entails
a dogmatic rejection of modernity and Western technology, then Khomeini was no
fundamentalist because he advocated the technological modernization oflran,
often labeling clerics who rejected technology as "reactionary" (ertejayi). 7) In
origin, the term "fundamentalist" refers to a strain of twentieth-century American
Protestantism that rejected a socio-political "social gospel" for an eschatological
gospel of "saving souls" and biblical literalism. Although he was by no means
neglectful of theological issues, Khomeini was predominately concerned with the
politics and society of his day. 8) If "fundamentalism" proposes "fossilized" ideas,
devoid of novel and dynamic interpretations, a negation of the dialectic of
knowledge, then Khomeini was no fundamentalist. On the subject of politics,
society, and philosophy, etc., and despite his appeals to orthodoxy, he was open to
new developments, often treating traditions and customs quite cavalierly, while
blending others with Western-derived concepts. Thus his religio-political
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philosophy was similar in many ways to Third World populism found in other areas
of the world. 148 For these reasons, the term "fundamentalist" as it is popularly
used is simply not applicable to the unique role and views of Khomeini.
In its place, Abrahamian describes Khomeini's movement as "populist",
which he defines as:
a movement of the propertied middle class that mobilized the lower
classes, especially the urban poor, with radical rhetoric directed against
imperialism, foreign capitalism, and the political establishment. In
mobilizing the "common people," populist movements use charismatic
figures and symbols, imagery, and language that have potent value in
the mass culture. Populist movements promise to drastically raise the
standards of living and make the country fully independent of outside
powers.... 149
The only important aspect I would add to Abrahamian's defintion is the
incorporation of "radical" rhetoric. As I have argued, that rhetoric originated in
the Marxist-Leninist anti-imperialist intellectual tradition, especially as manifested
in Third World liberation struggles. Inasmuch most of the Marxist-Leninist
influenced intellectuals and guerilla groups came from the Iranian "middle class",
although not all were entirely "propertied", the middle class was indeed responsible
for the rise in radical anti-imperialist critiques of the Shah and his regime,
especially in the cities, universities, and abroad. Nonetheless, I must slightly
disagree with Abrahamian in the case of Iran, because it was not these "middle
class" intellectuals and parties that radicalized the "lower classes" and "urban
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poor" during this period. It was in fact the clergy led by Ayatollah Khomeini who
radicalized the poor and urban Iranians. Although some would argue that the
clerical class belonged to the broader middle class, I would argue that the clerics
represented a separate class on their own, having a distinctive social function, way
of appropriating wealth, way of living, and worldview. More importantly, the
language used by clerics such as Bazargan and Khomeini, especially during the
1970's, was in fact appropriated from the Marxist intellectuals, although filtered
through Islamic terms and concepts. Thus Khomeini and the radical clerics that
followed became a conduit through which Marxist ideas, concepts, and analysis
could pass through to the lower classes, albeit while drawing on Islamic language.
Prior to the 1970's, Khomeini seems to have accepted the inevitability of
monarchal rule. Even during the 1963 suppression, when he was quickly
becoming the most vocal anti-Shah cleric, he did not advocate revolution or
overthrowing the Shah. 150 However, while he was in exile during the 1970s, a
change of direction in Khomeini's language seems to point to an ever increasing
influence of Marxism. Back in Iran, while social conditions were continually
deteriorating, the writings of Jalal Al-i Ahmad, 'Ali Shari'ati, Che Guevara, Ho
Chi Minh, Frantz Fanon, and other liberation theorists were all becoming
increasingly popular among young radicals, sometimes being the sole merchandise
sold by bookstore owners. As these writers became increasingly popular, we see
a corresponding change in Khomeini's language which reflects his deep connection
150
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to the events occurring in Iran. He begins to use words he has rarely used before,
or interprets terms differently as to encompass a greater audience. 151 For
example, when Khomeini spoke oftwo antagonistic classes (tabaqah), the
mostazafin (oppressed) and the mostakberin (oppressors), such language was
easily understandable by both the religiously- oriented urban poor and rural, and by
middle class leftist intellectuals. Just speaking in terms ofclass antagonism was an
appeal to the Marxist tradition, while also articulating the very experience ofthe
poor and downtrodden. Khomeini's world was divided among the tabaqeh-i bala
(the upper class), consisting ofthe oppressors: the rich, powerful, capitalists,
exploiters, corrupt, elite, plutocrats, aristocracy, and royalty, essentially those who
did not work for a living (he often referring to them as parasites), and the tabaqeh
i payin (lower class): who were the poor, oppressed, exploited, downtrodden,
slum-dwellers, starving, disenfranchised, alienated, and in general deprived ofthe
necessities oflife, essentially those who found themselves victims ofhistory. 152
As he had likened the Shah to Yazid, the murderer oflmam Hussein,
Khomeini charged the upper class with always supporting tyranny, oppression, and
falsehood over freedom, justice, and truth. Much like Shari'ati, Khomeini argued
that Muhammad had engaged in a "class struggle" against the aristocracy of
Mecca, and that Imam Hussein died in an attempt to liberate the oppressed from
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the oppressors. I53 The contemporary Iranian situation could be understood as a
parallel to Muhammad's "class struggle" and to Imam Hussein's struggle against
oppression, because both traditions, the Marxist and Islamic, have within
themselves a dialectic of history, whether this can be summed up as "all of history
is a class struggle" or ajihad, sacred struggle between "good and evil."
A very clever example of Khomeini's frequent borrowing of Marxist
language was his use of the phrase "opium of the masses", as he regularly did in his
speeches. For example, when denouncing those nations that sign the "Declaration
of Human Rights", such as the United States and Britain, yet also violate those
human rights throughout the world, he calls such declarations the "opium of the
masses." I54 This is because those imperial nations wish to show the world that
they are for universal human rights, thus lulling nations into believing they are
benign forces for good. Another example is when he charges that the Western
educated, anti-religious intellectuals try to convince Iranian students that the
clerics are reactionaries and their religious traditions are an "opium of the masses",
that keeps them from seeing the truth in Western modernization. 155 For Khomeini,
the opium dealer was the West and the gharbzadegi intellectual, not Islam or the
clergy.
To his audiences, Khomeini cleverly pointed to capitalism and imperialism
as the latest form of"evil" in the world, an evil with which the Shi'a community
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has long since been familiar. In order to "enjoin what is right, and forbid what is
wrong", as stated in the Qu'ran, Khomeini promised the end of the Dictatora
Coronada, replacing it with an Islamic system of governance, that would resemble
a utopian "socialist" state, i.e. ending exploitation, poverty, injustice, inequality,
unemployment, landlessness, etc.
On the verge of success, but still at Neauphle-le-Chateau, Khomeini
declared that ''the demands of the oppressed people of Iran are not restricted to the
departure of the Shah and the abolition of the monarchy. Their struggle will
continue until the establishment of an Islamic Republic that guarantees the freedom
of the people, the independence of the country, and the attainment of social
justice." 156 Linguistically, Khomeini was parroting the language of the young
radicals, while imbuing it with clerical and prophetic authority. That he spoke the
revolutionary language they spoke, that he clearly articulated their experiences,
that he fully identified with the revolutionaries' goal of ousting the Shah, that he
lived the ideal lifestyle of the "suffering charismatic" and continued to be
uncompromising in his opposition to the Shah only served to heighten his
credibility as a revolutionary leader among the Iranian masses. Furthermore,
Khomeini placed the Iranian revolution in the broader context of the Third World
rejection of imperial subjugation. For the Marxist intellectual, the destruction of
man's domination of man is the goal of all "liberation" movements, and therefore it
became a duty to engage in the revolutionary overthrow of the Shah. For the
156
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religious, the Hussein model of Shi'a Islam advocated by Khomeini also made
opposition to tyranny a religious duty, one championed by the Prophet and his
descendents. Furthermore, Khomeini promised that after the Shah's fall would
come a government based in rational authority, therefore bringing an end to man's
unjust domination over man - music to the ears of a socialist.
Although Khomeini and the leftist opposition had much in common, it must
be made clear that, although Khomeini could not accept leftist denunciation of
apolitical clerics. Khomeini believed that, after the revolution was completed, the
clergy would govern the nation, and therefore, no diminishing of the clergy's
power or legitimacy should be tolerated prior to that time. This sounds slightly
hypocritical given that Khomeini often denounced fellow clerics who took the
quietist position. However, his critique was an inter-clerical critique, a dispute
among equals. Such criticism from non-clerics was not welcome because it would
diminished their ability to govern later. Even though he would not tolerate such
anti-clerical views, he did nonetheless offer support
to many groups and thinkers when their goals including the overthrow of the Shah.
The convergence of Marxist-Leninist movements among middle class
intellectuals, with the ability of Khomeini to radicalize the religious urban poor and
rural produced a "coalition of dissent" that together brought the Peacock Throne
to its knees. Although Khomeini believed his views were an unblemished
representation of the Shi'a tradition, it is very clear that leftist intellectual traditions
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did influence his thinking and rhetoric. He was not immune to, nor did he overtly
claim to be unimpressed by, the analytical critiques of Marxist-Leninists and leftist
Islamic scholars, thinkers, and parties. With their help, Khomeini successfully led
the coalition against the Shah, an unprecedented conjunction of secular, religious,
Marxist, socialist, and Islamic elements, banded together for a single purpose.

Summary

As has been demonstrated, the influence of radical Marxist-Leninism and
the philosophy of Third World "liberation" struggles saturated the intellectual and
political life oflran during the period leading up to the Iranian revolution. The
communism of the Tudeh party grew exponentially in the 40's achieving their
massive influence among the industrial workers. Mossadeq's socialistic
nationalism of the National Front came to power in 1951, effectively cutting short
the rampant powers of the monarchy, only to be overthrown by the CIA in 1953.
The rule of the Muhammad Reza Pahlavi Shah saw the growth of Leftist Islamic
groups such as the Freedom Movement oflran, and the birth oflslamic-Marxist
guerilla warfare. As the nation saw increasing demographic changes,
industrialization, modernization, and Westernization, cultural alienation began to
flourish throughout the cities and country sides. Many towering left-influenced
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scholars, such as Jalal Al-i Ahmad and 'Ali Shari'ati began to systematize the
experiences of gharbzadegi into a radical political philosophy, and impressed on
the people the need to return to Islam as the only way of liberating themselves and
their nation from the Shah's Western cultural and political tyranny. Khomeini,
exiled abroad yet still seen as the figurehead of the revolution, benefited immensely
from these radical critiques of the Shah. By appropriating much of their
revolutionary language and arguments, and returning it to the people recast in
Islamic language, he was able to appeal to both the anti-imperial intelligentsia and
the religious commoner. Not only did the political and religious left influence his
personal understanding of the Shi'a tradition, but it also helped prepare the
revolutionary groundwork for the Iranian revolution.
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CHAPTER VII
FINAL CONCLUSIONS
As we have seen, the success of Ayatollah Khomeini in leading the Iranian
revolution was due to multiple factors, only some of which have been detailed in
this study. I believe that the theory of "prophetic charisma," which brings together
the "charisma" elucidated by Weber, and the "prophetic" as understood by Erich
Fromm, stressing the importance of the general role of prophets who stand outside
the given status quo of power, the theory - praxis dialectic, together with Prophet
Muhammad's example as the standard bearer oflslarnic notions of the
"prophetic", as well as the additional models of 'Ali and Hussein willingness to be
martyrs, provides a general model for which all later Muslim actions and speech
can be judged to be truly charismatic and prophetic. As we have seen, the
application of this theory to the individual who was Khomeini provides abundant
evidence that he represents a modem manifestation of such prophetic charisma.
He not only denounced the Shah through politically and
culturally piercing words, but uncompromisingly in deeds as well - thus
exemplifying Fromm's most important notion of the theory-praxis dialectic.
Although great loss befell him, such as prison time, exile, and the death of his son,
he never backed down from the threat of violence and continued his jihad without
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fear of persecution. Not only did he stand prophetically against the Shah, but also
against those "priestly" clerics who wished to hide cowardly behind the "Hassan
model" of political quietism while their national sovereignty was slowly handed
over to foreign nations, corporations, and despots. In doing this, Khomeini proved
to his followers inside and outside oflran that he not only had authority based in
the tradition of scholarship and titles, of a marja '-i taqlid, but that he also was the
carrier of prophetic authority based on the people's perception of his actions: that
is to say, the perception those actions conformed to a prophetic pattern established
in the Qur'an and by the exemplary figures oflslam. He would not resign himself
to inter-clerical debates over obscure religious matters while the social and
political realm was deteriorating under the heel of gharbzadegi-stricken monarchs
and intellectuals. To him, it was the right and duty of Muslims, and especially of
Muslim clerics, to engage in the political world, for Prophet Muhammad himself
was not only a man of 'ibada (worship), but a man of social action.
Khomeini led the first major revolution in the twentiethbcentury that
brought together the secular and religious camps in opposition to one single
enemy. Through the influence of Marxist influenced intellectuals such as Jalal Al-i
Ahmad and 'Ali Shari'at� and the appropriation and subsequent Islamization of
their Marxist language, theories and concepts, Khomeini acted as a conduit
between radical urban intellectuals and the religiously-oriented underclass. This
"coalition of dissent," expressed through massive protests, violent demonstrations,
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and low level guerilla warfare, brought the mighty Peacock Throne to its knees,
ending the rule of the Dictatora Coronada. Despite various factions' different
philosophical and theoretical backgrounds, the prophetically charismatic leadership
of Ayatollah Khomeini, coupled with the intense hatred of the Shah, acted as a
glue to hold the factions together to achieve their common purpose, the overthrow
of Muhammad Reza Shah and his government. Khomeini was able to appropriate
the best and most penetrating critiques of the Shah and his "White Revolution",
modernization, and Westernization, into one organically whole critique that could
be was easily accepted by both the secular and religious.
Whatever else is said about Khomeini, whether one wishes to concentrate
on the negative or positive outcomes of the revolution, one must acknowledge the
importance of his leadership and extraordinary achievements in bringing off one of
the most unlikely revolutions of the twentieth-century.
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